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Dissertation Overview
Do successful traders and investors have specific individual characteristics or is their
success merely luck? Recent research showed that mental characteristics influence eco-
nomic outcome of individuals. For example individuals with higher analytical reasoning
skills earn higher wages, have better education and schooling, are in better employment
and occupation situation Cawley et al. (2001), have higher stock market participation
Grinblatt et al. (2011) and show a higher degree of consistency in a number of differ-
ent choice situations (Burks et al., 2009). This cumulative dissertation investigates the
influence of mental characteristics of decision makers in financial markets.
As a starting point, I assume that mental characteristics affect what the decision maker
perceives as desirable, possible or even thinkable while taking the decision (Hoff and Gauri,
2015). Furthermore, I acknowledge the facts that i) humans have to solve complex decision
problems with their limited mental resources and ii) humans behave rationally conditional
on their capabilities or “internal constraints” (Simon, 1955), that is they do the best they
can. Moreover, I focus on decisions in financial markets, since they are complex tasks:
Beside the uncertainty about the future pay-off of the investment, financial markets are
also feedback systems for the expectations of others about the future pay-off (Hommes,
2013). This multi-dimensionality (e.g. time, uncertainty about the realization and about
others expectation) makes financial markets a good application and testing ground for
the influence of mental characteristics on decision making. The mental characteristics
investigated are the following:
First, limitations in the information processing (a.k.a. attention): In a period that de-
clares itself as information age ample information and news to process are an omnipresent
phenomena. For example a Google search query for the company “General Electrics”
generates 920m hits in less than one second, or the Sunday New York Times contains
more factual information in one edition than was available to a reader in all the written
material of the fifteenth century (Davenport and Beck, 2013). But, humans are limited in
their information processing capacities (Kahneman, 1973; Pashler and Sutherland, 1998;
Raymond, 2009). Moreover, psychology distinguishes between active information choices
and affective, stimulus driven attention. Both are driving factors for the attention of a
decision maker and are competing with each other. This rises the the question how do
both aspect affect the allocation of the limited attention resources and what are the effects
3
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for the financial market?
Second, analytical and mentalizing capacities: An investor on financial markets needs
analytical capacities to form an expectation about uncertain outcomes. However, since
the price of the asset is also determined by the expectation of others, the investor needs
to put himself into the shoes of the other market participants, which we call mentalizing,
in order to decode from the price movements the expectations of the others. These are
different types of information that are processed separately. The question is, how do the
capacities to decode each type of information affects the trading behaviour and thus the
market dynamics?
Third, risk-attitude and over-confidence: Since the outcome of an investment on fi-
nancial markets is uncertain, it seems natural to assume that risk-attitudes have an effect
on trading behaviour. From psychological research we also know that decision makers are
over-confident in the valuation of their information (i.e. they over-estimate the quality
of their own information and underestimate the quality of the others (Odean, 1998)).
Given that one cannot process all information and thus makes errors in the expectation
formation, over-confidence might affect the trading behaviour and thus the market as a
whole.
The aspect of information choice and trading behaviour is discussed in a theoretical
framework. The question how analytical and mentalizing capacities affects the invest-
ment decision is first reviewed in a conceptual framework to derive predictions. These
predictions are tested with an experiment, allowing to test for the individual participant
analytical and mentalizing characteristics as well as observe the trading behaviour in an
experimental asset market. Beside analytical and mentalizing capacities and among other
things, participants were also tested for risk-attitudes and over-confidence, serving as a
basis to test for the effects of them.
In the first chapter Active and Passive Information Acquisition: Application to Finan-
cial Markets I present a model that incorporates the trade-off between active information
choice and stimulus driven attention allocation, by assuming that the visibility or salience
of information reduces the effort to gather this information. Thus the visibility of an
information affects the information choice and at the end the investment decision. The
main insights are, first, that a higher visibility of a piece of information increases the
informativeness of the asset price and lowers the risk-premium. Second, an increase in
the visibility of an asset has two contrary effects on the attention allocation: A higher vis-
ibility of asset i makes it relative cheaper to inform oneself about it and this increases the
attention on asset i. However, some of the saved resources are spend on informing oneself
5about other assets, which reduces the attention capacity spend on i. This trade-off leads,
ceteris paribus, to a maximum amount of attention an asset can have due to changes in
visibility. If the visibility increases beyond that point, the attention allocated to the asset
decreases. However, the precision with which the information will be extracted continu-
ously increases in the visibility. Finally, the likelihood of an information to be neglected
decreases in the visibility. In addition to the theoretical analysis, I discuss how the dis-
tinction between stimulus and goal driven also affects the empirical investigation.1
In the second chapter Cognitive Capacities, Trading Styles and Experimental Asset
Market Bubbles (which is joint work with Andreas Hefti and Frédéric Schneider) we pro-
pose that observed heterogeneity in asset market trading behaviour is the result of two dis-
tinct, non-convertible cognitive capacities: analytical (“quantitative”) abilities and men-
talizing (“perspective-taking”) abilities. We develop a conceptual framework of these two
cognitive capacities, which yields testable predictions about individual trading behaviour,
revenue distribution and market dynamics: First, individuals will trade most successfully
if and only if they have both capacities. A person who can mentalize well but has poor
analytical capacities will suffer the largest losses. Someone with neither analytical nor
mentalizing capacities, will behave erratically and consequently some trading gains will
be offset by losses on average. Whereas those traders with only analytical capacities will
trade along the fundamental value and thus avoid losses but also miss trading gains. As
a consequence, being endowed with just one dimension does not assure trading success,
but can be highly detrimental to profits. We test these predictions in a laboratory en-
vironment, where we first independently screen subjects’ capacities and then conduct a
standard asset market experiment. We had 20 sessions with 2 experimental asset market
lasting 15 periods and with 16 participants trading with each other. The expected value
in the asset market starts at 360 Rappen and declines by 24 Rappen in each subsequent
period. Usually the market price stays above the expected value and crashes towards
the end of the experiment. We find individual trading gains and patterns to be strongly
consistent with the hypothesis. Moreover, we observe that participants being endowed
with both capacities start to sell their assets before the peak of the bubble and initiate
the crash of the market price. Finally, markets with on average higher analytical capac-
ities trade closer to the expected value, while markets with on average lower analytical
capacities trade on higher prices. There is no effect for the average mentalizing capacity
in the market. The results suggest that one dimensional measures for strategic sophisti-
1Many empirical approaches to measure attention for a specific stock, use appearance of this company
in the news (e.g. by counting the number of newspaper articles the stock is mentioned). While this is a
good proxy for the stimulus part of attention it does ignore the goal driven aspect. A good proxy for the
active information acquisition are real effort tasks (e.g. number of Google search queries, or tweets).
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cation abilities, such as the beauty contest, neglect a large portion of the variation. The
conceptual framework and the screening method could be applied to other (economic)
decision situations and games in order to explain observed heterogeneous behaviour. The
findings are also relevant on firm-level policies to select successful traders or on macro-
level analysis to understand sources for the dynamics during asset bubbles.
In the third chapter Re-examining the effects of risk attitude and over-confidence on
trading behaviour within experimental asset markets I use the date of the 40 experimental
asset market to re-examine the role of risk-aversion and relative over-confidence in experi-
mental asset markets. The existing experimental literature examining either risk-aversion
or over-confidence relies on small numbers of participants, markets or both; the studies
changed the size, the length of the markets or the incentive scheme, leading to even fewer
observations per treatment. Risk-aversion was tested by giving participants 20 choices
between a certain outcome and a risky lottery (Holt and Laury, 2002) and self-reported
questions on their everyday risk-attitude. Relative over-confidence was measured by ask-
ing people about their relative performance to other participants in an IQ-Test. There
are three general observations for risk-aversion measures: (1) First, for the first period,
the only weakly significant effect we found is that participant with less self-reported risk-
aversion in financial decision making offer more assets to buy. This is not a strong support
for the view that the market price usually starts below the expected value in experimental
asset markets. (2) The predictions about the role of risk-aversion of the standard noisy
rational expectation framework can be mainly confirmed: (a) The more risk-averse par-
ticipants are, the less they will trade. (b) However, on the aggregated level, there is no
correlation between the trading volume and the average risk-aversion in the market. (c)
The less risk-averse participants are in a market, the closer they trade on the declining
fundamental value. Most of the effects found over all periods are small, (weakly) signif-
icant and mainly driven by the final periods. (3) Finally, comparing the risk-aversion
measured by the Holt-Laury lottery task and the self-reported questions, the latter show
more often correlation with individual trading behaviour and market outcomes over the
whole asset market. On the individual level, the only (weakly) significant effects of rel-
ative over-confidence are: Relatively over-confident participants offer more assets to sell
after the peak of the bubble. Markets with, on average, higher relative over-confident
participants, tend to have a higher trading volume, which is particular large once the
bubble burst; these markets trade on higher market prices, in particular, around the peak
of the bubble. While the former confirms the theoretical predictions, the latter does not.
Both trader characteristics are not pay-off relevant. Together with the weakly significant
and small effect size of these trader characteristics, this casts doubt on the explanatory
7power of these characteristics.
Taking a broader perspective it is not unreasonable to claim, that people fail at de-
cision making from time to time at considerable costs(Ariely, 2015). For more than half
a century a large body of research literature documents empirical evidence of deviations
from the rational choice model2 in economics.34 This dissertation adds to this literature
by assuming that mental characteristics of the decision makers lead to systematic devia-
tions from the rational choice model. These concepts are applied and tested by decision
making in financial market as a complex environment for decision makers. I suggest an
approach to model the allocation of limited information processing resources. This model
is based on psychological evidence that the allocation of attention is influenced by ex-
ternal stimulus parts as well as by goal driven information acquisition. Furthermore, I
investigated together with Andreas Hefti and Frédéric Schneider how the heterogeneity in
the ability to process analytical and social information affects trading behaviour, success
in the asset market and the market outcome itself. Finally, I carried out a re-examination
on how risk-attitudes and over-confidence affects the trading behaviour and asset market
outcome. While in the (theoretical) literature both trader characteristics are seen as im-
portant, the results of my investigation give only weak support for this view. In sum, this
dissertation is only a small part of a broader research agenda for economists.5
The structure of the dissertation is as follows: The three papers are found in Part II
and the respective appendices are provided in Part III. Part IV contains the bibliography
and Part V presents my curriculum vitae.
2E.g. Lucas (1972).
3Kahneman and Tversky (1979); Simon (1955) and Thaler (1980) are probably the most known pi-
oneers in this field. See Conlisk (1996); Rabin (1998) and DellaVigna (2009) for an overview on this
literature.
4The rational choice model is a powerful and useful approach, but it ignores human cognition and
motivation and thus simplifies the social and cognitive influences on behaviour(Hoff and Gauri, 2015).
5The results so far affect also the question of welfare-analysis and thus policy recommendation aiming
at maximizing the actual well-being (Chetty, 2015; Hoff and Gauri, 2015). The observed behaviour of the
actual humans often generates differences in the experienced utility of the decision maker (i.e. the the
actual well-being) and the utility while making the decision (i.e. the objective the decision maker wants
to maximize) (Chetty, 2015). Therefore, the deviations from the rational choice model have implications
for economic theory to come up with models yielding better predictions about effects of existing policies,
as well as the policy tools themselves, by changing default options or framing the incentives (Chetty,
2015). From a pragmatic perspective incorporating behavioural economics into the analysis should be
interpreted as a progression of the rational choice model, rather than a defeat(Chetty, 2015).
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Part II
Research Papers
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1 Active and Passive Information Acquisition:
Application to Financial Markets
1.1 Introduction
A large fraction of the workforce in modern economies is occupied with acquiring, pro-
cessing and synthesizing information as foundations of decision making (Veldkamp, 2011).
This paper deals with the acquisition and processing of information as a cognitive process
with limited resources driven by the interest in the information provided (goal-driven)
and the accessibility or visibility of the information (stimulus-driven). In this manuscript,
first I suggest how to model both aspects of information processing and then I apply it
to a simple theoretical models of asset markets.
Consider the case of an investor receiving the information needed through his Bloomberg
terminal, a provider for financial news and data. Since the space on the screen is limited
not all information can be displayed on the screen. Each terminal is personalized to a
certain degree for the specific needs of the user. The investor now has to decide which
information channel she displays on her screen in a specific size, before she will receive
any information at all. It is reasonable that this decision is linked to the set of assets she
wants to trade and how uncertain the returns to these assets are in general. A bond with
AAA-rating might be less uncertain then a small currency of an emerging economy, mak-
ing the investor probably to allocate more space on the screen of the Bloomberg terminal
to the currency. However, there exists also market wide or global news, which are edited
by an editorial board. These global news run through a ticker or special global/market
news segment of the screen, highlighting the information displayed there. The decision on
this news is thus an external stimulus for the investor, which is not part of her decision
which news she wants to track.
The decision situation to the investor personalizing the limited space on the screen of
her Bloomberg terminal reflects evidences from psychology which differentiates the usage
of the limited attention capacities (Kahneman, 1973; Pashler and Sutherland, 1998; Ray-
mond, 2009) into an active, goal driven and passive, stimulus driven part.1 The active
1To experience both effects, watch the video "Test Your Awareness: Do The Test" produced by Trans-
port of London as a cycling safety advert: http://tinyurl.com/3g3q2jd
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attention seems to be common sense, considering oneself behaviour by listening to a cer-
tain speaker in a noisy environment the listener turns actively the ear towards the speaker
in order to get more information. Beside such introspective deliberations studies show
that attention can be focused depending on the task (Shaw and Shaw, 1977). While the
active part of attention seems natural, the passive or stimulus driven part is mostly un-
derestimated. However, there is a myriad of evidence that in most everyday decision this
part is faster and the most influential (Yantis, 1998). An example of attention scarcity is
the number of items under consideration before a purchasing decision varying between two
to six items, independent of the grand set of items (Hauser and Wernerfelt, 1990). Mozer
and Sitton (1998) report that the respond time in a visual detection task is flat if there
are few objects on the screen, but if the number of objects exceeds a certain threshold
the respond time increases exponential with the number of visualized objects. While the
number of considered alternatives shows little variation the content of this consideration
set does and depends mainly on relative visibility, i.e. motion, color or luminance of an
object matters relative to the local or also global environment of it (Nothdurft, 2000).
The accentuation or spotlight effect enhances the mental processing of the object by the
receiver (Maunsell and Treue, 2006).2 These patterns do also influence decision making
on financial markets and influences the aggregate behaviour of markets.3 These empirical
finding can be conceptualized by the distinction of an information poor and information
rich environment (Falkinger, 2007). Only if there is a “wealth of information”, attention
becomes a “scarce resource” (Simon, 1955) and thus has implication for decision mak-
ing. The exploitation of attention capacities as a scarce resource is influenced by active
choice and by visibility, which should be recognized in models dealing with information
processing.
2With clear behavioural consequences, e.g. the primacy phenomena that has been observed many
times on the internet. Web pages that appear higher on the search engine results list have a higher
likelihood to be visited (Drèze and Zufryden, 2004). Another example are price listing sites, a company
has an increase of 60% of clicks, when the offer is the lowest at such a price listing site (Baye et al.,
2009). Or that sales reduces by 83% if a company moves from the first to seventh place in the pricing
list (Ellison and Ellison, 2009).
3Jacobs and Hillert (2014) report the primacy effect for investment funds with a name at the beginning
of the alphabet generating c.p. 0.16% higher money inflows per month, stocks are traded up to 16% more
often at more then 10% lower costs compared to the last quarter of firms in an alphabetic order. Beside
liquidity, the breadth of ownership, valuation, analyst coverage and local media coverage is larger for a
stock earlier in the alphabet. The primacy effect also applies to stock exchanges where the stocks are
sorted by a numerical codes, like Japan (Jacobs and Hillert, 2014). Complementing this is the excessive
co-movement of stocks in returns, trading volume and volatility with similar ticker symbols (Rashes,
2001), the dotcom effect (Cooper et al., 2001) a stock enjoyed during the dotcom bubble by an abnormal
increase in its price after it announced to change the name into internet related dotcom name. Moreover,
easy remembered and short names of stocks attract more investors, have a higher turnover and firm value
as well as lower transaction price impact due to the higher liquidity (Green and Jame, 2013). One can
also look whether information has been ignored in asset pricing.
Chapter 1 13
While rational expectation as standard approach in economic theory assumes that all
information is available, this concept might have difficulties to incorporate the insights
from psychology on attention and thus to capture the decision problem of an investor as
described above; even with rational inattention (Reis, 2006; Sims, 1998) the most widely
used deviation in attention economics, one cannot capture all aspects, since these model
do assume that all signals come along with the same accessibility or visibility.4 Other
limited attention approaches such as Falkinger (2007, 2008) and Hefti (2011) focus more
on modelling the stimulus aspect of attention. For example Falkinger (2007) assumes in
a sender-receiver model that each information has to be sent at a certain volume in order
to be recognized, if the corresponding volume is to low, the receiver will not take notice
of the information.5 Applying this logic to the above mentioned example one could han-
dle the effects of information being made externally more salient, but could not capture
the decision on how to allocate the space on the screen, since it has the drawback that
the investor remains passive when it comes to information choice. But especially in the
context of asset pricing it is plausible to assume partially active information gathering by
the investor.
In this paper I start from the notion that first of all processing information is costly;
second, every human has limited cognitive capacities that can be spent on processing
information. The utilization of the capacities depends on the one hand on a choice (e.g.
which information channel the investor watches on the screen at which size), and on the
other hand by factors external to the decision maker (e.g. which information is placed
more prominently on the global or market wide information channels). Furthermore I
conjecture that a higher salience reduces the required effort to process the information.
More specifically, I follow Woodford (2008) who argues that the entropy cost-function
(Sims, 1998) is to flexible to explain attention specific outcomes extend the entropy based
cost-function with a visibility parameter which reduces the cognitive processing costs.
4Rational information choice helps to explain phenomena such under-diversification (Van Nieuwer-
burgh and Veldkamp, 2009); category-learning of investors (Peng and Xiong, 2006); excess co-movement
in asset prices of seemingly unrelated assets and investors home bias (Mondria, 2010); the information
choice itself is subject to the underlying decision problem (Hellwig and Veldkamp, 2009), e.g. if one wants
to buy an asset the strategies are such that the investor wants to act similar to the other participants,
thus the investor wants also to know what the others are knowing. This questions relevance of uniqueness
results in the global game literature, once one allows information choice. Caplin and Dean (2013) test
rational inattention theories against stochastic choice models within an laboratory experiment. The for-
mer does a qualitatively better job of matching this data, since stochastic choice models ignore the link
between incentives and attention. Hellwig et al. (2012) study the impact of different information choice
technology within a coordination game framework.
5His focus is on the “production” of salience in the competition of senders for attention and on the
equilibrium diversity of perceived information sources. A more detailed literature overview on stimulus-
and goal-driven attention can be found in Hefti and Heinke (2015).
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Thus both choice and stimulus influence the information processing process and therefore
the decision made.
Compared to standard entropy based cost-function, the main insights are that a higher
visibility of a piece of information lead to a higher informativeness of the market price
and a lower risk-premium. The likelihood of an information channel not to be followed
decreases with accessibility of the information. An increase in the visibility of an asset
has two contrary effects on the attention allocation.6 On the one hand more visibility
of asset i eases the information extraction for it, thus it makes it relative cheaper to
inform oneself about it and this increases the attention on asset i. On the other hand,
one can spend some of the saved resources on informing oneself about other assets, which
reduces the attention capacity spend on i. This trade-off leads, ceteris paribus, to an
maximum amount of attention an asset can have due to changes in visibility. If the
visibility increases beyond the point of the maximum attention, the attention allocated
to the asset will decrease. However, the precision with which the information will be
extracted continuously increases in the visibility.
In the remaining manuscript, I first introduce the information environment, the learn-
ing problem and the modelling of the information processing in section 1.2. Then I
continue with the application to a simple asset pricing framework in section 1.3. The
manuscript concludes with a discussion on the implications of the results for measuring
attention and testing for attention effects as well as real world implications in section 1.4.
1.2 Information Environment and Learning Problem
This section introduces the information environment and discusses the learning problem,
which are both essential to the attention allocation decision. Taking an abstract view on
an investor, r, the basic decision of her is to choose the amount q of an asset she wants to
hold. The asset itself pays out a stochastic dividend d˜∗ with expectation E[d˜∗] = µ∗ and
variance var[d˜∗] = σ∗. Since the investor r does not observe the true dividend process d˜∗
the investment decision q will be based on r’s belief d˜r of the true process d˜∗. Starting
from the premises, that the investor is also a receiver of informative signals about d˜∗, this
section takes a closer look on the sender - receiver interaction in order to understand what
produces the belief d˜r.
Sender s distributes an information d˜s about the true process d˜∗. The sender s can de-
cide with which visibility v ∈ R+ the information d˜s will be distributed, in the Bloomberg
terminal example this is the decision by the Bloomberg editors whether an information
6Similar to the income and substitution effects in a households budget allocation.
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is placed on the general global, market level or firm specific news-flow. Additionally the
sender s sets the precision τs of the news, which finds its equivalent in the quality or
clarity of the information.7 More technically the sender-precision τs works as a filter of
the noise involved in the reporting process. Thus one can formalize the information the
sender s reports about the true process d˜∗, as:
d˜s = d˜∗ + s
τs
, (1.1)
with s ∼ N(0, 1) as an exogenous noise process and uncorrelated with the true process
d˜∗. Consequently the variance of the information var[d˜s] distributed by the sender s is
given by:
var[d˜s] = σ∗2 + 1
τ 2s
≡ σ2s . (1.2)
In sum the send s distributes the information on the asset of interest as a package con-
sisting of the tupel {d˜s, v}.
Receiver r observes the tupel {d˜s, v}. The reciever r is a Bayesian agent and holds an
unbiased beliefs about the stochastic processes behind the dividend and the information
distributed by the sender s. These beliefs equal the true processes (i.e., her a prior beliefs
are µ∗, σ∗ and τs). In terms of the introductory Bloomberg terminal example, this means
that she has knowledge about the quality or precision of the average news distributed
through the Bloomberg network and the average dividend she can expect from it as well
as its volatility. While reading the Bloomberg news she extracts information about the
amount of dividend she can expect in the current period by owning the asset. Formally,
she receives a noisy signal d˜r upon the information d˜s:
d˜r = d˜s + r
τr
(1.3)
where r ∼ N(0, 1) as an exogenous noise process and independent of s and d˜∗. The
precision of r’s information extracting depends on r’s attention allocation (see below).
The variance of receiver r’s signal is given by:
var[d˜r] = σ∗2 + 1
τ 2s
+ 1
τ 2r
≡ σ2r . (1.4)
The precision τr with which receiver r filters the noise depends on r’s screen space
allocated to the specific news flow. Since more screen space goes along with more detailed
7Note that d˜∗ and v are the choices of the sender s. However the remaining analysis focuses on the
decision of the receiver, thus for the sake of simplicity d˜∗ and v will be treated as set by the sender
without discussing the details of the decision problem of the sender.
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information, headline vs. abstract, I assume that the precision τr is determined by the
effort I r spends on extracting information from d˜s. This represents the active, goal-driven
choice of attention. The visibility v reduces the required effort I to extract information
from d˜s with precision τr, representing the stimulus driven attention allocation. Moreover,
I assume that the sender precision τs decreases the effort to extract information out of
sender’s information. In sum, the the effort I represents the cost-of-producing τr, with the
following specification satisfying these assumptions:8
I
(
τr, v, τ
2
s
)
= 12v log2
(
1
1−R2sr
)
= 12v log2
(
σ2r
σ2r − σ2s
)
(1.5)
with the correlation coefficient Rsr = Cov(d˜
s,d˜r)
σsσr
= σs√
σ∗2+ 1
τ2s
+ 1
τ2r
. The suggested specification
is a slight modified version of the core of used by the rational inattention literature
motivated by Sims (1998), by multiplying the mutual information function,12 log2
(
1
1−R2sr
)
,
with 1/v.9 Note that the effort to extract information becomes infinitely large, I → ∞,
if the sent information becomes barely visible, v → 0, or the receiver r wishes to extract
the information with enormously high precision, τr → ∞.10 On the other side if the
information becomes very salient, v →∞, or the receiver extracts the information with a
low precision τr → 0, implying Rsr → 0, the effort cost to process this information tends
towards zero I→ 0.
The notion of attention as a limited resource is modelled by assuming an upper-bound,
κ, on the effort the agent actually can conduct by informing himself:
I
(
τr, v, τ
2
s
)
≤ κ (1.6)
One can interpret κ as the overall space available on the screen of the Bloomberg terminal.
1.3 Application to the financial market
This section applies the information processing described above to the underlying invest-
ment decision problem11 Consider a two period economy with one investor acting as a
price taker and one risky asset. The investor has an initial endowment e ∈ R+ she can
either spend on consumption today or buy shares of the asset and use the stochastic
dividend d˜∗t+1 per share for consumption in the second period. First, the simplest one
8Of course there are other specifications conceivable (e.g. an additive one).
9For details see appendix A.1.
10Since the correlation Rsr → 1.
11A version of (Biais et al., 2010).
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asset case will be discussed in detail to introduce the environment and look at some basic
mechanics of this model. In a second step the multiple asset case will be analysed.
The timing of events is summarized in figure 1.1. The decision making is a two period
asset investment problem, with the first period, t, as the investment period and the second
period, t + 1, as realization period. At first the sender s decides on the visibility v and
precision τs with which she wants to inform about the dividend process d˜∗t+1.12 Then the
investor r decides with how much effort she will extract the information from the signal
d˜st , thus she decides about the precision τr with which she follows the news-flow on her
screen. Subsequently nature N draws the white noise errors s,t and r,t. With the signal
about the dividend process d˜r at hand the investor chooses the amount of her endowment
e ∈ R+ she wants either to consume in the current period, ct, or invest into the asset,
yielding the dividend dt+1 in the second period financing the consumption ct+1. Thus she
decides in period t upon the amount qtpt = e− ct she wants to invest into the asset with
qt as the quantity she wants to hold and pt as the price of the asset. The price for the
asset is such, that the market clears. Note that once the investor received her signal d˜rt ,
the uncertainty arises only in period t+ 1 due to the unknown dividend realization.
s
v
τs
r
τr
N
s,t
r,t
r
qt
pt
r
ct
N
d∗t+1
r
ct+1
t t+1
Figure 1.1: Timing of Events
In sum the investor r makes two decisions in the period t, first how precise she wants
to extract the information and secondly her investment decision. Since this is a two stage
decision problem allows to solve the problem by backward induction. Starting from the
last decision to make, the investor solves for the optimal asset allocation given any signal
d˜rt (τr), which is informative is but noisy about the dividend realization d˜∗t+1, and the
budget constraints for both periods.
arg max
qt
E
[
U(ct) + βU(ct+1) d˜rt (τr)
]
s.t.
ct = e− qtpt
ct+1 = qtd˜t+1
12Since the focus is on the investors allocation of information processing resources, visibility v and
precision τs are treated as exogenous.
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Following Biais et al. (2010) and I assume mean-variance preferences, E (Ut(ct)) = E(ct)−
ρ
2V ar(ct) and E
(
Ut(ct) d˜rt (τr)
)
= E(ct d˜rt (τr)) − ρ2V ar(ct d˜rt (τr)) with ρ ∈ [0, 1] as the
risk-aversion parameter, allows for a tractable solution to the above described problem.13
Since there is only one investor in this economy for all shares, with out loss of generality one
can normalize the number of shares to one. Together with the market clearing condition
one can derive the equilibrium of the investment decision, in which the investor holds
all assets, qoptt = 1, at the price given by equation 1.12, which I will discuss later.14
The optimal solved asset allocation problem can be summarized by the following value
function:
V (d˜r(τr)) = e− pt + β
(
E
[
d˜∗t+1 d˜
r(τr)
]
− ρ2V ar
(
d˜∗t+1 d˜
r(τr)
))
Note two things: First, the quantity, qt, does not appear, since in the equilibrium of
the investment decision the investor will hold all assets and thus qoptt = 1. Second, even
though there exists an equilibrium price function, the investor takes the price as given and
does not consider any effects of her decision on the market price. Therefore she handles
pt exogenous to her decisions.
Using this ease of notation one can turn attention towards solving, the attention
decision of the investor choosing the precision with which she wants to extract information.
Thus she solves for the optimal attention allocation taking into account the expected
valuation given the investment problem will be solved optimally:
max
τr
V (d˜r(τr)) (1.7)
s.t.
I (τr, v, σs) ≤ κ (1.8)
The constraint on information processing effort 1.8 is more interesting in the multi-asset
case, however in order to understand the main mechanisms at work I will first continue
with the single asset case. The attention allocation can be simplified when one recognizes,
that the value function, V (d˜r(τr)), declines with the variance of d˜r(τr) and that the
expectation of d˜∗ is invariant with respect to τr. Thus the investor wants the variance
of the signal d˜r(τr) to be as small as possible. Giving some intuition for this: Assume
that the investor r made her optimal consumption choice for any signal d˜r, she maximizes
her utility by minimizing the variance in the expected consumption choosing a higher
precision τr with which she filters the information about the expected dividend. Thus in
13See Mondria (2010) p.1842 and Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) p.782 on a detailed discussion
about the implications for the investment decision of mean-variance preferences.
14See appendix A.2 for details of the derivation of this equilibrium.
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order to solve the attention allocation problem, equation 1.7, it is enough to minimize the
uncertainty due to the variance of the signal d˜r. Thus the attention allocation problem
stated in equations 1.7 and 1.8 boils down to
min
τr
V ar[d˜rt (τr)] (1.9)
s.t.
I (τr, v, σs) ≤ κ (1.10)
According to equation 1.4, the variance of d˜rt (τr) decreases in the precision of the informa-
tion extraction τr and the effort of producing this precision, equation 1.10 also increases
with τr. Consequently an optimal precision goes along with a binding effort constraint1.10.
Thus by construction the optimal attention allocation in the single asset case is a function
τr (v, σs, κ) implicitly defined by
I (τr, v, σs) = κ. (1.11)
It has the following properties: First, ∂τr
∂κ
> 0, a relaxation of the effort constraint increases
the precision of information extraction τr, i.e. the more resources are available, the higher
will be the precision of the extracted information. In terms of the Bloomberg terminal
this means, the larger the screen size of investor r the more space she can allocate to
a single news-flow and thus can filter more noise improving the precision of her beliefs.
Second, ∂τr
∂τs
> 0, if the sent information is less precise, the investor can extract with the
same effort only information with a lower precision. Third, ∂τr
∂σ∗2 < 0, if the variance of the
dividend of interest σ∗2 increases, the investor’s extract information at a lower precision
rate. Fourth, ∂τr
∂v
> 0, the higher the salience of the information sent by the sender, the
more precise will be the extracted information, which is fairly intuitive as the investor
spends less effort in searching the information rather then reading the news and extracting
the information she is looking for.
While the first three properties could be easily replicated with a standard rational
inattention approach (e.g., Mondria (2010); Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009));
the fourth property is the new aspect of salience of information added to the rational
inattention framework.
Turning attention towards the asset price, one has to go back to the equilibrium of
the investment decision with the equilibrium asset price:15
peqt = β
 1τ2r
σ2s + 1τ2r
µ+ σ
2
s
σ2s + 1τ2r
(
d˜∗t+1 +
st+1
τs
+ 
r
t
τr
)
− ρσ2s
(
1−R2
) (1.12)
15See appendix A.2 for details how to derive the market price.
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An increase in the investor’s information extraction precision τr has two effects. At
first, the re-activity on the signal, γ = σ2s
σ2s+ 1τ2r
, becomes stronger the higher the precision
τr is. The Bayesian rational behind is, that the investor trades-off the prior, the average
expected dividend µ, against the newly received information d˜r; the higher the precision
in the information extraction the trustworthy the received information will be and thus
the more weight will be put on it by the investor r. Therefore the price itself becomes
more informative, which can be seen from the conditional variance about the realization of
the dividend d˜t+1 once the price p has been announced, Σ1 = V ar
(
d˜ p
)
, decreases in the
precision τr.16 Implying that a higher precision goes a long with less uncertainty about the
dividend once the price has been observed. Secondly, the risk-premium, σ2s
(
1− σ2s
σ2s+ 1τ2r
)
,
decreases in the precision τr. A higher precision τr in the information extraction implies
a reduced uncertainty about the dividend, which makes the investor r demand less com-
pensation for holding a risky asset, leading to a higher price-level, ceteris paribus. The
following proposition summarizes the analysis from above.
Proposition 1.1. A higher information processing constraint κ and/or a higher visibility
v of the information, increases the information contained in the market price and reduces
the risk-premium, increasing the level of prices.
Proof. See main text. 
1.3.1 Multi Asset Case
Before continuing with studying the attention allocation among multiple assets, the (in-
formational) environment and the attention-effort function have to be adjusted for the
case of multiple assets. For simplicity, I assume there are I assets with independent and
uncorrelated dividend streams. For each asset i ∈ I the sender sends one piece of informa-
tion d˜si = d˜∗i +
si
τsi
, where si ∼ N(0, 1) is an exogenous white noise process. Thus similar to
the single-asset case one can summarize the variance of the information i by, var[d˜si ] = σsi .
I summarize all information send in the vector d˜s = [d˜s1, ..., d˜sI ]′ and their variances in the
respective vector σs = [σs1, ..., σsI ]′.17 Since information i ∈ I is distributed with the visi-
bility vi, the respective visibility parameters are collected in the vector v = [v1, ..., vI ]′.
The investor r has to decide how precise she will process every incoming information,
from this information processing she receives for asset i the noisy signal d˜ri = d˜si +
ri
τri
with ri ∼ N(0, 1) as an exogenous noise process and τ ri as the precision of r′s information
extracting from the senders information d˜si . Collecting all signals from the investor in
16See appendix A.3 for detailed derivation.
17The vector of the respective covariances of the signal is zero.
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the vector d˜r = [d˜r1, ..., d˜rI ]′ and the precision with which she extracts the information
from the sender by the vector τ r = [τ r1 , ..., τ rI ]′. Since the dividend streams of the assets
are independent, I assume independence in the effort to extract the information for each
asset:
I(τ r,v, τ s) =
I∑
i=1
I(τ ri , vi, τ si )︸ ︷︷ ︸
κi
(1.13)
With κi being the effort to extract information about asset i and can be interpreted as the
attention allocated on asset i and it must hold that ∑Ii=1 κi ≤ κ. For analytic tractability
I assume the same timing of events and mean-variance preferences as in the single asset
case. Thus the asset allocation problem is:
arg max
qt
ct + β
(
E
[
ct+1
∣∣∣d˜r(τ r)]− ρ2V ar
(
ct+1
∣∣∣d˜r(τ r))) (1.14)
s.t.
ct = e− q′tpt (1.15)
ct+1 = q
′
td˜t+1 (1.16)
where qt = [q1,t, ..., qI,t]′ is the vector of quantities hold of each asset and pt = [p1,t, ..., pI,t]′
is the price vector for each asset. Note that all uncertainty arises in the second period,
thus there will be no variance of consumption in t. In equilibrium of the asset allocation
the prices are such that all shares of the assets are hold by the investor. The result of the
optimal asset allocation can be summarized in the value function
V (d˜r(τ r)) = e− pt + β
(
E
[
d˜t+1
∣∣∣d˜r(τ r)]− ρ2V ar
(
d˜t+1
∣∣∣d˜r(τ r))) (1.17)
Thus, the attention allocation reads:
max
τ r
V (d˜r(τ r)) (1.18)
s.t.
I(τ r,v, τ s) ≤ κ (1.19)
Lemma 1.1. The attention allocation maxτ r V (d˜
r(τ r)) is equivalent to
minτ rV ar
(
d˜t+1 d˜
r(τ r)
)
(1.20)
Proof: See Appendix A.4
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Applying Lemma 1.1 the solution to the attention allocation problem is then:
IRi
IRj
=
σ2i,s
σ2j,s
Ri
Rj
, (1.21)
Ri = σi,s√
σ2i,s+
1
τ2
i,r
is the correlation between the information distributed by sender s on asset
i and information extracted by the investor r. In equilibrium the relative marginal effort
cost equals the relative correlation of the information the investor extracts from the sender
news adjusted by the variance with which the news is sent. In order to get some more
details I will now use the specification of the attention effort cost function introduced in
equation 1.13, then 1.21 becomes:
(
1−R2j
1−R2i
)2
vj
vi
=
σ2i,s
σ2j,s
(1.22)
Solving this equation for Rj and plugging it back into the attention effort constraint 1.19
one can determine the correlation Roptj corresponding to the optimal attention allocation.
Substituting Roptj into κj = 12v log2
1
1−R2j
we get for the optimal effort allocation:18
κopti =
1
ln 4
1
1 +∑Ij 6=i
j=0
vi
vj
κ ln 4 + I∑
j 6=i
j=0
(
1
vj
ln σi,s
σj,s
+ 12vj
ln vi
vj
) (1.23)
τ 2opti,r =
1
σ2i,s

4κ I∏
j 6=i
j=0
(
σi,s
σj,s
√
vi
vj
) 1
vj

1
1
vi
+
∑I
j 6=i
j=0
1
vj
− 1
 (1.24)
Thus in the multi-asset case, the attention allocation does not only depend on the in-
dividual characteristics of the asset itself and of the quality of the news with which the
information are send about the asset; it is also influenced by the characteristics of all
other assets (i.e. the relative properties matter.)
Proposition 1.2. The optimal attention capacity κopti spend on asset i and the precision
with which the information is extracted τ 2opti,r depends positively on the overall attention
capacity κ available and negatively on the variance σ2j,s of the signals of other assets j 6= i.
While κopti increases with the variance σ∗2i of the underlying dividend stream and decreases
in the precision τ 2i,s of the news distributed by the sender, the effects in τ
2opt
i,r are ambiguous.
Proof. This follows from the derivatives ∂κ
opt
i
∂κ
> 0, ∂κ
opt
i
∂σj,s
< 0, ∂τ
2opt
i,r
∂κ
> 0, ∂τ
2opt
i,r
∂σ2j,s
< 0,
18See appendix A.5 for a detailed derivation.
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∂κopti
∂σ∗2i
> 0, ∂κ
opt
i
∂τ2i,s
< 0, ∂τ
2opt
i,r
∂σ∗2i
≷ 0 and ∂τ
2opt
i,r
∂τ2i,s
≷ 0. 
Consider a change in the variance of the sender’s signal σ2i,s about asset i, which might
happen due to an change in the variance σ∗2i of the underlying dividend stream of as-
set i or due a change in the noise (i.e., lower precision τ 2i,s) of the news distributed by
the sender. If σ2i,s decreases due to a smaller variance in the dividend stream, the addi-
tional gain to learn something valuable for reducing the overall portfolio variance declines.
Therefore the investors is less interested in spending more attention resources, lower κopti ,
on extracting information about asset i. On the other hand, if σi,s declines due to a
higher precision in the news distributed, the quality of the news distributed is higher and
thus the receiver has to spend less effort herself to extract the desired precision level of
information. In both cases the variance σ2i,s decreases and so the attention κ
opt
i spent on
asset i. If σ2j,s is low19 there is more overall attention capacity left for asset i and thus κ
opt
i
as well as τ 2opti,r increases. These results from proposition 1.2 can also be obtained within
a standard rational inattention approach (Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2010). The
more interesting effects are with respect to the visibility.
The salience vi with which the information is sent has two contrary effects on asset
i 6= j’s optimal attention allocation κopti , as can be seen from the derivative:20
∂κopti
∂vi
= 1
1 +∑Ij 6=i
j=0
vi
vj
( 1
2ln4
1
vi
− κopti
) I∑
j 6=i
j=0
1
2vj
(1.25)
Recall that κopti is asset i’s fraction of the overall attention capacity κ and a change in the
visibility vi reduces the effort to extract the information. If the visibility vi increases each
bit of information becomes relative cheaper and these lower effort costs makes it attractive
for the investor r to substitute more of her overall attention capacities towards informing
herself about asset i.21 However, due to a higher visibility vi the investor can achieve
the same precision τ 2opti with less resources, thus the lower effort needed is distributed
partially among all other assets.22
Proposition 1.3. There exists a v∗i at which the investor’s attention for asset i is the
highest κopti (v∗i ) = arg maxvi κ
opt
i , which is decreasing in the overall attention capacity κ
and the variance of the news σ2i,s from the sender s about asset i. An increase in the
19Which might happen, due to similar reasons as for σi,s.
20See appendix A.6 for details of the derivation.
21This is similar to the substitution effect when prices change in a consumers expenditure problem.
22Similar to the income effect in the consumers expenditure problem.
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variance σj,s of the information send about asset j increases v∗i . However, the precision
with which the information is extracted τ 2opti,r increases continuously in vi
Proof. See appendix A.5. 
To grasp some intuition behind, consider the Bloomberg terminal, where the decision
maker has only a certain amount of space to display all relevant information for the
investment decision in the assets. Thus in general a larger size for the news-flow about
asset i, makes the information after reading the news more precise (i.e. increases in τi,r).
However, while a better location, let’s say from the stock specific level to the market
news-ticker increases the overall reading time for the information on asset i (i.e., increase
in κopti ) there will be a point, when an increase in the visibility (e.g. from the market to
the global news-flow) does no longer increase the reading time. To the contrary, it will
decrease κopti , since the information is so easy accessible, that the remaining reading time
is better invested in informing about the other assets. This means that there is in optimal
visibility, v∗i , for each piece of information dependent on the underlying parameters (i.e.,
v∗i (κ, σ21,s, ..., σ2I,s, vj)). If the investor has less time to read the news, lower κ, the attention
maximizing visibility increases and thus a better placement of the article influences the
overall reading time spend on this article more than before.23
A similar effect on the attention maximizing visibility v∗i as a decrease in κ has an increase
in the variance of signal σi,s.24 Furthermore an increase in the visibility of the piece of
information has less impact on the reading time spend for asset i when the variance of
the signal becomes larger at the same time 25 and therefore the attention maximizing
visibility is reached earlier. An increase in the variance σj,s of the information sent about
asset j increases the attention maximizing visibility, v∗i since there is more to learn about
asset j dividend and thus there is a substitution away from attention on asset i towards
asset j, leading to less capacities left over for i and therefore having the same effect as a
decrease in κ.
The time spend to inform oneself about asset i depends on the overall visibility of
the other assets, vj, in an ambiguous relationship.26 As discussed in the case of asset i
starting from almost invisible pieces of information vj close to zero, an increase in vj will
lead to a substitution of attention capacities towards asset j, leading to a decrease in the
resources left for all other assets. However, after a certain point the information is so
visible that the attention spend on it does not increase with a higher visibility, more the
23Which follows from ∂v
∗
i
∂κ < 0.
24Which might happen due to either an increase in the variance of the underlying dividend or a decrease
in the precision of the newspaper article.
25Which can be seen from the cross-derivative ∂κ
opt
i
∂vi∂σi,s
< 0
26 ∂v∗i
∂vj
≥ 0 iff σ
2
i,s
σ2
j,s
≥ vjv∗
i
and ∂v
∗
i
∂vj
< 0 iff σ
2
i,s
σ2
j,s
<
vj
v∗
i
.
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contrary happens, since the effort becomes less to extract information about asset j more
attention capacities are left over for all other assets, thus the time spend to inform oneself
about asset i increases after this point.27
Proposition 1.4. The news-flow about asset i will be neglected, κi = 0, if
4κ ≤
I∏
j 6=i
j=0
(
σj,s
σi,s
√
vj
vi
) 1
vj
.28 (1.26)
The likelihood, to fall under the threshold 1.26 increases with a lower overall attention
resources κ, a larger the number of assets I covered by the investor’s portfolio, a smaller
variance of the news, σ2i,s, about in relation to σ2j,s, smaller visibility vi or the more is
to learn about the other assets σ2j,s. If
σ2i,s
σ2j,s
vi > vj holds, an increase in the visibility of
information on j increases the likelihood of an neglected news-flow of asset i. The opposite
holds true for σ
2
i,s
σ2j,s
vi < vj.
Proof. See Appendix A.8. 
An intuition to proposition 1.4 is that some news-flows might be neglected, dependent
how large the processing capacities are and how much news-flow the investor has to track.
If some assets are less volatile than the other assets and thus the gain is smaller in terms
of reducing the conditional variance once the investor spent effort on informing himself,
the higher is the likelihood to ignore these assets. This is the result of the goal-direct part
of the attention allocation process and one could obtain similar results using the standard
rational inattention approach (Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2010). However, if the
visibility of the news is still small enough, an increase in the visibility of the news-flow,
leads to higher attention-capacity spend on this news-flow. There is also a relative effect,
since an increase in the visibility of other assets j up to a certain point (i.e., σ2j,s. If
σ2i,s
σ2j,s
vi > vj) increases the likelihood for asset i to be neglected. Thus the sender choice of
the visibility can influence which news-flow gets neglected or not, reflecting the stimulus
driven part of the attention allocation process.29
27See Appendix A.7 for the derivatives.
29While in this manuscript the sender remains passive, evaluating δκ
opt
i
δvi
gives intuition for consequences
for sender behaviour discussed e.g. (Falkinger, 2007; Hefti, 2011), with senders competing to draw
attention on their news or being neglected. In these models the competition among attention usually
works by aiming to achieve a relative salience strong enough to pass a hurdle in the attention perception
of the receiver.
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1.4 Discussion on measuring attention
Several approaches try to measure attention, one can classify these measures following the
distinction of active and passive information choice: Media coverage is an intuitive and
practicable proxy for stimulus driven attention, since the fact that a news appears in the
media is a decision made by the distributors. Higher media coverage of a share correlate
high abnormal trading volumes and extreme one-day returns (Barber and Odean, 2008;
Fang and Peress, 2009); stronger momentum effects especially for stocks with high earning
uncertainty Hillert et al. (2014). Peress (2008) uses the total number of firms mentioned in
the Wall-Street Journal as attention-grabber. Individual investors tend to be net buyers of
’attention grabbing’ stocks, measured by media coverage. One issue with media coverage
is to differentiate between the impact of the event and the effect of the report about the
event, Engelberg and Parsons (2011) circumvent this by looking on articles about earnings
announcements in local newspapers and report significant influence of local media on the
trading behaviour in these regions.30 Engelberg et al. (2012) document large overnight
returns of stocks after they where recommended in a popular TV show, these spikes
reverse over the next few months. Soccer matches compete among attention resources,
too, Ehrmann and Jansen (2012) document that the trading volume in a countries stock
exchange drops by 55% during a match if the national team is involved.31
Another stimulus drive approach is to focus on special events, e.g. Yuan (2015) focuses
on the aggregate and household-level effect of "market-wide attention-grabbing events",
such as record levels of the Dow Jones or front page articles about the stock market. High
market-wide attention events combined with a high level of the stock market lead share-
holders to sell their stocks dramatically, reducing market returns by 0.19% on days after
the attention-grabbing event. DellaVigna (2009) argue that investors are most distracted
on Fridays due to the upcoming weekend, and thus looked at earning announcements on
Fridays and found the post-earning announcement drift is more pronounced when there
is strong competition for investors attention.
A way to measure goal driven attention is based on measuring the increase in tasks
that require real effort: An increase in the google search volume index indicates a rise in
stock prices over following two weeks (Da et al., 2011). Or tweeds contain information
30Another work around is to look on the impact of old information about firms, Tetlock (2011) finds
that stock returns respond to such stale news, even though in a less pronounced way compared to new
information.
31Moreover, there seems to be a decoupling from the international stock markets, speaking in favour of
a different price formation process during a match. Especially for less salient information the attention
was low. Small global price movements, where not reflected in the national stock markets and the returns
across individual firms showed lower cross-sectional dispersion, indicating that the information processing
took place on a market or sector level rather on a firm specific one.
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about short-term forex EUR/USD exchange rate (Papaioannou et al., 2013) and perform
better in forecasting the stock market compared to traditional sentiment surveys (Bollen
et al., 2011). Also blog entries (Gilbert and Karahalios, 2010) and facebook status up-
dates (Karabulut, 2013) contain information about future stock market movements that
are not already in the market data. Preis et al. (2013) found that google search queries
are also "early warning signs" for an upcoming downward trend, reflecting individual in-
vestors concerns.32 Changes in the view of financial related Wikipedia pages are also an
indicator for investors concerns and predict downturns (Moat et al., 2013). Mao et al.
(2011) confirm that Google search queries are especially useful with a higher prediction
accurate then normal forecasting models in episodes of major changes and high volatility.
Aouadi et al. (2013) confirms this finding and observes that search queries are signifi-
cant determinants of market illiquidity. Analysing professional traders communication
via Instant Messengers one observes that traders write more about today and show less
concern about tomorrow if the market volatility is high, and vice versa (Saavedra et al.,
2011). Textual analysis of social-media platforms helps to predict future stock returns
and earning surprises (Chen et al., 2014).
The main issue with all measures is, that while they measure a part of attention, beside
the approaches using textual analysis they do not know the direction of the underlying
information. Furthermore, the attention allocated on a certain information increases
the precision with which this information is extracted and thus the weight with which
the information influences the decision but not the direction of the effect. Thus for the
empirical analysis one would assume rather a strong interaction effect between attention
measures and fundamentals rather then an influence on more or less trading, higher or
lower prices. Summarizing, the fact that some one draws attention towards an information
should not be informative, unless there is a bias towards more (less) attention if there
special type of news like people are more interested in negative events than in positive
ones.33
1.5 Concluding Remarks
Huberman and Regev (2001) report a case from 1998 of an exorbitant price movement in
an the share price of the biotech company ENMD due to a special report in the New York
Times, even though this report did not contain new information for investors familiar with
32Moreover, one can construct profitable trading strategies upon key-words reflecting the overall state
of the economy.
33In the context of media coverage of terrorism in Israel, Melnick and Eldor (2010) find evidence that
visibility of the news itself is a signal and observe that bad news have a bigger impact on the economy
than good news, which they explain with loss aversion; the effect became smaller overtime.
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this topic and therefore could not be the main driver, it must have been the visibility of
the information in a special report announced on the first page of a big newspaper.34
The anecdotal and the empirical evidence underline the importance of accessibility
and visibility of news, even in a context where the investors are interested in gathering
actively information relevant for their investment decision. This paper starts from the
observation that not all information can be processed and that this processing process
itself is subject to a goal-driven aspect and an external stimulus-driven part. Thus first the
information processing process is modelled, capturing the goal-driven aspect by letting
the investor allocate the processing capacities dependent on her goal to minimize the
uncertainty. However, the cost of processing the information varies with the visibility
of the information itself, which is assumed to be a decision made by the sender of the
information.
This information processing is applied to a simple frameworks of asset pricing. The
main findings are that a higher visibility and higher processing capacities lead to a lower
risk premium and more informativeness of the price. Furthermore, there exists a visibility
of the information sent beyond the investor will decrease the attention resources spend
on this information, even-though the information received will become more precise with
an increase in its visibility. The investor will neglect an information flow if the number of
assets in their investment universe increases, if the information flow becomes less visible
or if the outcome of the asset is less uncertain.
Further research might look at markets with agents differing in their information pro-
cessing capacities ( e.g., real world examples would be algorithmic based traders and small
investors). A higher information processing capacity should result in an informational
advantage over agents with less information processing capacities. This informational
advantage could be the source of asymmetric information and thus create an adverse
selection problem for agents having lower information processing capacities. The reac-
tion to this adverse selection problem might affect the overall market outcome. Another
34On Sunday May, 3rd 1998 an special report in the New York Times (NYT) about a breakthrough
in cancer therapy research by the biotech company ENMD caused a jump in the share price from 12.063
the Friday close, up to 85.000 at the opening of the stock exchange and the stock exchanged closed with
a price at 50 . The price stayed above 30 the subsequent weeks. While one would expect such a market
reaction to new information, the fact is that the breakthrough has been reported couple of months ago
in November 1997 the nature magazine had it on its front-page, Times wrote about it in its business
section, CNN and NBC mentioned the breakthrough as well. Even the NYT itself reported about this
in the Appendix. But the market reaction in November 1997 was barely noticeable. The question arises
what caused the market movement in May 1998? The information itself was not new to investors familiar
with this topic, which finds support in a follow up article of the author of special report, where he
underlined, that this report did not contained new information compared to November 1997. The special
report in May 1998 was announced on the first page of the NYT and covered several pages, while the
announcements in November 1997 where either fare in the back among other news releases or only visible
to those who showed already interest in this topic, e.g. article in Nature.
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interesting research path to take, is to apply the suggested attention allocation mecha-
nism on further economic decision making (e.g., with informed consumers interested in
consumption goods and firms also competing for attention to sell their products).
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2 Cognitive Capacities, Trading Styles
and Experimental Asset Market Bubbles1
Joint with Andreas Hefti and Frédéric Schneider
2.1 Introduction
Which factors determine who looses and who wins in financial markets? Is it merely luck,
or do traders need specific individual abilities, and if so, what kind? Recent research
suggests that mental abilities correlate with behavioural trading patterns. One strand
of this literature focuses on quantitative or analytical abilities as the key determinant of
successful asset trading because these skills are necessary to assess the fundamental value
of an asset (e.g., Baghestanian et al., 2012; Corgnet et al., 2013; Noussair et al., 2014).
Other researchers suggest that good perspective taking skill or mentalizing ability ought
to be the key determinant (Bossaerts et al., 2016; Bruguier et al., 2010; De Martino et al.,
2013; Suzuki et al., 2016).
In this paper we argue that the performance of traders cannot be explained as result
of a one-dimensional skill spectrum. We propose that only an integrated model of both
analytical and mentalizing abilities can adequately explain why certain traders are suc-
cessful while others fail, despite the availability of the same information to all traders.
Beside analytical thinking, every trader needs an understanding of the “animal spirits”
in the market to stay “ahead of the curve”2 in order to form an expectation about future
profitable developments in the market. Or as George Soros pointed out, sometimes mar-
ket prices “do not merely reflect the so-called fundamentals; they themselves become one
of the fundamentals which shape the evolution of prices” (Soros, 2003, p. 7).3 We propose
that the two abilities, analytical thinking and obtaining a well-calibrated perception of
1Parts of this chapter are published as Working Paper No. 234 from the Working paper series /
Department of Economics at the University of Zurich.
2Keynes, who coined the term animal spirits in this context, was himself a successful speculator. He
acknowledged that “there is the instability due to the characteristic of human nature that a large propor-
tion of our positive activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather than mathematical expectations
[...]” (Keynes, 1936, pp. 161-162).
3These moments of “irrational exuberance,” when prices detach themselves from the fundamental, are
“the psychological basis of a speculative bubble,” according to Robert Shiller (Shiller, 2015, p. 7).
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the other market participants, involves different and independent cognitive resource of
individual traders.
To make sense of asset market data, researchers often assume heterogeneous behaviour
across traders (Boswijk et al., 2007; Kaizoji et al., 2015). Explaining, beyond the purely
descriptive level, the source of this heterogeneity is a central issue of behavioural research
in economics and finance.4 Our working hypothesis is that the way humans think about
investment decisions is the product of two fundamentally different cognitive capacities:
The analytical capacity (what we call the A-Dimension) captures a person’s grasp of the
logical and quantitative aspect of a decision problem, which helps individuals predict
the equilibrium outcome of a game.5 The mentalizing capacity (M-Dimension)6 is “the
ability to construct a working model of the emotional states of others” (Reniers et al.,
2011, p. 85), i.e. to understand other’s beliefs and intentions, which helps to predict their
actions.7 Differences in these two capacities lead to variation in the view on the world and
thus heterogeneous behaviour. Psychological and neuroscience studies have shown both
abilities are stable and largely independent traits (Reniers et al., 2011; Van Overwalle and
Baetens, 2009).
We first conceptualize of how both dimensions influence expectation formation and
investment decisions. As a consequence of the two-dimensional, non-convertible nature
of cognitive capacities we claim the existence of distinct trading styles dependent on
the cognitive capacities mix (cognitive types) and a corresponding non-trivial revenue
distribution over the cognitive types. We introduce four stylized types based on their
cognitive capacity mix (see figure 2.1). “Featureless” (FL-) types have a low level of both
analytical and mentalizing capacities. “Technocratic” (TE-) types have high analytical
but low mentalizing capacities. They can deduce the equilibrium outcome of a game but
are unable to see any pattern in deviations from equilibrium behaviour. “Semiotic” (SE-)
types are aware of others’ behavioural patterns and are good at deducing intentionality
behind these patterns. We call this type semiotic because this type tries to read the “signs”
of intentions in observables (such as the past asset prices). Finally, “sophisticated” (SO-)
4As Hommes (2011) on p. 21 notes: “An important challenge to a research program in behavioural
economics and finance based on bounded rationality is to come up with a plausible and general theory
of heterogeneous expectations.”
5This includes logical reasoning and mathematical calculations such as expected value.
6There are a couple of terms, theory of mind, mentalizing, and cognitive empathy, that are often used
interchangeably in the literature. The unifying aspect is the ability to put oneself in “the shoes of the
others” (Frith and Singer, 2008; Reniers et al., 2011; Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009).
7Even tough, the definition of mentalizing is based on a relation among two person, (i.e. to take the
perspective of another person) and at financial markets the trader is confronted with decisions by a group
of others, recent studies found the activation of areas in the brain usually associated with mentalizing
(Bruguier et al., 2010; De Martino et al., 2013; Suzuki et al., 2016). Bossaerts et al. (2016) suggest to
interpret these findings in a way that traders perceive the market as an intentional entity.
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types are skilled in both dimensions. They know the equilibrium outcome but are aware
of the fact that there can be systematic deviations from this outcome, due to others
behaviours.
A
M
“Technocratic”
(TE)
high
“Featureless”
(FL)low “Semiotic”(SE)
low
“Sophisticated”
(SO)
high
Figure 2.1: The four basic cognitive types
This figure shows the four cognitive types. Due to the inde-
pendence of the analytical (A)- and mentalizing (M)- capaci-
ties, one can plot both cognitive capacities as an ordered pair
of perpendicular lines. Each point in this plane represents a
specific cognitive capacities mix. In the further analysis we
concentrate on four stylized types with four distinct cognitive
capacity mixes.
This framework suggests that in the asset market each person forms a mental model of
the asset value on the basis of their individual cognitive capacities mix. We posit that each
of the two mental dimensions corresponds to one aspect of valuing an asset: To correctly
understand the fundamental value of an asset a trader needs analytical ability, and to
correctly process the price information of other traders valuations they need mentalizing
capacities. This is the basis for a testable model of cognitive capacities and ensuing
trading behaviour.
The main predictions of our theory can be summarized as follows. The two-dimensional
nature of cognitive capacities generate distinguishable, characteristic trading patterns of
the four mental types, which could be described as noise trading (FL-types), fundamental
trading (TE-types), trend chasing (SE-types), and bubble riding (SO-types), respectively.
The four types vary in their success in the market. In particular, the most successful
traders need both mental abilities, because only a combination of these skills allows a
trader to appropriately understand both when prices depart from the fundamental and
when they fall back. Therefore, we predict that SO will be the most profitable type.
Analytical capacity alone does not generate substantial trading gains because a deficit in
mentalizing capacity leads to a misinterpretation of price deviations from the fundamental.
Therefore, TE will earn less than SO. Conversely, a strong mentalizing capacity alone
results in even more serious mistakes: Semiotic traders will detect and follow an upward
price trend but miss the optimal exit point since they do not sufficiently account for the
34 Cognitive Capacities, Trading Styles and Experimental Asset Market Bubbles
fundamental. Accordingly, being skilled in only one dimension is not sufficient to develop
a successful trading strategy and may even be detrimental for the final outcome.
In a second step, we conducted a laboratory experiment to test our hypothesis. The
laboratory offers the necessary control over the decision environment and the parameters.
Most importantly, we can confine trading to a single asset whose expected value we
control. Moreover, we can measure individuals’ cognitive types independently, record
their behaviour in detail, and exogenously manipulate the type composition in markets.
The experimental design consisted of two independent phases. In the first phase we ran
a battery of incentivized tasks to elicit subjects’ cognitive capacities on each dimension.
This allows us to categorize the participants into one of the four cognitive types. In the
second phase, we observed participants asset trading behaviour in an experimental call-
market similar to Smith et al. (1988). This game is a spot market for one asset with
known dividend structure; it is a standard paradigm to investigate asset market bubbles.
We endow participants with shares of the asset and some cash. In each of the 15 periods of
the asset market, they trade shares of the asset among each other. Participants traded by
submitting simultaneous bid and ask orders, which allowed us to observe their willingness
to pay and accept money for the asset. Participants could not buy shares on credit or sell
them short. These asset markets notoriously generate market prices that are above the
expected value of the dividend process, this allows us to compare individual behaviour in
this bubble environment and individual cognitive capacities.
Our experimental results are consistent with our model predictions. First, as predicted
the cognitive capacity mix determines trading behaviour and earnings. Analysing sub-
jects’ trading patterns, we see that technocratic types largely trade on the fundamental,
buying when the asset price is below or at the fundamental value and selling when the
price rises above it; these types make money from the dividend but miss out on the profits
from speculating on the bubble. Semiotic types follow the rising asset price, with peak
asset holdings slightly after the peak of the bubble; these types lose the most money as
they are unable to unload their asset holdings profitably after the bursting of the bubble.
The sophisticates anticipate both the rising and the bursting of the bubble and ride it un-
til about two to three periods before its peak; these types make the most money through
their superior market timing. Finally, featureless types do not show any pronounced trad-
ing pattern and behave erratically. Consequently, some trading gains are offset by losses,
which on average leads to small insignificant losses. Summarizing the findings on the sub-
ject level, analytical capacities are not enough to maximize trading gains without a strong
accompanying mentalizing capacities. Conversely, having only mentalizing capacities can
be outright detrimental, as these traders will miss the optimal exit point. To become
a successful trader, good market timing is indispensable and requires the insight when
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prices depart from the fundamental and when they revert back. Thus traders, who are
strong in both capacities, are most likely to get the market timing right and their success
is a joint product of exercising both cognitive capacities.
The different trading patterns help to explain the dynamics in the markets. We observe
that the market price is determined by the sell-orders and thus that the sophisticates tend
to initiate their sales between the eighth or ninth period, which is before the burst of the
bubble. On the aggregate level, the mix of cognitive types should influence the size and
length of the bubble. We test these population-based predictions of our model and find
that markets with a high proportion of analytically skilled subjects tend to have smaller
bubbles.
The results are interesting for institutional traders as they might select traders ac-
cording to their cognitive capacities to increase trading gains. Furthermore, our results
give a better understanding of the dynamics in different markets and thus might help to
better target policy intervention on different levels to reduce the size of financial market
bubbles. The main implication of our results is that a one dimensional measure, such as
the beauty contest, is insufficient to cover the whole variation in the data and neglects
important types for the market dynamics. In general as a framework for off-equilibrium
behaviour, we believe that our two-dimensional cognitive capacity approach is not con-
fined to financial markets but may be adapted to explain behavioural puzzles in other
domains as well. For example, a couple of recent studies examine the role of “strategic
sophistication”, which we interpret as an combination of our two mental dimensions.8 It
would therefore be interesting to investigate strategic games, such as the Beauty Contest,
using our classification of mental types.
In the rest of the paper, we first discuss the related literature in section 3.2. In the
subsequent section 2.3 we discuss the conceptual framework in more detail, apply it to
the asset market and derive the hypothesis. Then, we explain the experimental design in
section 2.4 and present the empirical results in section 3.5. Finally, section 2.6 discusses
our findings and concludes this paper.
8(Bosch-Rosa et al., 2015) find that markets with strategic sophisticates generate smaller than average
bubbles. Similarly (Levine et al., 2015) find that strategic sophisticates make higher profits in experimen-
tal asset markets. Finally, strategic sophisticates showed higher activation in a brain region associated
with Theory of Mind (Coricelli and Nagel, 2009).
36 Cognitive Capacities, Trading Styles and Experimental Asset Market Bubbles
2.2 Related literature
A number of contributions considered empirically the consequences of analytical9 and
mentalizing10 capacities for economic outcomes.11 The literature so fare did not dis-
cussed the interaction effects of the two dimensions of cognitive capacities. Among the
large literature on the determinants of traders’ behaviour in experimental asset markets
we concentrate on those closest to us examining the role of analytical and mentalizing
capacities.
Some researchers find an effect of analytical capacities both on individual trading
behaviour, profits, and bubble size. Participants scoring well in the cognitive reflection
test (Frederick, 2005) achieve higher profits in laboratory spot markets (Corgnet et al.,
2013) and in spot markets with an added futures market (Noussair et al., 2014); their
trading style is less focused on momentum and more on fundamental value (Baghestanian
et al., 2012). On the other hand, Bruguier et al. (2010) did not find that cognitive ability
is related to the ability to correctly predict asset prices, and Janssen et al. (2015) found
no correlation between CRT and behaviour in their speculation task. On the macro level,
markets with higher average analytical skills exhibit lower price volatility (Breaban and
Noussair, 2015; Cueva and Rustichini, 2015).12 These observations are in line with studies
on actual stock market behaviour. People with higher IQ are more likely to participate in
real stock markets, hold a more diversified portfolio, and achieve higher Sharpe ratios than
people with lower IQ, even after controlling for socio-demographic covariates (Grinblatt
et al., 2011; Korniotis and Kumar, 2010; Luik and Steinhardt, 2015). Among the rare
studies that look at mentalizing capacities, Bruguier et al. (2010) find that participants
who are more skilled in mentalizing are better at predicting rising prices in experimental
asset bubbles, which is in line with our own predictions. However, higher mentalizing
9Frequently, individual analytical skills are estimated by variations of standard IQ-tests or the Cog-
nitive Reflection Test (CRT, Frederick (2005))
10For this dimension there exists no uniform and generally acknowledged measure. However there is a
consensus that mentalizing, cognitive empathy or Theory of Mind is a stable personality trait (Reniers
et al., 2011) and it consists of sub-traits (Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009). Some approximations are
the Heider-Simmel-Task, e.g. (Heider and Simmel, 1944), the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, e.g.
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1997) or the QCAE-questionnaire (Reniers et al., 2011).
11The main insights are that individuals with stronger analytical skills tend to be more patient, show
a higher willingness to take calculated risk, are less loss averse at small-stakes (Benjamin et al., 2013;
Dohmen et al., 2010; Frederick, 2005), and make fewer reasoning errors in guessing-games (Rydval et al.,
2009). Moreover they bet lower numbers (the Nash prediction) in experimental beauty contest games
and are more likely to win (Burnham et al., 2009). For the cognitive mentalizing dimension we know that
neuronal networks associated with mentalizing are active when subjects make their decision in games
with strategic uncertainty, e.g. the beauty contest (Bossaerts, 2009).
12A recent study suggests that bubbles (and high volatility) arise through the interaction between
different analytical types (Hanaki et al., 2015).
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capacities also correlates with the tendency to ride the bubble too far and to lose money
(De Martino et al., 2013).
A couple of recent studies cannot be categorized cleanly along the two cognitive dimen-
sions, analytical and mentalizing capacities, as they use composite measures. Bosch-Rosa
et al. (2015) found that markets with subjects, which we would classify as sophisticates
generate smaller bubbles than those populated with subjects that we would likely classify
as belonging to the other types.13 Similarly, Levine et al. (2015) found that subjects scor-
ing high on strategic sophistication (as measured by success in Beauty Contest games)
make higher profits in experimental asset markets. Crucially, both studies use Beauty
Contest Games to measure strategic sophistication, which, in our framework, is equiv-
alent to high analytical and high mentalizing capacities.14 Because both capacities are
necessary to perform well in the beauty contest, these studies cannot easily disentangle
the effects of the two dimensions.
According to our conceptual framework, these results tell only part of the story. We
contend that the interaction of both independent dimensions is relevant for explaining
success in the asset market. Thus the gains observed with high analytical capacities are in
reality generated by the subgroup of sophisticated types, the same group that is identified
through performance in the beauty contest. On the other hand, we posit that most of
the losses are made by the subgroup of semiotic types, who have low analytical capacities
but high mentalizing capacities. Thus our conceptual framework and the empiric results
underline a need to examine both dimensions independently.
More broadly, our conceptual framework opens a new avenue to think about be-
havioural deviations from equilibrium behaviour. Off-equilibrium behaviour, such as asset
market bubbles, is outside the scope of traditional game theory. More recent work tries to
incorporate behavioural aspects into the existing framework. Some approaches introduce
the possibility for random mistakes in people’s choices (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995);
others assume that people’s responses are optimal, but based on flawed beliefs (Camerer
et al., 2004; Stahl and Wilson, 1995). Both approaches can successfully explain a variety
of observed deviations from equilibrium but struggle with other behavioural patterns,
among others, asset market bubbles.
Our framework is related to both strands of the literature in that we assume that
individuals may make mistakes in their best response even if their beliefs are correct
13They use a battery of tests consisting of Cognitive Reflection Test (indicative of analytical capacities),
“Race to 60” (backward induction, again analytical capacities), and performance in Guessing Games
(mentalizing and analytical capacities).
14In support of our view, subjects behaving like strategic sophisticates in the Beauty Contest Game
showed higher activation in a brain region associated with Theory of Mind (Coricelli and Nagel, 2009),
which is equivalent to our mentalizing capacities.
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(namely, when they lack analytical capacities), and that they may have mistaken beliefs
even if they know how to best-respond (when they lack mentalizing capacities). We add
to this literature a specific psychological foundation (differential cognitive capacities),
and by testing empirically the predictions implied by that foundation. We think that
this approach may be useful for other behavioural regularities beyond the topic of asset
market behaviour.
In sum, previous research has theoretically and experimentally used one-dimensional
skill-based approaches to heterogeneous non-equilibrium behaviour in games. However, to
our knowledge, our paper provides the first theoretical and experimental documentation
of two separate and conceptually unrelated cognitive capacities that interact to produce
different behavioural types. In our case, we document that two cognitive dimensions
interact in a non-trivial way to produce complex trading patterns.
2.3 The conceptual framework
In the asset market all participants know that in this phase they earn what they have as
cash holdings at the end of the last period of the game. They can increase these cash
holdings by generating trading gains,(i.e. buying cheap and selling high) and by earning
dividends. Thus each participant has to evaluate the value of an asset by a (private)
forecast of the future asset price based on the observables (i.e., price history and the
fundamental value). Understanding the fundamental value component, FVt, in period
t, is a matter of calculating the expected value of the dividend process; it involves the
A-dimension. On the other hand, inferring from the price history Pt−1 = {p0, .., pt−1}
the valuation of the asset from the other market participants is more about analyzing
the decision situation from the view point of others and to take their perception of the
decision situation into account; this needs the M-dimension.15 Therefore the specific
cognitive capacities mix determines each individual’s forecast of the market price of the
asset.
2.3.1 Expected value of the asset
We assume that the expected value of an asset, Ei (Vt), at time t by individual i ∈
{FL, TE, SE, SO} is a linear combination of its price pt−1 observed in the last period
and a private signal xit on the asset’s fundamental value FVt.16
15One might also follow Bossaerts et al. (2016) arguing that traders perceive the market price itself as
an intentional entity.
16This is in line with standard asset pricing models with informed speculating investors, e.g. Hellwig
(1980); Kyle (1989) and Vives (2010).
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Ei(Vt | xit, pt−1) = cit + αi1xit + αi2pt−1, (2.1)
where xit = FVt + σit, with σit being an white-noise error term and cit is an individual
time dependent constant.17 To account for the role of cognitive capacities in evaluating
fundamentals on one side and making inferences from the observed price on the other,
we assign to each of the four types shown in figure 2.1 a type specific weighting scheme
(αi1, αi2). More specifically, we hypothesize to reject the following three pairwise null:
Hypothesis 2.1. Homogeneous trading profiles (αTE1 = αSE1 and αTE2 = αSE2 ), (αTE1 = αSO1
and αTE2 = αSO2 ) as well as (αSO1 = αSE1 and αSO2 = αSE2 ).
Furthermore, the technocratic-types should mainly respond ceteris paribus to a change of
the fundamental, while the semiotic-types will respond ceteris paribus to a change of the
last period pt−1. The sophisticated-types should, on average, respond to both components.
This implies for the size of weights.
Hypothesis 2.2. Weighing Size (a) αTE1 ≥ αSO1 > αSE1 and αSE2 ≥ αSO2 > αTE2
Being more specific, the size of the weights for the antipodal types, technocrats and
semiotic, should differ on both the fundamental and the price component.
Hypothesis 2.3. Weighing Size (b) αTEj 6= αSEj for j = 1, 2.
Combining hypothesis H 2.2 and the assumption, that the weights are systematically
influenced by the cognitive capacity mix, one can conclude for weights of the featureless
type that αSOj ≥ αFLj for j = 1, 2. Thus the featureless type has difficulties to decode
both components. Thus, we expect featureless types will show more or less unsystematic
trading patterns.
2.3.2 Trend of the Fundamental Value, Asset Price Dynamics
and Trading Gains
With the expected value,Ei (Vt), at time t per type i ∈ {FL, TE, SE, SO}, equation 2.1,
we can now conclude the expected market dynamics given a particular trend of the funda-
mental value, see figure 2.2. For the cases of an constant or increasing fundamental value,
17Note that in this analysis risk preferences play no role. In fact, we control for risk preferences in
the experiment and find no compelling evidence for a correlation of risk preferences with cognitive types.
However, one might think of them as part of the individual constant cit.
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we only consider the expected value of each type, while for the case that matches with
our experimental set-up, declining fundamental value, we go more into details and derive
hypothesis H 2.4 for the expected trading gains of each type. To keep things simple, our
analysis starts with the assumption that the price in the last period coincided with the
fundamental value of that period.
Constant fundamental value over time: All types will have the same willingness to
pay under a constant fundamental value, because the price in the last period was already
the same as the fundamental value. Thus independent whether they take the price from
the last period (SE), the actual fundamental value (TE), or a mixture (SO), they will
form the same expectation about the price of the current period. Even if the market price
in the last period and the fundamental value would not coincide, due to the sophisticates
and technocratic types, the price will soon converge towards the fundamental value and
remain there, with small deviations due to noise trading by the featureless types.18 The
observed trading behaviour of the technocratic, semiotic and sophisticated type should
not differ after the convergence. Furthermore, one would not expect a large deviation of
the market price from the fundamental value.19
Increasing fundamental value: With an increasing fundamental value, the technocrat
will increase the willingness to pay and thus their buy offers for the asset per period, while
the semiotic type take the lacked asset price into account, underestimating the value of
the asset. The semiotic types will behave as a mixture, increasing their expectation of the
price for the asset with the increase of the fundamental, but dampen this increase by the
lack of the last-period price in the knowledge that they might be able to buy the asset
cheaper. In sum, the market price will increase overtime, but stays below the fundamental
value.20
Decreasing fundamental value: While the technocrats will constantly lower their
valuation of the asset, along the fundamental value, the semiotic types stick to the price
of the last period and will overestimate the value of the asset in the current period, and
sophisticated will mix in her asset valuation between fundamental value and last period
price. The resulting market price will be above the fundamental value, only go down
18Which might be emphasized by the fact that a constant fundamental value is easy to understand,
and thus relatively more people might decode the fundamental value component and behave accordingly.
19The size of the bubble is less pronounced in experimental asset markets, with a lump-sum dividend
at the end of the market (Caginalp et al., 2001; Noussair et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2000; Stöckl et al.,
2015), which can be interpreted as constant Fundamental value overtime.
20Stöckl et al. (2015) observe that asset markets with an increasing fundamental value, have the ten-
dency of undervaluation.
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slowly and thus there is a tendency of a bubble, even if the asset price was not overvalued
before.
(a) Constant$
Periods
t-1 t
◦TE, SE, SO
(b) Increasing$
Periods
t-1 t
◦ SE
◦ TE
◦ SO
(c) Decreasing$
Periods
t-1 t
◦ SE
◦ TE◦ SO
Figure 2.2: Sample Paths of the Fundamental Value and Willingness to Pay
This figure shows sample paths of a fundamental value and for the cognitive types exemplary the willingness to
pay in period t given that the price in period t−1 was equal to the fundamental value. For simplicity, we assumed
that semiotic types always use the price of the last period for their willingness to pay (i.e.
(
αSE1 = 0, αSE2 = 1
)
),
technocratic types always use the fundamental value as their willingness to pay (i.e.
(
αTE1 = 1, αTE2 = 0
)
),
sophisticated types use a mix of both (i.e. αSOj ∈ (0, 1) for j ∈ {1, 2}) and the featureless type is neglected here,
due to its unsystematic and possible random trading behaviour. Graph (a) assumes a constant fundamental
value, thus each type will have the same price expectation for the actual period. Graph (b) assumes an increasing
fundamental value. While the semiotic type will underestimate the value by far, the technocratic type has the
highest willingness to pay and the sophisticated will be in between. Graph (c) assumes a falling fundamental
value. Here the order is reverse to the previous panel, the semiotic types will have the highest willingness to
pay, followed by the sophisticated and technocrats. Even if the price determination is different for the call- and
double-auction market, both reflect the average expected values of the market participants over a whole period,
and thus in both types of markets we would expect an asset price equal to the fundamental value in (a), an
under-valuation in (b) and an over-valuation in (c). Which finds support by laboratory experiments (Stöckl
et al., 2015).
As sophisticates will have a higher valuation than the technocratic types, the latter
do not hold on to or acquire as many assets as the former. While selling the assets early
prevents the technocratic types from incurring heavy trading losses, it also means that
they tend to forgo some of the trading gains that sophisticates realize. In sum, we ex-
pect technocrats to make non-negative trading gains, but lower gains than sophisticates.
A similar comparison between sophisticates and semiotic type, the latter underestimate
the fundamental value and thus overvalue the asset relative to sophisticates. The conse-
quences on the trading gains in our experimental asset market are quite severe, because an
over-valuation of the asset means that semiotic types buy and hold assets at high prices
of which they later cannot get rid at all or only at substantial losses. Thus we expect
semiotic types to incur the most substantial losses of all four types. Based on cognitive
capacities alone one could superficially conclude that featureless types, should incur the
highest trading losses, as they have neither analytical nor mentalizing capacities. How-
ever, featureless types fail to account for both the declining fundamental (tending towards
holding higher valuations) but also ignore the price component (tending towards lower
valuations). While their trading pattern will be more erratic than systematic, some might
do profitable trades but at the same time others might incur losses. Thus on average we
expect semiotic types to have zero profits from trading or even small losses. We summa-
rize these predictions in the following empirically testable hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 2.4. Trading gains The four cognitive types, i ∈ {FL, TE, SE, SO}, earn
different trading gains Πi. Specifically, ΠSO > ΠTE > 0 ≥ ΠFL > ΠSE.
Summarizing the implication of the heterogeneous cognitive capacity mixes on the
weights being put on the fundamental value and the last period prices respectively, we
conclude: Featureless types will behave erratic [Noise Trading Style]. Technocratic types
will trade on the expected value of the asset21 [Fundamental Trading Style]. Semiotic
types will behave follow the trend with sub-optimally late exit timing [Momentum Trading
Style]. Sophisticates will ride the bubble and show the best market timing of all types
[Bubble-Riding Trading Style].
Sophisticates will therefore also be the most profitable types, semiotic types will suffer
the greatest losses, and the two remaining types will show middling performance. Cru-
cially, an improvement in only one capacity does not translate into better performance.
Rather, we predict an interaction effect between capacities.
Cognitive TypesA
M
Technocratic
Featureless Semiotic
Sophisticated
Trading PatternsA
M
Fundamental
Noise Momentum
Bubble rider
Figure 2.3: From cognitive type to trading patterns
These trading patterns will influence the market dynamics, too. For example, due to
the switch of the sophisticated types around the peak of the market price, from buying
towards selling the asset, we expect these types be among the first initiating the burst of
the bubble. For the macro-level, these dynamics implies that the severity of the bubble
depends on the type composition of the market.
21This intuition is underlined by a subject note documented in appendix B.1.
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2.4 Experimental Design
In order to answer the question whether trading success is merely luck or cognitive ca-
pacities, we want control the random factors as much as possible, making the laboratory
the natural choice. First, it allows us to measure independently an individual’s cognitive
capacities through different tasks. Then, we can observe the same individual’s behaviour
in an experimental asset market giving us maximum control over the market environ-
ment. In particular, we can restrict trading to one specific asset with an exogenously set
fundamental value, determined through a simple, commonly known dividend process.22
Importantly, this prevents any form of privileged trading through asymmetric informa-
tion. We can exogenously endow participants with cash and shares of the asset and choose
the market structure, such that participants can simultaneously place buy and sell orders
over multiple periods. By recording these orders, we obtain a direct measure of each
participant’s willingness to pay and willingness to accept. Finally, as discussed in the
above section when the asset price experiences a bubble, we expect that each cognitive
type will show a distinct trading pattern. Therefore, we use an experimental asset market
that reliably produces periods where the asset price is above the fundamental value.
We conducted 20 laboratory sessions, each with 32 participants in the laboratory of the
economics department at the University of Zurich.23 Most of the participants are enrolled
at the University of Zurich or ETH Zurich. Each experimental session was divided into two
phases. In phase one, each participant passed through a series of tasks that were designed
to obtain performance-based measures of the analytical and mentalizing capacities. Each
task either involved answering questions or winning a game. For each correct answer or
winning a round we rewarded participants with CHF 0.30.24 In phase two, we grouped
the 32 participants into two equal sized groups each constituting one experimental asset
market. In the following, the two phases are discussed in more detail.
2.4.1 Phase 1: Measuring Cognitive Capacities
Experimental sessions started by randomly assigning seats to participants, getting them
seated in front of their computer terminals and then providing general information about
the procedures (see appendix B.3). Subsequently, participants started with Phase one
of the experiment. In this phase, they completed a series of tasks. Table B.1 shows the
22Quantifying the fundamental value of an asset is usually not possible in real financial markets.
23We used hroot (Bock et al., 2014) for recruitment and ztree (Fischbacher, 2007) for programming the
experiment.
24This form of incentives is standard in experimental economics.
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sequence of tasks. The instructions for each task was presented on participants’ computer
screens, before the task started. Each task was designed to capture a specific aspect of
either the analytical or the mentalizing capacity dimension.25 For each of both capacity
dimension we constructed a measure by taking the mean of the percentage of correct
answers or won round in the tasks for this capacity. Thus the maximum possible score in
one dimension is equivalent to 100, implying that all tasks have been completed without
any error.
Table 2.1: Sequence of Experimental Tasks
Phase 1 Phase 2 Exit Questionnaire
Word Problems
Experimental Asset Market Socio-economic surveyFinancial Literacy Questions
Raven’s Progressive Matrices
Game of Nim
[Risk Attitude Test]
Heider Test
Reading the Mind in the Eyes
2.4.1.1 Analytical Capacities
For the analytical dimension, we chose three tasks that reflect general intelligence (Raven’s
Progressive Matrices), mathematical and logical skill (word problems), and strategic rea-
soning (Game of Nim).
Raven’s Progressive Matrices measures non-verbal intelligence. Participants see
eight different patterns and, from their arrangement, have to choose the correct ninth
pattern from a list of potential answers. We used a version that consisted of 12 items, with
a time restriction of 12 minutes for all items.26 The test measures two underlying abilities
of the analytic capacities: deductive ability, requiring to think clearly and make sense of a
complex problem, and reproductive ability, requiring to store and reproduce information.
The resulting measure for general intelligence is the number of correct answers.
Game of Nim is a simple strategic game for two players (McKinney Jr and Van Huyck,
2006). It consists of a board with several rows, each of which contains a variable number
of “stones.” Players take turns and successively remove stones from the board. Players
can choose any row that still contains stones and can remove as many stones from that
25During this phase, we additionally elicited risk attitude, using a standard Holt-Laury price list. The
lottery choice was fixed to a 50 : 50 chance of winning either CHF 20 or nothing, and the certain payment
moved upward from CHF 0 in increments of CHF 1.
26Appendix B.4.1 provides a more detailed description, including instructions.
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row as they like. A player wins by removing the last stone from the board. Participants
played five consecutive boards with progressively more difficult board constellations. We
let participants play this game against a computer opponent that was programmed to
best-respond to participants’ actions. The participant was always granted the first move,
which allowed for winning under the right strategy. There was no time restriction on
solving each game.27 The game is solvable through backward induction, such that success
is determined by a player’s ability to think strategically.28 The resulting measure is the
number of games won against the computer.
Word Problems consist of seven problems testing for quantitative and logical reasoning
from a standard assessment center test for applicants in the finance industry.29 For each
question, subjects had 60 seconds to answer. The resulting measure is the number of
correct answers.
2.4.1.2 Mentalizing
Mentalizing is the ability to make accurate inferences about the mental states of oth-
ers. As stated above, this requires at least two abilities, (1) to recognize and identify
others’ intentions (“perspective taking”) and (2) develop a correct working model about
the resulting behaviour (“online simulation”) (Reniers et al., 2011). Incentivized tasks
assessing both abilities are more difficult to find than for the analytical dimension.30 We
follow Bruguier et al. (2010) and operationalize this ability dimension with two separate
tests. In the first one, participant’s have to infer other people’s mental states (Reading
the Mind in the Eyes Test), in the other they have to develop a working model about
others intentions from others’ actions (Heider-Simmel Test).
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test as used by Baron-Cohen et al. (1997)
consists of black-and-white photos of human faces expressing a certain mental state (e.g.
they look concerned, happy, considered). More specifically, participants can see the eye
area of each face and have to deduce the person’s intentional state. For each face, partic-
ipants could choose from a menu of four possible intentional states the picture expresses,
27Appendix B.4.3 provides a more detailed description, including instructions.
28Nim belongs to the same class of combinatorial games as race games, for example the game “Race
to 100” that is used in other studies to measure strategical skill (Bosch-Rosa et al., 2015; Gneezy et al.,
2010; Levitt et al., 2011)
29The same questions as used in Bruguier et al. (2010). These problems are similar to questions in
standardized tests such as the SAT or GRE. The appendix provides a more detailed description (including
instructions) B.4.4.
30Psychologists mostly use self-reported measures, such as questionnaires (e.g. Reniers et al. (2011)).
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without time constraint. The options are such, that under normal circumstances the cor-
rect answer is obvious.31 This test measures the perspective taking abilities by inferring
others people mental state. The resulting measure is the number of correct answers.32
The Heider-Simmel Task consists of a pair of video clips in which geometric shapes
move on a plane imitating intentional social interaction (Heider and Simmel, 1944).33
The task tests the ability to develop a correct working model about others’ intentions
and goal-directnesses. Following Bruguier et al. (2010) we used a modified, incentivized
version of the original task.34 We stopped the videos every five seconds and asked the
participants to predict whether two of the shapes will be closer together, further apart,
or keep the same distance at the end of the next five-seconds sequence. Participants
had 5 seconds to answer each question.35 This version of the task allows a direct and
objective assessment whether the given prediction is correct.36 This test measures the
online simulation abilities (, i.e. out of the intentional moves of the geometric figures, the
participants should develop a working model allowing them to predict the future moves).
2.4.1.3 Summary statistics of the cognitive capacity measures
The results from the screening phase of all 20 sessions (N=640) shows that the two cog-
nitive capacities are largely independent of each other. Figure 2.4 displays the joint
distribution of the two dimensions. The red line shows the linear fit. The corresponding
correlation coefficient ρ = 0.099 suggests a very weak (but significant) correlation between
the two measures (p = 0.012, N = 640). The black horizontal and vertical lines indicate
the median for each dimension (, i.e. 59.37 and 57.3 for the A- and M-Dimension re-
spectively). We use the resulting four quadrants to classify our participants into the four
cognitive types, Featureless (FL), Semiotic (SE), Technocratic (TE), and Sophisticated
31The appendix provides a more detailed description (including instructions) for Reading the Mind in
the Eyes Test B.4.5.
32A low score in the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test is predictive of autism. People with autism
disorder score below average on cognitive empathy, i.e. mentalizing, but score about the same as healthy
controls when tested on affective empathy (Dziobek et al., 2008).
33The clips are publicly available, for example at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VTNmLt7QX8E.
34The original task asks participants several questions to describe the observed situation and thus
relies on free-form verbal responses to assess how much a participant anthropomorphizes the shapes and
theorizes about their “intentions.”
35The appendix provides a more detailed description (including instructions) of the Heider-Simmel-Task
B.4.6.
36Bruguier et al. (2010) show that a good performance in either test is predictive of the ability to detect
whether or not price movements in an experimental asset market are affected by traders with superior
insider information and to forecast price changes in such experimental asset market. This underlines
that subjects with higher mentalizing capacities detect more easily systematic patterns behind the price
process.
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of A and M performance measures
Each dot represents a participant. The horizontal axis shows the participant’s per-
formance in the M-Dimension, the vertical axis the performance in the A-Dimension.
The dot cloud suggests little relation between the two measures, as highlighted of the
red line of best linear fit. The black lines indicate the median for each measure (, i.e.
59.37 (A) and 57.3 (M)).
(SO).37 Table 2.2 lists the basic summary statistics of the total group and by cognitive
type. The participants in each skill category are similar with respect to age, with a mean
age around 23 years in all four categories, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no
contingency (p = 0.276, N = 640, Pearson χ2 test). However, the four groups are less
balanced with respect to gender (χ2 test, p < 0.001, N = 640) because women and men
tend to perform differently on the A-Dimension.38
We also elicited participants’ risk preferences using a Holt-Laury-type choice task
(Holt and Laury, 2002).39 The last column of Table 2.2 shows the average number of
times that a participant chose the lottery over the certain amount. The differences across
cognitive types are small and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no contingency (χ2
test, p = 0.302, N = 640).40
37As robustness checks, we conduct our analyses leaving out the participants close to the median and
leaving out the most extreme participants, which did no alter the results as reported in the respective
appendix.
38On average, women score 53.7 points out of 100, and men score about 63.1 points on that scale (t-test,
p < 0.001, N = 640). On the other hand, women tend to perform slightly better on the M-Dimension,
where women score on average 57.2 points, and men 55.9 points (t-test, p = 0.05, N = 640).
39A choice among a lottery that yields CHF20 or CHF0 with equal probability or a certain amount.
See appendix B.4.7.
40Nevertheless, we also demonstrate that all our results remain qualitative similar when controlling for
risk attitude.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics by Cognitive Type
Cognitive Type Participants Women (%) Age (years) Av. risky choices
Featureless (FL) 171 57.9 23.5 11.7
Semiotic (SE) 159 66.0 23.4 11.0
Technocratic (TE) 150 30.7 22.8 12.1
Sophisticated (SO) 160 43.1 22.9 12.4
Total 640 49.8 23.2 11.8
This table shows some average characteristics for each of the four types. Note that men tend to score higher in the A
dimension, resulting in a gender imbalance across skill types.
2.4.2 Phase 2: Experimental Asset Market
For the second phase, we divided participants of each session into two groups with 16
participants each and played a call market version of the Smith et al. (1988) asset market
with each of these groups.41 In each market the 16 participants were endowed with cash
and shares of an asset.42 The asset market lasts for 15 periods. Each period has a
trading phase, where participants can trade shares against cash, followed by a dividend
phase, where the asset pays a randomly drawn dividend.43 The random dividend is a
standard feature in the experimental asset market, in order to mimic the uncertainty of
the fundamental value steaming from the nature of the process. However, even in markets
with a certain per-period dividend and thus eliminated risk from the dividend one observes
deviations of the market price from the fundamental value (Porter and Smith, 1995). Cash
holdings are denoted in Rappen.
In each period, participants can trade shares by submitting one sell order and one
buy order.44 A buy order consists of the maximum price that a participant is willing
to pay for a share and the number of shares that the participant is willing to buy if
41We implemented a slightly modified version of the call market from the GIMS program for asset
market experiments in ztree (Palan, 2015).
42A market has 40 assets in circulation and each participant is randomly endowed with one of four
possible portfolios: 1 asset and 2228 Rappen; 2 assets and 1956 Rappen; 3 assets and 1684 Rappen; or 4
assets and 1412 Rappen. The amount of cash in each portfolio was chosen such that a participant could
earn on average the payment per hour in the laboratory in Zurich (i.e. 2500 Rappen) if he/she would
neither buy nor sell through the whole asset market and only earn the dividend. 100 Rappen = 1 Swiss
Franc (1 Swiss Franc ≈ USD 0.98 at the time of the experiment).
43Shares of the asset have no intrinsic value beyond the dividend stream. The dividend is drawn from
the set d ∈ {0, 8, 28, 60}, each number with probability 0.25. We generated a random dividend stream at
the beginning of the study and used this stream in each of the sessions to keep the inflow of cash constant
across all markets.
44Appendix B.7 shows the trading screen.
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the market price is at most equal to the participant’s maximum offer. Conversely, a sell
order consists of the minimum price at which a participant is willing to sell a share and
the number of shares that the participant is willing to sell if the price is at least equal
to the minimum bid.45 The computer automatically collects all buy and sell orders and
calculates a market-clearing equilibrium price.
For our experiment, the call market offers two advantages over a double auction. First,
the resulting data are better suited for the analysis of participants’ trading strategies,
because buy and sell orders can be interpreted as participants’ willingness to pay and
willingness to accept. Second, the execution of a call market saves time compared to the
double auction, which helped us to the duration of the a session manageable.
Aggregate outcome also depends on the market mechanism. Generally, as call markets
give fewer opportunities for making offers and trading shares, they exhibit fewer price
mirages, are in general closer to the rational expectation equilibrium, and have less trading
price volatility than double auctions. The fewer price mirages are mainly the result from
the removal of within-period trading dynamics in call markets, reducing the opportunities
both for speculative trading (Baghestanian et al., 2014) and for learning about others’
trading strategies. Thus, a call market reduces the amount of offers and the size of the
asset bubble compared to a double auction, which should limit the downside risk of trend
followers and the upside scope for speculation by bubble riders.
2.4.2.1 Market Price and Order Volumes
The average pattern of the market price and order volumes over the 15 periods are shown
in figure 2.5. Due to the expected dividend payment of 24 Rappen in each period, in
the first period the expected value of the asset is 360 Rappen and it decreases by 24
Rappen in each subsequent period leading to a declining fundamental value (solid grey
line). The lowest expected dividend earning from holding an asset is zero over all peri-
ods. The highest expected dividend earning from holding an asset is 60 Rappen in each
period with a dividend payment. Thus, it starts at 900 Rappen in the first period and it
declines by 60 Rappen in each period (dashed grey line). As discussed in section 2.3 given
the behaviour of our types, we expect that the market price stays above the downward
trending fundamental value.
As in many experimental asset markets, the average market price starts below the
expected value of 360 (Palan, 2013), here around 337 Rappen. Subsequently, the price
increases until period 6 or 7 - one market already peaked in period 1 (min) another
45Participants can leave their buy/sell order blank, in which case they will not buy/sell shares in this
period. The computer does not accept orders that violate a participant’s budget constraints, that is,
buying on credit and short selling are not allowed.
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Figure 2.5: Average Market Price (Baseline)
The solid black line shows the evolution of the average market price across
all baseline markets. The solid grey line shows the expected value and the
dashed line shows the highest possible earnings from the dividends over
period 1 to 15.
in period 12 (max). Then, between period 7 and 12 it stagnates or slightly declines.46
Finally, it crashes towards the end of the asset market. Thus, the deviation of the price
from the expected value (i.e. the bubble component) is negative at the beginning and
continuously increases afterwards until it bursts, see the grey dashed line in figure 2.8.
Due to the stagnating prices during the middle part, the bubble component is largest
between period 11 and 12 - where in one market the bubble peaked in period 9 (min) and
in another in period 14 (max). In the following, we refer to the period with the largest
deviation of the market price from the expected value as the peak period.
Notably the market price tracks closely the sell order prices. The number of assets
demanded on the buy side (100 - 200 per period in an average market) exceeds by far the
number of assets offered to sell (4-25 per period in an average market). Moreover, while
the number of assets demanded by buy-offers stays almost the same over all periods, the
number offered assets to sell declines from 25 to 4 towards the middle periods 6-9, till it
increases again to 30 towards the end, which leads to a u-shaped pattern in the number
of transacted assets itself.
2.4.3 Procedure
All 20 laboratory sessions followed a similar protocol and belonged to one of the following
three treatments, affecting the composition of the groups in the second phase. In the
baseline treatment (1) we grouped the subjects for the asset market according to their
randomly assigned pc number. For the A-seggregation treatment (2) we ranked the sub-
jects according to their performance in the word-problems and grouped them for the asset
46In some markets we even observed no trades and thus no prices mainly in this time interval.
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market into equal sized high-low groups.47 In an analogous way, in the M-seggregation
(3) treatment, participants were grouped into the asset market by using the Heider-Test
performance from phase 1.48 Before the actual trading in the asset market started49, we
informed the subjects about their own performance and how the other participants in
their asset market performed in the respective task.
Table 2.3: Grouping in Treatment Variations
Treatment Grouping # Groups/Markets # Participants
(High/Low)
Baseline Random 16 256
A-Seg. Word-Problems 12 (6/6) 192 (96/96)
M-Seg. Heider-Task 12 (6/6) 192 (96/96)
In phase 1, except for the Game of Nim, participants did not receive feedback about
their performance.50 The first phase lasted about 45 minutes, followed by a short break
(about 10 minutes) to revive. Phase 2 started with detailed paper instructions, which we
read aloud in front of all participants.51 Participants then had to answer comprehension
questions to ensure that the subjects understood the trading rules, especially the declining
expected value of the dividends.52and the calculation of their final pay-off. The asset
market did not start before all participants had answered all questions correctly.53 Finally,
we implemented two pay-off-irrelevant practice periods to make participants more familiar
with the computer interface. After the practice rounds, the 15 actual trading periods
started. The pay-off for phase 2 was determined by the amount in their cash account
at the end of the asset market, (i.e. shares of the asset became worthless after the final
period). Phase 2 took on average a little over 90 minutes. After Phase 2 was finished, we
administered the exit questionnaire and paid out participants in cash, when they left the
laboratory.54 The earnings for the entire session are the sum of the earnings for the tasks
in phase 1, the cash holdings at the end of period 15 in the asset market in phase 2, and
47In general, if the there was more than one person having the same value at the cut-off line and we
could not split the participants into equal sized groups, we again used the randomly assigned pc numbers
to assign those subjects with the same value in either the high- or low-group.
48Logistical constraints (especially the short time for preparing the segregation during the session)
did not allow for a more precise screening. Appendix B.11.2 reports the type distribution of each asset
market, as an ex-post approval that the chosen segregation procedure worked.
49After the instructions for phase two.
50We summarized performance at the end of the entire experiment.
51See appendix B.5
52See appendix B.6
53Cheung et al. (2014) show that making participants aware of the declining fundamental value in the
comprehension questions reduces the bubble size.
54The questionnaire is in appendix B.8
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a show-up fee of CHF 10.55 On average, subjects earned around CHF 69.77 with CHF
23.3 being the lowest and CHF 120.5 the highest payments.56 One entire session lasted
about 2.5 hours, which implies an hourly wage of CHF 27.6, excluding the show-up fee.
2.5 Results
This section presents the results from the laboratory experiments and starts with the
performance in the experimental asset market in our baseline condition of the four different
cognitive types. In a second step we try to analyse how and when the cognitive types
generate their gains and losses. In the final step, we look at how the different type
distributions affect the market outcome.
2.5.1 Performance
Note that the overall performance in the asset market (, i.e. cash holdings at the end
of period 15) is influenced by the trading gains (, i.e. the amount of money earned in
addition to dividend payments), and (random) dividend earnings. Since we are interested
in the decision taken, we concentrate first on the trading gains as a result of trading
shares with other participants.57 Both trading gains and dividend earnings increase the
cash holding at the end of the asset market58, we used excess return to capture both
strategies in a second step. Excess returns are the difference between the actual return
from the asset market (i.e., cash in period 15) and a counter-factual passive strategy,
that is, the cash a participant would have earned from just holding the initially endowed
shares. Consequently this measure shows the added value of the active decision made by
the participant, compared to a passive portfolio.
Result 2.1. The trading gains for all four cognitive types differ as predicted by the con-
ceptual framework, i.e. sophisticates (semiotic) realize the largest trading gains (losses),
while featureless and technocratic barely generate notable trading gains. Thus, focusing
on just one of the two dimension masks important heterogeneity across cognitive types.
55Thus the earnings in phase 1 could not be lost in the asset market, where we endowed each participant
with cash and assets, such that if they do not trade, they could earn CHF 25 for the asset market, by
holding the original endowment.
56 Details about the earnings per task are documented in appendix B.2.
57Considering the cash holdings at the end of period 15 does not alter the ranking for the overall
performance. At the end of period 15 Featureless-types hold on average CHF 28.38, Semiotic CHF 26.86,
Technocratic CHF 29.03 and Sophisticated CHF 30.09 in their cash account.
58Which was the actual task, since participants received their cash holdings at the end of period 15.
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Being better at only one cognitive capacity does not increases trading gains. Moreover, a
one-sided specialization on mentalizing capacities leads to substantial losses.
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Figure 2.6: Trading gains across cognitive types
On the vertical axis, we plot trading income over the entire duration of the asset market for the
baseline treatments (N=256). Panel (a) shows both the median split along to the A dimension
(left side) and along the M dimension (right side). Viewed in isolation, the A dimension shows
a substantial difference in trading gains/losses, while the M dimension does not seem to predict
trading success. Panel (b) displays the four different types and uncovers great heterogeneity. The
semiotic type incurs most of the losses while the sophisticated type earn most of the profits and
the featureless types as well as the technocrats earn zero profits.
The left side of panel 2.6a shows the difference in average trading income between par-
ticipants who score above the median on the analytical dimension and those who score
below the median. In line with most of the existing literature, we find that, on aver-
age, better analytical skill translates into trading profits while low analytical capacities
results in losses. On the other hand, the mentalizing dimension alone does not explain
much (right side of the panel). However, as described in the conceptual framework in
section 2.3, we expect that considering the two dimensions in isolation masks substantial
heterogeneity. In particular, 94 percent of the profit of the average 250 Rappen profit for
those with high analytical capacities accrue to sophisticates, and only 6 percent to the
technocratic types. Similarly, of the average 177 Rappen loss for those with low analyt-
ical capacities, 99 percent fall to the semiotic type and only 1 percent to the featureless
type. Panel 2.6b shows the split into our four cognitive types. Analytical capacities are
only a good predictor for trading gains if the participant scores high in the mentalizing
dimension, too.
Table B.2 confirms the visual impression from panel 2.6b with a set of OLS regressions
of trading gains on three dummy variables : A-high equals one if a participant scored above
median on the A dimension, and zero otherwise; likewise, M-high is one if the participant
scored above median on the M dimension; and A*M interacts these two variables. We find
that the four-type specification (M3) improves upon the two binary type specifications
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Table 2.4: Regression analysis trading gains across cognitive types
m1 m2 m3 m4
A-high 426.828*** 34.784 32.859
(135.771) (184.485) (188.558)
M-high -19.577 -424.671*** -431.895***
(129.846) (135.139) (133.028)
A*M 855.236*** 865.240***
(218.974) (224.123)
# Lottery -7.654
(15.215)
Constant -176.733*** 8.794 -4.034 87.382
(57.382) (58.361) (72.013) (197.230)
adj.R2 0.028 -0.004 0.052 0.049
N 256 256 256 256
OLS regressions, standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the market level, using
White sandwich estimators. Unit of observation: participant.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Dependent variable: Trading gains for entire asset market phase, in Rappen.
Independent variables: Constant: baseline category. “A-high:” dummy for above-median perfor-
mance in the A dimension; ‘M-high:” dummy for above-median performance in the M dimension;
“A*M:” interaction between A-high and M-high; # Lottery: number of times a participant chose
the lottery over the certain amount in the Holt-Laury task.
(M1 and M2) by uncovering the source of the difference between A-high-types and A-
low-types. As seen in the figure, we can show that the bulk of the profits are generated
by the sophisticates, who score high on both dimensions, and that most of the losses go
to the semiotic types. We find that the semiotic type performs worse than any other
type (p = 0.04 against FL, t-test, p < 0.0001 against SO, p = 0.05 against TE, both
Wald tests), and the sophisticated type performs significantly better than all other types
(p = 0.004 against FL, p = 0.05 against TE, both Wald tests). However, we cannot reject
the hypothesis that the technocratic type does better than the featureless type (p = 0.87,
t-test).59 Thus, we find that being good in only one dimension and lacking capacities in
the other is at best not different than scoring low on both (in the case of the technocratic
type) and at worst disastrous to trading gains (in the case of the semiotic type).
59The same is true if we control for risk attitudes in the form of number of risky choices in the Holt-
Laury task (M4). If anything, the differences in parameter estimates become larger than in M3. Semiotic
type performs worst (p = 0.006 against FL, t-test, p < 0.0001 against SO, p = 0.0233 against TE, both
Wald tests); SO performs best (p = 0.004 against FL, p = 0.04 against TE, both Wald tests). Risk
attitude itself has a negligible and insignificant effect on trading gains (p = 0.0.6, t-test).
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Figure 2.7: Portfolio excess returns
Excess returns compared to passive strategy by cognitive type. Vertical axis shows
average excess return, horizontal axis shows standard deviation of excess return across
participants within cognitive type. The more to the upper left, the better the per-
formance and the more homogeneous is the behaviour among individuals of the same
type. The figure shows that the average sophisticate strategy entails both the highest
return and highest consistency in behaviour while the semiotic type has simultaneously
the lowest return and the highest heterogeneity among individuals in this group.
While trading gains reflect the performance due to action by the participant, it neglects
the potential strategy decision of holding assets and earning the dividend. Therefore we
use excess return to capture both strategies. Figure 2.7 shows participants’ excess returns
across the four cognitive types. We plot the average excess return, separated by cognitive
type, on the vertical axis. On the horizontal axis, we plot the standard deviation of excess
return across participants within the group of cognitive types. That is, the higher the dot,
the better the average excess return of this cognitive type compared to a passive strategy;
the more to the left, the more consistent is the type as a group in achieving this return.
We find that the sophisticated types are not only the one with the highest performance
but also with the least variation in performance. On the other hand, the semiotic types
have both a negative return (meaning this type would have done better leaving the initial
portfolio alone) but also the highest variation in performance. The technocratic types
have the second highest excess return but show also the second largest variation. Finally,
the featureless types have an excess return close to zero and a relatively low variation.
Due to the high variation of the returns for most of the types, we run analogously to
table B.2 regressions on the total trading income using different quantiles for classifying
the types. The main direction of the effects do not change as the results reported in
appendix B.10 suggest.
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2.5.2 Trading Styles
Following the conceptual framework, the differences in performance of the cognitive types
should be the result of different ways of expectation formation and thus heterogeneous
trading patterns. The experimental evidence mainly confirms hypotheses (H1-H3) of your
conceptual framework.
Result 2.2. The cognitive types show mainly distinct trading patterns H 2.1 particular in
terms of as asset holdings. While the technocrats and semiotic types have opposed trading
strategies H 2.3, the sophisticated type shows a mixture of both H 2.2. The sophisticated
types are significantly better at solving the timing problem, when to exit the bubble, which
enables them to earn higher trading gains.
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Figure 2.8: Type-wise Mean Asset holding
Mean asset holdings per type over time (left y-axis) and mean bubble component (right axis) (, i.e.
the mean of the difference between market price and fundamental value). Note that the bubble
component is on average negative at the beginning and increases till period 11 or 12, followed by
a sharp decline (, which is a bit later then the market price that on average has its peak in period
6 or 7, followed by a stagnation and a crash from period 12 onwards).
Asset holdings: Successful trades lead to changes in the asset holding and the size of
the change depends on the quantity successfully offered. Figure 2.8 plots on the left y-axis
the mean asset holdings per type at the end of each period, after all trades are settled and
on the right y-axis the size of the bubble60 as a measure of the average market dynamics.
60The mean of the market price less the fundamental value
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On average, the semiotic types accumulates assets over time, while technocratic types
increase their asset holdings in the first three periods but then quickly sell their assets,
apart from an repurchase endgame effect. Moreover, sophisticates sell their assets in the
first three periods and then start to increase the number of assets again up to period 6,
while holding them and starting a consequent lowering of their asset holdings before the
peak of the bubble. Finally, the featureless types holds an almost unchanged stock of
assets over all periods.
A variance analysis suggests that there are differences among the four types in terms
of asset holdings. Comparing the asset holdings of two types with each other, one can
reject the null that the asset holdings are the same at the level of p < 0.0001 for the
comparison between the LS vs. SE, LS vs. SO, SE vs. TE, SE vs. SO can and at
p = 0.1 for LS vs. TE. The reaming comparison of the SO vs. TE is insignificant.61
Table 2.5 regresses for each mental type the asset holdings at the end of each period
on the fundamental of the current period and the price of the actual period. Starting
with the featureless type in the first column, beside the constant of around 2.8 assets
there is no significant effect of either component on the asset holdings. Confirming the
visual impression of figure 2.8 that on average the featureless type remain with their asset
holdings. In contrast the asset holding of the semiotic type correlates highly significantly
negative with the fundamental value and positive with price of the last period. While
according to the conceptual framework we would have expected no significant correlation
with the fundamental value; the significant positive correlation with the price of the last
period is in line with the framework. The technocratic types positively correlate with
the current fundamental value, which is also in line with the predictions. , which is in
line with the predictions, too. While the positive signs for both components for the asset
holding of the sophisticated are in line with the predictions, there is no significance on
either component.
Table 2.6 takes on closer look on the differences in the determinants of asset holdings
among types. Here the data on asset holdings of two types are pooled62 together, and ad-
ditionally we introduced a dummy i ∈ {FL, SE, TE, SO} for one of types and multiplied
it with the components. This way we can disentangle the additional effect of belonging
to group i in comparison to the other and whether this difference is significant. Starting
with the comparison of FL vs. SE in the first column, the regression suggests that be-
longing to semiotic type makes those participant react significantly more negative on the
61Running an F-Test on testing the null that both compared types are the same, yields similar results,
with SE vs. SO and SE vs. TE being highly significant different (p-Value<0.001); FL vs. SE and FL vs.
SO being significantly different (p-Value=0.05); FL vs. TE and TE vs. SO not being different at all.
62E.g.: For the FL vs. SE, for the regression we pooled the data from the participants being either FL
or SE and ignored the others
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Table 2.5: Determinants of asset holdings per type
FL SE TE SO
FVt -0.001 -0.004*** 0.004** 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
pt−1 -0.000 0.003*** -0.004 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Constant 2.827*** 2.944*** 2.796*** 1.137
(0.305) (0.320) (0.997) (0.828)
R2-overall 0.0012 0.0162 0.0093 0.089
N 1176 822 713 729
Standard random effects estimator, using clustered standard errors at the market level, robust standard errors
in parentheses. Unit of observation: participant.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Dependent variable: Asset holdings at the end of each period
Independent variables: “FVt:” Fundamental Value, expected dividend earnings at the beginning of the period
(, i.e. FVt = (16− t) ∗ 24; “pt−1:” Price in the last period.
fundamental and weakly significant positive to the last period price, than those belonging
to the featureless types. The FL vs. TE comparison in the second column suggests only
a difference in coefficient for the fundamental, with the TE reacting stronger to it. While
the coefficient on both components are similar for the FL vs. SO comparison, there is an
overall difference that on average over all periods sophisticated hold 1.7 assets less than
the featureless type. The semiotic and technocratic types, those having the diametral
cognitive capacities, also differ significantly in their reaction to the fundamental and last
period price, with the technocrats following stronger the fundamental value and less the
last period price. Comparing semiotic and sophisticated, they differ in terms that the
sophisticated reacts more positive to the fundamental value of the asset. The TE vs.
SO comparison shows no significant differences in both types’ reactions. However, the
differences in the coefficients points in the right direction.
Summarizing, the regressions on the asset holding dynamics and willingness to pay
and accept mainly support that there are differences among the cognitive types, beside
for the comparison among technocratic and sophisticated types.
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Timing The question remains what leads to the significant differences in trading gains
between the technocratic and the sophisticated, if they respond similar to changes in the
fundamental and prices in their expected value63 as well as in the quantity of assets hold.
Figure 2.8 already indicates that the sophisticated on average reduce their asset holdings
slightly before the market price reaches it high. Figure 2.9 plots the average net quantity
traded per cognitive type ( i.e. numbers of assets bought less number of assets sold)
around the peak of the market price in period 7 or 8. In general the traded number of
assets declines toward the peak of the market price and increases towards the end ( when
the bubble bursts). The sophisticated types are the only one that are consistently on the
net sell-side once the price started to fall (Period 8 onwards), indicating that on the one
hand they are better with the timing on average and on the other also drive down the
market price with their collective action.
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Figure 2.9: Net of successful trades per cognitive type group
This figure shows the net number of successful trades made per cognitive type group over time in
an average market, for the periods around the burst of the bubble (, i.e. 6-14). The net number
of successful trades is the the sum of all assets bought less the sum of all sold assets per cognitive
type group for each period. A positive number means, that this group in total bought more assets
in the specific period; a negative number means that the cognitive type group sold more assets as
a whole group.
Testing this timing ability, we compared whether the types anticipate an increase or
drop in the price for the next period by adjusting their asset holdings. A drop (increase) in
the market price of the subsequent period is defined as a market price, pt+1, below (above)
the market price of the current one, pt. Note that, when the subjects make their offers
63Approximated by their willingness to accept and pay.
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neither pt nor pt+1 have been realized. On average each market experienced 5− 6 periods
where the market price went up in the subsequent period, with a minimum of 2 and a
maximum of 8 periods; 6−7 periods where the market price went down, with a minimum
of 2 and a maximum of 11 periods. Since the behaviour might be different if a price drops
or increases in the next period, we separated the cases and run type wise comparisons
regarding the number of assets bought or sold in the current period. Table 2.7 compares
the asset change, assets hold at the end of the period less the asset hold at the beginning,
in the current period if the price goes up in the next period. This is done by regressing
the asset change on dummies for belonging to one of the groups. Take column four, which
compares the semiotic and the technocratic types: The constant says that on average
the semiotic types buy 0.1 assets if the market price goes up in the next period, which
is weakly significantly different from zero. While the technocrats significantly buy 0.26
assets less then semiotics. However, the insignificant constant in column six shows that
on average the amount of assets sold by the technocrats does not significantly differ from
zero. The bottom line is that only the semiotics buy weakly significant into the asset, if
the market price goes up the subsequent period and only technocrats differ significantly
in this regard from the semiotics.
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The main interest, when it comes to timing a bubble, is the anticipation of the drop
in the market price. Table 2.8 reports the average amount of changes in the asset holding
and how the types differ. Again the semiotic systematically buy the asset, if the asset
price goes down in the next period. However, the sophisticated significantly, reduce on
average their asset holdings by 0.17 assets in the current period anticipating that the price
goes down in the subsequent period. The sophisticated significantly differ in this regard
from the technocratic and semiotic types. This indicates, that the sophisticates might be
better at solving the timing issue and exit the bubble early and consequent enough, which
initiates the fall in the market price.
Willingness to pay and accept: The conceptual framework predicts that TE-types
follow a fundamentalist trading-style, SE-types a momentum trading-style, FL-types a
noise-trading style and SO-types a bubble-riding trading-style. In order to test for the
hypotheses, that all cognitive types follow the same trading strategy H 2.1 - which we
want to reject - more rigorously, we use the period-wise individual willingness to pay64
and accept65 as a measure for the expected value Ei(Vt). We estimate equation (2.1)
separately for each type and compare the estimated coefficients among the types.
Table 2.9: Willingness to pay per type
FL SE TE SO
FVt 0.261*** 0.174*** 0.478*** 0.606***
(0.051) (0.044) (0.068) (0.111)
pt−1 0.799*** 0.807*** 0.684*** 0.549***
(0.056) (0.0914) (0.096) (0.179)
Constant -71.95*** -66.482** -83.592*** -82.887**
(25.25) (31.34) (22.712) (36.358)
R2-overall 0.214 0.212 0.318 0.359
N 927 684 586 600
Standard random effects estimator, using clustered standard errors at the market level, robust standard errors
in parentheses. Unit of observation: participant.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Dependent variable: Willingness to pay for each period
Independent variables: “FVt:” Fundamental Value, expected dividend earnings at the beginning of the period
(, i.e. FVt = (16− t) ∗ 24; “pt−1:” Price in the last period.
Table 2.9 shows that for all types the estimated αi1, αi2 have the expected signs.66 A
higher fundamental value and a higher last period price both increase the willingness to
64See table 2.9.
65See table B.4.
66The Breusch-Pagan test suggests a random-effects model. One can reproduce the same results with
OLS with clustered standard errors for robustness.
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pay. An F -test rejects the null hypothesis that both coefficients are the same for all
possible combinations of types67, except for the comparison of technocratic vs. sophisti-
cated types and featureless vs. semiotic types. Hence we can reject H 2.1 that any two
different cognitive types have the same cognitive model for the price expectation, beside
for the two comparison featureless vs. semiotic and technocratic vs. sophisticated types.
A closer look at table 2.9 shows that the weights for the fundamental value is larger for
the technocratic type than for the semiotic, while the latter puts more emphasis on the
momentum component, which gives support for H 2.3. Moreover the difference among
sophisticated and technocratic types are reverse to what we expected, the technocrat has
a larger weight on the last period price than the sophisticated-type and a lower one on
the fundamental value.68 Taken together, the willingness to buy and the willingness to
accept analysis provides weak evidence in support for the differences in the valuation of
the asset by each type.
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Figure 2.10: Cumulative Trading Gains per Cognitive Type
This figure shows on the y-axis the average cumulative trading gains (, i.e. amount
earned from selling assets less amount spend on buying assets up to the current period),
per type. In order to compare market dynamics the average market price (grey line)
and the average bubble component (, i.e. market price less expected value of the asset)
(grey dotted line) are added.
Summary on trading styles: Figure 2.10 summarizes the findings and observation in
this trading pattern analysis by plotting the average cumulative trading gains, amount
earned from selling assets less amount spend on buying assets up to the current period,
67At the 1% level for the pairs: FL vs. TE, FL vs. SO, SE vs. TE, SE vs. SO. The same holds if we
include the additional requirement of a common intercept.
68In appendix B.11 table B.3, table B.3 and table B.5 we document and discuss results, testing for the
differences of the parameters among types, i.e. to reject the null hypothesis that αi1 = α
j
1 or αi2 = α
j
2 for
i, j ∈ {TE, SO, SE}, we run additional regressions with pairwise comparison of types.
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of each cognitive type. The average market price and bubble component has been added
in order to compare the cumulative trading gains with the overall market dynamics. The
featureless types, on average do not change their asset holdings over time, but increase it a
bit in the second half, leading to on average small losses in the trading gains. The semiotic
type keeps on building up their asset holding depository and thus generate their large
trading losses over the whole 15 periods. The technocrats generate their trading gains in
the first 8 to 9 periods and then keep them mainly constant. While the sophisticated sell
a bit at the beginning, staying stable in the first half of the market and then increasing
their trading gains from period 9-13, the period between the peak of the market price and
the peak of the bubble, thus before the market price starts to fall steeply. Figure B.21 in
appendix B.11.1 confirms with cash holdings at the end of the period, that sophisticated
mainly differ in the timing, when they reduce their asset holding and by how much, which
leads to their significant difference in trading gains at the end of the market in period 15.
2.5.3 Market Outcomes
Given the previous results we can conjecture that a higher share of technocratic types
will bring the market price closer to the fundamental value whereas more sophisticates
will lead to an earlier peak in the market price. Thus the cognitive type composition in
the market affects the market price and therefore the size of the bubble.69
Result 2.3. The type distribution affects the market outcome. Particularly, a higher share
of A-high types in a market reduces the size of the bubble. We do not find similar effects
for the M-dimension. Regression results indicate that differences in market outcomes of
the A-segregation seem to be driven by the sophisticated and semiotic types. The no-effect
in the M-segregation is the result of offsetting behaviour from the sophisticated and the
semiotic types in the same market.
In order to test how the distribution of types influence the asset market we conducted
the segregation treatments, where we split the participants after the first phase according
to their performance in the respective dimension. As described in section 2.4, we created
markets with participants who tend to score high or low in one dimension, resulting in
A-high, A-low, M-high, and M-low markets.
The market outcomes for the split along the A-dimension are plotted in figure 2.11
(a); it compares the average prices (full black line) in the baseline markets with the
average market price in the A-low (dark blue line) and A-high (light blue line). In all
69Note in the conceptual framework is no specific discussion of how the cognitive types affect the market
outcome. Thus the subsequent empirical analysis is more of an empirical observation, then a clear test
of a hypothesis from the conceptual framework.
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Figure 2.11: Market Prices in the Segregation Treatments
In both graphs the full black line is the average market price across all markets in the respective
treatment, the grey full line is the expected value and the dotted line is the highest possible earnings
from the dividends. Graph (a) Light (dark) blue is the average market price in the A-low (high)
markets. Graph (b) Light (dark) blue is the average market price in the M-low (high) markets.
three markets, the first one or two periods have market prices below the expected value
(grey full line). The A-high markets are closest to the expected value in the first periods,
thus show the smallest undervaluation. This deviation pattern remains over the rest of
the asset market game ( i.e., the average price shows the smallest bubble and remains
below the maximum one could earn from the dividend (dotted line)). Those markets with
relatively more A- low types show the largest deviation (up- and downwards) from the
expected value.70
A segregation along the M-dimension, see figure 2.11 (b), did not result in any signifi-
cant differences among both market types, nor compared to the baseline markets. M-high
types act differently depending on the composition of types in the market. Thus it might
be that a simple segregation neglects particular interactions among types. In order to
test for possible interaction effects, we ran regressions on the market level. The market
price, trading volume, the period with the largest deviation of the market price from the
fundamental value (peak period) and the size of the largest deviation (bubble max) are
the market outcomes we were interested in. As explanatory variables we used the median
of A- & M-capacities and the interaction of both capacities in the markets. Table 2.10
reports the results for all periods.
When it comes to the market price, the median analytical capacity does not affect the
market price. The higher the median mentalizing capacities in the market the higher is
70This observation is in line with the literature that higher average analytically capacities in the market,
lead to lower bubbles sizes (Breaban and Noussair, 2015; Cueva and Rustichini, 2015).
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Table 2.10: Median cognitive capacities and market outcome
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price Volume Peak Period Bubble max.
(p 50) A 1.307 0.074* 0.147 4.108
(1.668) (0.042) (0.092) (4.620)
(p 50) M 4.030* 0.106** 0.074 10.206*
(2.135) (0.053) (0.116) (5.862)
(p 50) AxM -0.061** -0.002** -0.003* -0.133
(0.029) (0.001) (0.002) (0.081)
Constant 211.474* 0.361 7.470 -130.457
(120.323) (3.023) (6.572) (331.240)
adj. R-squared 7189.78 3093.97 163.60 477.20
N 576 600 40 40
OLS estimator, using clustered standard errors at the market level, robust standard errors in parentheses. For
regression (1) and (2) we pooled all periods and markets. Since there is only one largest deviation (3) and (4)
only have one result per market. Unit of observation: session.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Dependent variable: “ Price:" Market Price; “Volume:" Number of asset traded; “Peak Period:" Period with the
largest deviation of the market price from the fundamental value; “Bubble max:" Size of the largest deviation
of the market price from the fundamental value;
Independent variables: “(p50) A:" Median of the analytical capacity in the market; “(p50) M:" Median of
the mentalizing capacity in the market; “(p50) AxM:" Median of the interaction of analytical and mentalizing
capacities in the market.
the market price; while a larger median interaction term between both capacities reduces
the market price significantly. If the market median of one of the capacities increases the
trading volume becomes larger, whereas the median interaction term reduces the trading
volume in the market. The larger the median of the interaction term in the market, the
earlier is the peak of the bubble(i.e., the period with the largest deviation from the market
price). And finally, the higher the median mentalizing capacity the bigger is the size of
the largest deviation of the market price from the fundamental value.
Interpreting these results within the conceptual framework: The more the median
participant in the market has a cognitive capacity mix of a technocratic type, the higher
the traded volume will be. The more the median participant has a mix of the semiotic
type, the higher the market price will be, the more will be traded and the bigger will be
the size of the largest deviation of the market price from the fundamental value. The more
the median participant has the mix of a sophisticated type, the lower is the market price,
the less will be traded and the earlier will the bubble burst. Thus again, the differences in
market outcomes of the A-segregation seem to be driven by the sophisticated and semiotic
types. Where the former led to an early peak of the bubble in the A-high market and the
latter amplified the trend of the market price in the A-low markets. The no-effect in the
M-segregation would be the result of offsetting trading behaviour from the sophisticated
and the semiotic types in the same market. On the one side the semiotic types follow the
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trend and tend to make the bubble more extreme. On the other side the sophisticated
ride the bubble but are also the ones leading to the burst of the bubble; with more
sophisticated in the market, the bubble peak will be earlier, reducing the bubble size.
This finally affects the trend following behaviour of the semiotic types.
2.6 Conclusion
Many price patterns observed in real financial markets can only be explained by ac-
counting for heterogeneous behaviour across traders (Boswijk et al., 2007). Creating a
framework of heterogeneous behaviour that goes beyond the purely descriptive level, and
explains why and how heterogeneous expectations are formed, is an important challenge
to behavioural economics and finance (Hommes, 2011). While there is an important liter-
ature on the implications of heterogeneous information for asset markets (Brunnermeier,
2008), heterogeneity in the perception and processing of information has received much
less attention. It is proposed that even if everyone receives the same information, the pro-
cessing of this information and thus the perception of it differs among individuals. The
source of these heterogeneous perceptions lie in the differences in cognitive capacities.
We started with the working hypothesis that the way humans think about invest-
ment decisions is the product of two fundamentally different cognitive capacities: The
analytical capacity, A-Dimension, captures a person’s grasp of the quantitative aspect of
a decision problem, which helps individuals predict the equilibrium outcome of a game;
the mentalizing capacity, M-Dimension, is the ability to understand others’ beliefs and
intentions, which helps to predict their actions. The variation in the level of these two
capacities led to different perceptions of the decision situation and thus heterogeneous
behaviour.
We applied this hypothesis to a decision situation of an investor and discussed in
a simple conceptual framework how the two independent cognitive capacities influence
expectation formation and thus leads to heterogeneous behaviour in asset markets. The
basic notion is that a deficit in either dimension led to a systematically distorted cognitive
model of future price developments, which in turn biases willingness to pay for an asset
and willingness to accept an offer as well the traded quantity. Most importantly, a single
dimension alone is insufficient to explain the observed behaviour. In order to provide a
simple conceptual framework for how these cognitive capacities affect the behaviour, we
use four stylized cognitive types: The featureless type (FL) lacks both capacities and we
expect this cognitive type to have an unsystematic trading style. The technocratic type
(TE) has strong analytical capacity but lacks mentalizing ones. This type will be able
to identify the fundamental value of the asset and avoid trading losses. The semiotic
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type (SE) possesses high mentalizing capacities and has poor analytical capacities. This
type will identify the systematic (upward) trend of the market price, but has difficulties
in recognizing the departure from the fundamental value, which leads to late exit and
heavy losses. Only the sophisticated type (SO), who has both capacities, will identify the
systematic departure from the fundamental and anticipate the eventual return of the price
to the fundamental value. Based on this framework we derived the testable predictions
that there is a mapping from each cognitive type to one of the following trading styles:
fundamentalist- (TE), momentum-trading (SE), noise trading (FL) and bubble riding
(SO).
Our experimental approach allows us to test these predictions in a tightly controlled
environment, where we can measure each trader’s two dimensional cognitive capacities
mix independently and observe their trading behaviour in a simple experimental asset
call-market with exogenously imposed fundamental values. The empirical findings can
be summarized in three key results: (1) Analysing the trading gains of the asset market,
we observe that the four cognitive types achieve different outcomes. While sophisticates
realize the largest trading gains, the semiotic types face the largest losses. We found barely
notable differences among the featureless and technocratic types in terms of trading gains.
Thus, focusing on just one of the two dimension masks important heterogeneity across
cognitive types. Being better at only one cognitive capacity does not increases trading
gains. Moreover, a one-sided specialization on mentalizing capacities leads to substantial
losses. (2) These differences in trading gains are the result of heterogeneous trading
patterns. While the technocrats and semiotic types have opposed trading strategies, with
the former following a fundamentalist approach and the latter act as momentum traders.
The sophisticated behaves like a bubble rider and is significantly better at timing the exit
of the bubble, before the market price declines strongly. (3) On the market level we found
that a higher share of A-high types reduce the bubble size, while there is no effect if the
share of M-types becomes larger. The differences in market outcome in the A-segregation
seem to be driven by the trading behaviour of the sophisticated and semiotic types. Where
the former led to an early peak of the bubble in the A-high market and the latter amplify
the trend of the market price in the A-low markets. The no-effect in the M-segregation
is the result of offsetting behaviour from the sophisticated and the semiotic types in the
same market.
In sum our results uncover a structure that was hidden in previous, one-dimensional
approaches that mostly aimed at the analytical dimension of cognitive capacities (e.g.,
performance in beauty contest as measure for strategic sophistication (Bosch-Rosa et al.,
2015; Camerer and Ho, 2015)). The bottom line is that heterogeneity in cognitive capac-
ities translates into heterogeneity in behaviour and being better in one dimension does
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not compensate for a lack in another dimension on the behavioural level. In terms of
the experimental asset market: Being good in either analytical or mentalizing capacity
does not translate into higher trading gains, but can in fact be highly detrimental to
profits. We think that such interaction effects between both dimensions also appear to
(economic) decision situations beyond the asset market application. Another avenue to
take, is to test our findings in the field.71 Overall, understanding market dynamics and
why certain groups react the way they do, might help to better target policy measures
that may mitigate the rise of miss pricing in financial markets.72
This paper contributes to the discussion on skills of traders, by highlighting the in-
teraction of two cognitive capacities influencing trading decisions. Success in financial
markets is not pure luck but also the result of exercising the right cognitive capacities.
Making trading become a gamble if one lacks one of the necessary capacities to fully
understand the decision situation.
71Thus classifying real portfolio manager and small private investors according to the first phase of
our experiment and compare the returns in their portfolios. This might help to improve performance
by adjusting selection mechanisms for professional traders by institutional investors and nudging private
investors if they show tendencies for a certain behaviour, by highlighting certain information, they tend
to neglect.
72While technocrats and sophisticated do react on a certain information, semiotics might have difficul-
ties to decode the information and find an optimal response to it.
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3 Re-examining the effects of risk attitude
and over-confidence on trading behaviour
within experimental asset markets
3.1 Introduction
Investors risk-aversion (Geanakoplos, 2010) and over-confidence (De Bondt and Thaler,
1995) are among the most common explanations when it comes to anomalies on finan-
cial markets, such as deviations of the asset price from the fundamental value or excess
trading volumes. In order to test the influence of these trader characteristics on trad-
ing behaviour one has to both measure these characteristics and to observe the trading
behaviour. Laboratory experiments are well suited for such tests, since they allow to as-
sess separately participants characteristics and the trading behaviour. Furthermore, one
can control the trading environment and market size, knows the fundamental value and
the characteristics of all other market participants. Experimental studies examining the
influence of either risk-aversion or over-confidence rely either on a small number of partic-
ipants, or markets, or both. Furthermore, some of the studies changed the size, the length
of the markets or the incentive scheme; implying even fewer observations per treatment.
This manuscript takes advantage of a big dataset of 40 experimental asset markets which
last for 15 periods and uses the same underlying random dividend stream.1 Moreover,
in contrast to the other experimental studies, all markets are large with 16 participants
(N = 640 participants total), mitigating the market power of a single trader. This is a
broad data basis to re-examine the role of risk-aversion and over-confidence and to check
the robustness of previous results. In a first step, some definitions of risk-aversion and
over-confidence are given to clarify and structure the used concepts in this manuscript.
Risk-aversion: In everyday speech a person is considered to be risk-averse if this per-
son prefers an outcome with some uncertainty to an outcome with more uncertainty but
a higher expected value. In economic terms, risk-aversion is usually defined by a decision
maker who considers owning the expected outcome of a lottery to be at least as good as
1The 40 markets experienced one of three different treatments. For a description of these treatments
see section 2.4 of chapter 2.
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participating in this lottery.2 This definition leads to several measures of risk aversion
based on choosing among lotteries (Dohmen et al., 2010; Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Holt
and Laury, 2002). Even though such measures deliver precise rankings among subjects,
they might be to narrow (i.e., they might be only applicable to a specific set of situa-
tions where risk arises from an uncertain but known source(Ang et al., 2010)). A more
holistic approach for the measurement of risk-aversion is to understand risk-aversion as
a personality trait and thus, to use subsets of self-reported questions of personality ques-
tionnaires, as it is often done in psychology.3 In this study we use both approaches and
find similar results. Yet, patterns are more robust for the measures which are based on
the self-reported questions.
Over-confidence: Following Moore and Healy (2008) over-confidence can be classified
into three categories, depending on to whom a participant is comparing his or her abilities
and how these are measured. First, over-confidence in the sense of over-estimation means
that a person over-estimates his or her own “abilities, performance, level of control or
chances of success”(Moore and Healy, 2008, p.3). If for example a student believes that
his or her grade in an exam will be 4.0, while it is lower in reality, one would call this
over-estimation. This type of over-confidence is also known as miss-calibration. Second,
over-confidence in the sense of over-precision means that a person believes to make less
errors than it is actual the case. This makes people believe their judgements to be correct
in more cases than it is actually the case (Alpert and Raiffa, 1982; Lichtenstein et al.,
1977). Usually miss calibration is measured by asking participants to assign a probability
to any of their answer hat their answer is correct. Third, over-confidence in the sense of
over-placement makes participants think that they are better than others. For example
90% of US car drivers believe themselves to be a safer and more skilled driver than the
median driver in the US (Svenson, 1981). This phenomenon is also known as "the-better-
than-average-effect". In the subsequent analysis I will use an over-placement measure. In
what follows I refer to this measure as relative over-confidence.
The set-up of the experiment consists of two phases: In the first phase, the individual
participant characteristics were elicited. Risk-aversion was obtained in two distinct ways:
First, by the Holt-Laury task giving participants 20 choices between a certain outcome
and a risky lottery (Holt and Laury, 2002). While the risky lottery remains fix over all 20
decisions, the certain outcome increases from the first to the last decision. The number of
risky lottery choices over the certain outcome yields the measure of risk-attitude of a par-
2See Definition 6.C.1 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995).
3Such as: When it comes to driving a car, on a scale from 0 (very cautious) to 10 (very risk taking)
how would you judge your risk behaviour?
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ticipant. Second, by asking them self-reported questions on their everyday risk-attitude.
Relative over-confidence was measured by the respondent’s assessment of his or her rel-
ative performance (in quintiles) compared to other participants. The deviation between
the expected quintile and the real quintile yields the degree of relative over-confidence.
In the second phase, we let the participants trade a single asset in an experimental asset
market. Each share of the asset paid out a random dividend with an expected value of
24 Rappen in each period. In these type of markets the market price tends to be above
the fundamental value (i.e. a bubble).
The main results of the experiments are:
Risk-aversion: At the individual level no risk-aversion measure correlates with the final
pay-off from the experiment, the offered numbers of assets to buy, or the offered prices
to sell. Nevertheless, the offered buy price declines over all periods when participants are
more risk-averse in career matters. However, participants choosing more often the lottery
over the certain outcome in the Holt-Laury task tend to offer lower buy prices, once the
bubble bursts. This effect is weakly significant. During all 15 periods, more risk-averse
participants tend to offer less assets to sell, hold fewer assets, make less often bid- and
sell-offers and are involved in fewer successful trades. While these effects are small in
size for the whole market, the effects become stronger after the peak of the bubble. In
particular, in the final period one can speak of a considerable effect of the risk-measure.
At the market level, there is a correlation between the risk-measures and the trading
volume for all 15 periods. However, the higher the average number of risky-choices in the
Holt-Laury-task, the higher is the trading volume in the final period. The market price
tends to be lower, if the average risk-aversion is lower in the market. Again, this effect is
mainly driven by the periods after the peak of the bubble.
Relative Over-Confidence: At the individual level, there is no correlation between
the relative over-confidence measure and the final pay-off from the experiment. The only
(weakly) significant effect is that relatively over-confident participants offer more assets
to sell after the peak of the bubble. The weak significance of the effect raises the question
on multiple-testing and whether there are correlations among relative over-confidence and
individual trading behaviour.
At the market level, I find that market with, on average, higher relative over-confident
participants, tend to have a higher trading volume. The trading volume is particular
large once the bubble burst. Furthermore, markets with an higher average of relative
over-confidence experience higher market prices, in particular, around the peak of the
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bubble.
The remaining manuscript is structured as follows: Section two provides a literature
overview focusing on results from experimental studies. In section three, theoretical hy-
potheses are derived within a classic noisy rational expectation framework. Section four
describes the experimental design and section five discusses the empirical results. Finally
section six discusses the findings and concludes this manuscript.
3.2 Literature Review
Since Smith et al. (1988) the number of experimental asset market studies which aimed
at explaining financial market anomalies by individual trader characteristics exploded. In
this literature review, I restrict the focus to studies on the effects of risk attitude and over-
confidence on trading behaviour in experimental asset markets. The interested reader is
referred to Palan (2013) and Powell and Shestakova (2016) for a broader review on the
current state of research using experimental asset markets.
Risk-attitude: Ang et al. (2010) argue, similar to Geanakoplos (2010), that heterogene-
ity in risk attitudes can lead to price movements and that therefore prices can deviate
from the fundamental value. They test this hypothesis within 14 oral-double auction
markets with around 12 participants in each lasting over 10 periods; each market varies
either in the group composition, task of the participant (e.g. investment horizon, tourna-
ment structure etc.) or initial endowment. Risk attitudes are elicited based on a subset
of questions of a psychological personality inventory test (Jackson, 1976), and only those
participants with the lowest/the highest risk aversion were invited to participate in the
experimental asset market. Their main result is that less risk-averse participants tend to
speculative trading strategies and trade at higher prices on average.
Fellner and Maciejovsky (2007) use data from four blocks of continuous double auction
experimental asset markets with overall 26 markets and 280 participants. The blocks vary
by the number of periods (13-18), the subjects per market (8-12), the initial assets (5-
8) and the initial cash endowment (250-300 in experimental currency units). The risk
attitudes are derived based on a Holt-Laury task with seven decisions, where participants
had to choose between a risky binary lottery and a certain outcome. One of the decisions
was implemented randomly. The main finding is that the less risk averse participants are,
the higher the total market activity, the offers made, and the number of successful trades.
Breaban and Noussair (2015) conducted 16 sessions of experimental asset markets,
which lasted 15 periods and had 7-9 participants in each market. Each market had a flat
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fundamental value in periods 1-8. In periods 7-15 half of the markets had an increasing
fundamental value, while the other of the markets had a falling fundamental value. Risk
attitudes are assessed by a Holt-Laury task. The main results are: First, the higher the
average risk-aversion in the market, the lower the price level in markets with increasing
fundamental value. Second, at the individual level more risk averse participants tend to
sell more units, trade close to the fundamental value and are also less likely to behave like
a momentum trader.
Eckel and Füllbrunn (2015) analyse 12 markets with 9 participants in each market, but
varying gender composition in each market. Risk-aversion is elicited by a Holt-Laury task
using 6 lottery options that vary in risk and expected return (Eckel and Grossman, 2008).
The main finding is that markets with more risk-averse subjects tend to experience smaller
bubbles. This effect, however, is difficult to disentangle from the gender effect induced by
the group composition of the markets in the experimental design of Eckel and Füllbrunn
(2015).
Over-confidence: Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) investigated six experimental asset
markets with 12 participants each, measuring over-confidence by (a) over-precision and (b)
over-estimation tasks. Michailova (2011) investigated ten experimental asset markets with
6 participants each; over-confidence was measured by over-precision tasks.4 Both studies
show that markets with a significant proportion of highly over-confident participants
experience both larger bubbles and trading volume.
Smith (2012) conducted 6 experimental markets with 6 participants. Over-confidence
was measured by using (a) over-estimation and (b) over-placement tasks. The main
findings are: First, over-confident traders do not trade more than other traders, but they
might perform better. Markets with on average higher over-confident participants show
higher trading volumes, but no effect on the market price was found.
Oechssler et al. (2011) run in 18 sessions a continuous double auction market with 3
rounds, each round consisted of 10 real trading days, 10 participant and 5 assets to trade
in each market. Over-confidence was measured by using an over-placement task.5 They
find that an increase in the median over-confidence increases the probability of bubbles.
4I.e. letting participants answer 18 quiz questions and ask them about their confidence that the answer
is correct in percentage points. A bias score can be calculated by subtracting from the average percentage
confidence the average of correct answers.
5Over-confidence was operationalized by asking participants before each round to rank themselves
among the 60 other participants of the treatment in terms of payout after the round.
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3.3 Hypothesis formation
This section derives hypotheses based on a discussion on the influence of risk-aversion and
over-confidence within the standard competitive rational expectation model with hetero-
geneous information (Grossman, 1976; Hellwig, 1980). The derivation of the canonical
framework with traders competing in demand schedules follows Ch. 4.2 of Vives (2010).6
3.3.1 Model and risk-aversion:
Assume an economy with a single risky asset, with random liquidation value θ˜ which
is normally distributed with mean θ¯ and variance 1
τθ
.7 The economy is populated by
informed traders and noise traders, where the aggregated trade volume of the latter is
assumed to follow a random variable u˜ with mean zero and variance 1
τu
.8 The informed
risk-avers traders, indexed on the interval i ∈ [0, 1] with the Lebesque measure, derive
their utility from the return function Πi =
(
θ˜ − p
)
xi of buying xi shares of the risky asset
at price p. The utility function is of CARA-type Ui(Πi) = −e−ρiΠi , where ρi > 0 is the
CARA coefficient.9 The non-random initial wealth of the traders is normalized to zero.
Each trader i ∈ [0, 1] receives a signal si about the ex-post liquidation value θ˜, specifying
the signal as s˜i = θ˜+ ˜i; the errors,˜i, have mean zero and variance 1τ . Moreover, they are
uncorrelated across traders and uncorrelated with the noise trading volume, u˜, and the
liquidation value θ˜. The traders can condition their trades on the price and their private
signal si, thus the information set of trader i is {si, p}. The distributional assumptions
are common knowledge among all traders in the economy. The analysed equilibrium is a
symmetric one, in which all traders play the same strategy.10 The best response for any
arbitrary signal si and price p is given by:11
xi (si, p) =
E(θ˜|si, p)
ρiVar(θ˜|si, p)
(3.1)
From 3.1 one can derive the first testable hypothesis.
6Different to Vives (2010), I consider the special case that all traders are informed and receive a signal
about the liquidation value of the asset. Thus in terms of Vives (2010) the fraction of informed traders
is µ = 1.
7One can think of a fundamental value.
8The expected volume of noise trading E (|u|) is proportional to the standard variation 1√τθ . See
footnote 10 in Vives (2010) Ch. 4.2.
9Note a higher ρi implies a higher risk-aversion and ρ−1i can be interpreted as the risk tolerance of
the trader.
10See Vives (2010) pp. 114, for a formal definition of this type of equilibrium within this framework.
11 Vives (2010) pp.116.
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Hypothesis 3.1 (Individual Valuation and Risk-Aversion:). If agent j has a higher
risk aversion than agent i, i.e. ρj > ρi, and both have the same information set {sj, p} =
{si, p}, then agent j will trade less than agent i.
For the derivation of the market equilibrium Vives (2010) assumes, that all traders
have the same risk-aversion, i.e. ρi = ρ ∀i ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, traders understand the
relationship between the underlying uncertainty (θ˜, u˜) and prices. The informed traders
use a demand schedule strategy (i.e. upon reception of their private signal, traders submit
their demand schedules contingent on the private signal). Once the price is realized, the
amount the agent wants to invest into the risky asset is xi(si; p). Thus trader i’s strategy is
a mapping from his private signal to the correspondences of demand functions, xi(si; ·). In
addition, noise traders place their orders and then an auctioneer finds the market clearing
price.12 Using standard methods13 one can characterize the linear Bayesian equilibria of
this demand function game by:
xi(si; p) = ρ−1τ (si − p)− τθ
ρ+ ττuρ−1
(
p− θ¯
)
. (3.2)
In this equilibrium, informed traders have two reasons to trade: First, they can spec-
ulate on their private information with a responsiveness of ρ−1τ (perceived noise trading
motive). Second, they sell (buy) more of the asset if the price is above (below) the prior
expectation of the asset value, which corresponds to the typical behaviour of a market
maker. The intuition for this behaviour is that even if the traders are informed, due
to their noisy signal they do not fully know whether price changes are motivated by
other informed traders or by noise traders. The expected aggregate volume traded by the
informed traders is given by:14
E
[
|
∫ 1
0
xi(si; p)di|
]
=
√
2
τupi
. (3.3)
Hypothesis 3.2 (Expected Trading Volume and Risk-Aversion). The risk-aversion
of traders in a market, ρ, does not influence the expected trading volume in the market.
While it might be counter-intuitive, that risk-aversion can affect a single agents de-
cision and not the whole market, one has to keep in mind that on the aggregate and in
12If there are multiple market prices, then the one with minimum absolute value will be picked, if there
is also a negative price with the same absolute value the positive price will be chosen. If there is no
market-clearing price, the market shuts down and the auctioneer sets a price equal to ±∞ leaving the
traders with infinitely negative utility.
13See Vives (2010), pp.117, for details of the derivation.
14See Vives (2010) pp.121 for details of the derivation.
80 Effects of risk attitude and over-confidence on trading behaviour
expectations the speculation motives of all informed traders can cancel out each other.
Thus, the motive only for market-making is left (i.e. counterbalancing the noise trading).
The equilibrium market price in this linear Bayesian equilibrium is given by:15
P
(
θ˜, u
)
= θ¯ + λ−1
(
τρ
−1 (θ˜ − θ¯)+ u˜) . (3.4)
The parameter λ−1 = ρ+ττuρ−1
τ+τθ+τuτ2 ρ−2
is also known as the market depth, i.e. the impact on
the market price if the trading volume moves by one unit. If a market can absorb a large
trading volume without moving much, then this market is classified as a deep market.
Hypothesis 3.3 (Market Price and Risk-Aversion). The higher the risk-aversion of
traders in a market, ρ, the lower the relative weight, τρ−1, on the signal of the fundamental
value, when compared to the noise trading, u˜.
From equation 3.2, we know that the propensity to trade on the private signal, ρ−1τ,
declines in the risk-aversion of the traders. Thus, they are less willing to exploit their
private information, when they are more risk averse, which reduces the informativeness of
the market price. Therefore, loosely spoken, the more risk-averse the market participants,
the less will the market price track the fundamental value.16
3.3.2 Relative over-confidence:
Similar to the broad meaning of over-confidence, there exist several approaches of how
to model them. Most of these approaches focus on over-confidence in the sense of over-
estimation or over-precision. Kyle and Wang (1997) and Odean (1998) incorporate over-
precision in the trading model framework of Kyle (1985)17 and Hellwig (1980).18 They do
so, by assuming that an over-confident trader differs in his perception of the precision of
his private signal τˆ−1 . Thus, the trader perceives τˆ−1 < τ−1 .
In this manuscript the measure used is a relative over-confidence task.19 In the spirit of
Kyle and Wang (1997) and Odean (1998), one can interpret this relative over-confidence
as the perception of these agents that other agents are not as good as they are. Thus,
15See Vives (2010) pp.117 for details of the derivation.
16See Vives (2010) p.121 for a detailed discussion on the informativeness of the market price.
17Kyle and Wang (1997) show in their theoretical framework of rational speculation, that such miss-
calibrated traders generate higher expected profits than the rational opponent and that such traders can
persist and survive in the market in the long-run.
18Odean (1998) shows that higher miss-calibration of the traders implies a higher trading volume,
higher price volatility, less price quality and a lower expected utility.
19Thus subjects think they rank higher with their own performance relative to the others, then its
actual the case. E.g.: They think of them-self to belong to the best 20% in a group, even though they
belong to the middle 20%.
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agents perceive a higher noise trading activity in the market (i.e. their perceived noise-
trading τˆ−1u is larger than the actual τ−1u ). Hence, a larger perceived noise-trading activity,
τˆ−1u , can be interpreted as higher relative over-confidence. The following hypotheses are
the result of comparative statics with respect to τ−1u .
Hypothesis 3.4 (Expected Trading Volume and Relative Over-Confidence).
The higher the perceived noise-trading τˆ−1u in a market, the larger is the expected trading
volume in the market ( see equation 3.3).
Equation 3.2 shows that the speculation on the private signal, ρ−1τ, remains unaf-
fected by larger perceived noise trading. However, the market making motive, decreases
in τˆu and so does the perceived need to counterbalance the noise trading.
Hypothesis 3.5 (Market Price and Relative Over-Confidence). The relative weights
between changes in the fundamentals and noise trading in the equilibrium market price
remain unaffected by the perceived noise-trading, τˆ−1u , in the market (see equation 3.4).
The higher expected trading volume in the market increases the market depth (i.e.
λ−1 is lower). However, the change in market depth affects market price changes due to
changes in the fundamental value as well as the noise traders demand (see equation 3.4).
The relative weights among both components remain unaffected by a change in the per-
ceived noise-trading activity, τˆ−1u . Consequently, it is unclear, whether markets with
higher relative over-confident participants are more or less informative and thus track
closer or depart further from the fundamental value.
3.4 Experimental Design
The experimental sessions from chapter 2 also elicited risk-aversion and over-confidence,
providing a large data basis to test the influences of risk-aversion and over-confidence on
trading behaviour and observe trading behaviour independently. Thus, the procedure in
the sessions and the asset market are the same as described in section 2.4 of chapter 2.
In the following, I only describe the tasks measuring risk-preference and relative over-
confidence.20
3.4.1 Risk-Preference Task
Risk-preferences are measured by a standard Hault-Laury lottery task and several self-
reported questions asking the subjects to judge their risk-perception in specific real-life
situations.
20For a description of the other tasks refer to section 2.4 of chapter 2
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Holt-Laury lottery task: Risk-aversion was assessed by a choice task similar to Holt
and Laury (2002). The participants are confronted with a decision table with 20 decisions
to make between option A receiving a fix amount and option B a lottery with CHF 0 or
CHF 30 as equally likely outcomes. Each decision was presented in one row and the certain
amount increased from row to row, while the lottery was always the same. At the end of
the session, the computer randomly draw one of the 20 rows and implemented the choice
in this row, thereby determining the subjects payments in this task. This approach allows
us to determine the certainty equivalent of the subject and, thus, to compare the degree
of risk-aversion across subjects. The resulting variable is called [# Risky Choices].21 The
higher this variable, the less risk-averse was the choice made by the participant in this
task.
Dohmen et al. (2010) find that individuals with higher analytic capacities, measured
by two sub-modules of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, take significantly risk in the
Holt-Laury lottery task, this relation is independent from age and sex. This is in line with
recent work on the subjective component of risk perception (e.g., Andersen et al. (2014);
Harrison et al. (2015)).22
Self-reported questionnaire: As an alternative measure for risk-preferences, a self-
reported questionnaire was used. Questions concerning risk preferences were included to-
gether with the additional questions in an exit questionnaire at the end of the experiment.
To elicit risk preferences participants were asked to answer a couple of self-reported ques-
tions which would describe themselves. The most relevant for the analysis in section 3.5
are reported here:23
• You can behave differently in different contexts. How would you assess your will-
ingness to take risks in the following areas? [All questions had a scale from 0 (try
to avoid risks) - 10 (fully prepared to take risks))]
• With financial matters? [risk3]
• With your professional career? [risk5]
Thus, the higher risk 3 and risk 5 the lower is the self-reported risk-aversion in this
particular matter.
21Detailed instructions and the computer screen can be found in the appendix B.4.7.
22Therefore, the evaluation of the consequences between a lottery and a certain amount might be more
clear to a participant with higher analytic capacities.
23Note we also asked further questions on the risk-attitude that can be found in the appendix B.8.
Since these measures did not showed any robust effects, we do not analyse them further.
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3.4.2 Over-confidence Measure
Together with the Raven’s Matrices non-verbal IQ-Test24 we measured over-confidence,
by asking the subjects after the Raven’s Test: "Which group do you think you belong to?";
with "Best 20%", " 20% immediately below the best 20%", "Middle 20%", "20% immedi-
ately above the worst 20%" and "Worst 20%" as options to answer; thus corresponding to
the five quintiles.25 The relative over-confidence measure, OCrel, is constructed by sub-
tracting the estimated quintile, Qestimated, from the actual quintile of correct answers,
Qperformance. Both quintile measure can be either 1,2,3,4 or 5 with 1 corresponds to the
best 20% and 5 the worst 20%.26
OCrel = Qperformance−Qestimated (3.5)
Thus, if OCrel is zero, the estimated quintile coincides with the performance quintile; if
OCrel is positive (negative), the subject over (under)-estimates its quintile. The main
drawback of this measure is that eventually not all subjects can be classified due to the
limitation on its borders: In the most extreme case a very over-confident subject answer-
ing all (no) questions correctly can not be classified to be over (under)-confident according
to this measure.27
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Measure Mean SD Min/Max
# Risky Choices 11.78 3.89 0/20
risk3 2.90 2.19 0/10
risk5 4.86 2.61 0/10
OCrel 0.90 1.38 -4/4
Age 23.16 3.44 17/47
Gender 0.50 0.50 0/1
N=640, # Risky Choices, OCrel, risk3 and risk5 are as
described above; "Age": Self-reported age of the subject;
"Gender": dummy variable, 1 if the subjects reports to
be female and zero otherwise.
Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics of the risk-aversion and the over-confidence
24The appendix provides a more detailed description (including instructions) for Raven B.4.1.
25The screen can be found in the appendix B.4.2.
26Subjects having 7 or less correct answers in the Raven’s Test belonged to the worst 20%; those with
8 correct answers belonged to the second worst quintile; those with 9 correct answers belonged to the
middle quintile; subjects with 10 answers belonged to the second best quintile and those with 11 or 12
correct answers belonged to the best quintile.
27Which might partially explain the high negative correlation between the analytical dimension from
chapter 2 and OCrel, (ρ = −0.3411, p− value < 0.01).
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measures, gender, and age. On average, the participants are 23 years old; 50% of them are
female. At the Holt-Laury task participants started on average to prefer the save outcome
over the risky-lottery at CHF 12 which is lower as the expected value from the lottery
offered. The relative over-confidence measure, OCrel, indicates a slight overconfidence on
average.
Table C.1 in the appendix C.1 shows the correlation among all measures. The #
Risky Choices is weakly positive correlated with analytical capacities28,risk3 and risk5 ;
# Risky Choices and gender are negatively correlated. Most self-reported risk-measures
are positively correlated with each other29 indicating that, they measure a similar char-
acteristic of the subjects. OCrel is negatively correlated with analytical capacities and
slightly positively correlated with age.
3.5 Results
This section discusses the results from the laboratory experiments for the risk aversion
measures (section 3.5.1) and over-confidence measures (section 3.5.2). Each of these sub-
sections is divided into particular time periods of the experimental asset market (All-, 1st-,
before the bubble peak -, after the bubble peak-, 15th-period(s)). While it is obvious to
examine all periods, I also take a closer look on the period one, for two reasons: First,
some researchers speculate that the first period market price is below the expected value,
due to risk-averse participants (Palan, 2013). Second, due to the lack of a prior market
prices the participants have no information about the value expected of others. Since the
influence of risk-aversion and over-confidence might differ throughout the formation of
a bubble and after its crash, I separately analyse the periods before and after the peak
of the bubble, i.e. the period with the largest deviation of the market price from the
fundamental value. Finally, I also take a closer look on the final period, because after
the period fifteen the asset can not be traded any more (i.e, only the risky nature of the
dividend determines the value of the asset).
Individual trading behaviour is measured by the following outcome variables of indi-
vidual decisions made during the asset market: Offered Buy- and Sales Prices as well as
the numbers of assets offered to buy and sell; the number of assets hold at the end of the
period; the change in the assets inventory from the beginning of the period to the end of
the period and participation in the period (i.e., whether the participant made a sell or
an buy offer). Moreover, I analysed the effect on outcomes at the market level and used
as outcome variables: The market price, the trading volume, the period of the bubble
28As measured in chapter 2.
29Except for risk8 to risk4, risk5, and risk6
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peak and the size of the largest deviation of the market price from the fundamental value
(Bubble Max).
To present the results in a compact manner, the regression coefficients of the regres-
sions are summarized in tables 3.2 to 3.5. The full set of regression results is shifted to
in the appendix C.2 and C.3.
3.5.1 Risk-aversion
Result 3.1. Risk-Aversion: Individual Trading Behaviour
There are a few significant results of the risk-aversion measures on the outcome variables
at the individual level: More risk averse participant have a lower likelihood to make buy-
and sell offers, offer lower prices to buy the asset, offer a lower number of assets to sell,
hold less assets and is less often involved in successful trading. The majority of results
hold for the self-reported willingness to take financial or career risk measures but not for
risk-aversion measured by the Holt-Laury task. Nevertheless, these effects are small in
size and mainly driven by periods after the peak. In particular, in the final period, the
above mentioned effects of risk aversion become stronger in size and the significance level
increases. No effects on any of the outcome variables are found in the first period. Neither
of the risk measures has an impact on the final earnings from the asset market.
Table 3.2 and Table 3.2 summarize the estimation coefficients obtained from separate
OLS regressions of the individual trading behaviour variables and the risk-measures and
individual characteristics (age and gender), respectively. The discussion of the results will
refer to the respective tables in the appendix C.2.
All periods: There is a small effect between the offered buy-price and the self-reported
risk-attitude in professional career (risk5)30. If risk5 increases by one unit, the offered buy
price is 1.86 Rappen higher. The mean of all offered buy prices is 250 Rappen (SD:134.4),
thus the size of the effect is not very high and only significant on the 10% level. There
is not effect of any risk-aversion measure on the offered number of assets to buy31 or
offered sell-price32. The less risk averse the participant are in the Holt-Laury-Task (#
Risky Choices) the more assets they offer to sell.33 While this effect is highly significant,
the magnitude of the effect is not very large with 0.05 assets more offered to sell for one
unit increase in the Holt-Laury-task; considering that on average 2.2 (SD: 2.04) assets
were offered to sell. The assets hold at the end of the period increases if the participant
30See table C.2 column (4).
31See table C.4 columns (1,3,4).
32See table C.3 columns (1,3,4).
33See table C.5 column (1).
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is less risk-averse in the self-reported risk-attitude in financial decisions (risk3).34 A one
point increase in the risk3 measure increases the number of asset hold by 0.07. Given
that on average, the participants hold 2.5 (SD: 2.78) assets, the size of this effect is small.
Participants self-reporting less risk-aversion in risk3 and risk5 tend to build up their asset
holdings over all periods (Asset changes).35 But again with a small effect size of an 0.001
increase if the risk3 and risk5 measures go up by one unit. On average the number of asset
changes is zero with a standard deviation of 1.46. Furthermore the less the self-reported
risk-aversion in risk3 and risk5 the more often these participants make a buy- or a sell
offer in the market.36 On average 0.91 (SD: 0.28) participants make a buy- or a sell offer
in a period. There are no effects from any risk measure on the cash holdings at the end
of the asset market, and thus on the earnings from this task.37
1st period: The only effect in the first period is that participant who have a low
self-reported risk-aversion in financial matters (risk3), tend to offer more assets to buy.
Otherwise, there are no effects between the risk-measures and any of the outcome vari-
ables.38 Hence the explanation that the market price is below the expected value due to
risk-averse participants in period 1, is not supported.
Periods before the peak of the bubble: The offered buy price is higher, the lower the
self-reported risk attitude in career matters (risk 5).39 The effect size is small and weakly
significant. The number of assets offered to sell is significantly higher if the participants
made less risk-averse choices in the Holt-Laury task.40, with a small effect size wise. The
higher the risk aversion in career matters, the lower the likelihood to participate in the
market by making an buy- or a sell-offer.41 There are no effects of risk measures on the
offered numbers of assets to buy42, the offered price to sell43, the number of assets hold
at the end of the period44 and the number of successful bought or sold assets.45
34See table C.6 column (3).
35See table C.7 columns (3,4).
36See table C.8 columns (3,4).
37See table C.37 columns (1,3,4).
38See tables C.9 to C.15 columns (1,3,4).
39See table C.16 column (4).
40See table C.19 column (1).
41See table C.22 column (4).
42See table C.18 column (1,2,4).
43See table C.17 column (1,2,3).
44See table C.20 column (1,2,4).
45See table C.21 column (1,2,4).
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After the peak of the bubble: The less risk averse the participants in the Holt-Laury
Task, the lower is the offered buy price.46 The effect of a 1.85 Rappen reduction for each
unit increase in the # Risky Choices is still not large, considering the average of 141
Rappen (SD: 134) offered as buy prices. Furthermore, the offered number of assets to sell
is lower the more risk averse the participants are in the Holt-Laury task.47 The number
of assets hold at the end of the period are higher, the lower the self-reported risk-aversion
measures of risk3 and risk5.48 The more risk-averse participants reported to be in risk3,
the less likely they are to make a buy- or sell offer49 and the lower the number of actual
bought or sold assets50 There are no effects on the offered assets to buy51 or the offered
price to sell an asset.52
15th period: The less risk averse the participants in the Holt-Laury Task, the lower is
the offered buy price.53 Given that in this period the average offered buy price is around
43 Rappen (SD: 64), the effect of a reduction by 1.85 Rappen for each unit higher of
# Risky Choices is considerable. The number of assets hold at the end of period 15 are
higher, the lower the self-reported risk-aversion in risk3 and risk5. Given the average of 2.5
(SD: 3.9) assets hold at the end of period, the effect size of 0.1 or 0.2 more assets hold per
unit higher on the risk3 and risk5 measures.54 The more risk averse participants reported
to be in risk3, the less likely participants are to make a buy- or sell-offer55 and the lower
the number of actual bought or sold assets56 In both cases the effects are considerable.
There are no effects on the offered assets to buy57, the offered price to sell an asset and
the number of offered assets to sell.58
Result 3.2. Risk-Aversion: Market Level
Markets with, on average, higher risk aversion trade on higher market prices over all
periods. This is mainly the result of the periods after the peak of the bubble. Risk-aversion
46See table C.23 column (1).
47See table C.26 column (1).
48See table C.27 column (3,4).
49See table C.29 column (3).
50See table C.28 column (3).
51See table C.25 column (1,3,4).
52See table C.24 column (1,3,4).
53See table C.30 column (1).
54See table C.34 column (3,4).
55See table C.36 column (3).
56See table C.35 column (3).
57See table C.32 column (1,3,4).
58See table C.31 columns (1,3,4).
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only affects the traded volume of assets in the final period, where markets with on average
lower risk aversion have a higher trading volume in period 15.
Table 3.4 summarizes the estimation coefficients obtained from separate OLS regres-
sion of the market outcomes and the average of the risk measures at the market level.
The discussion of the results will refer to the respective tables in the appendix C.3.
Over all periods the average propensity to take risk in financial matters (market mean
of risk3) reduces the market prices.59 Figure C.4(a) in appendix C.3 suggests, that this
is mainly driven by the phases around the bubble peak60 as the effect size is larger for
the phase after the peak of the bubble.61 If the average at the Holt-Laury task in the
market increased by one unite, the market trades after the peak of the bubble is by 23.01
Rappen less. The effect in the last period seems to be smaller then the effects directly
after the bubble peak.62 However, since the market price at the end was on average 49
Rappen (SD: 39), the relative effect size is larger. There are no effects of the average risk
measures for the first period.
For trading volume we do not find many effects of the risk measures, beside a small
positive and weakly significant effect of the average number of risky choices in the Holt-
Laury task for the last period.63 Furthermore, there are no effects of the average market
risk aversion measures on the period the bubble peaks64 or the largest deviation of the
market price from the fundamental value.65
59See table C.40 column (1).
60See table C.40 columns (2,3).
61On average the market price is at 331 Rappen (SD: 125) over all periods, at 379 Rappen (SD: 59)
before the peak of the bubble and at 197 Rappen (SD: 147) after the peak. The highest (smallest)
observed market price was 750 (1) Rappen.
62See table C.38 columns (3,5).
63See tables C.41 and C.42.
64See table C.44columns (1,4).
65See table C.44columns (2,5).
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3.5.2 Realtive Over-Confidence
Result 3.3. Relative over-confidence: Individual Trading Behaviour
There is only one (weakly) significant effects of relative over-confidence on the individual
trading behaviour: After the peak of the bubble participants with a higher relative over-
confidence tend to offer a lower number of assets to sell. There are no other effects on
the other parameters of individual trading or the final earnings from the asset market.
Table 3.5 summarizes the coefficients obtained from OLS regressions of variables of
individual trading behaviour on relative over-confidence, age and gender. The discussion
of the results will refer to the respective regression tables in the appendix C.2.
There is a weakly significant negative effect of a higher relative over-confidence on the
offered volume to sell the asset after the peak of the bubble.66 In the periods after the
peak of the bubble the participants offered on average 2.9 assets so sell (SD: 2.63), thus
the effect size of a reduction in the numbers of assets offered to sell by 0.18 if the relative
over-confidence increases by one unit, is not small but not huge either. Otherwise, there
are no significant and robust effects on the individual level for the relative over-confidence
on either of the outcome variables or in either of the phases of the bubble formation.67
66See table C.26 column (2).
67See tables C.2 to C.37 column (2).
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Result 3.4. Over-confidence: Market Outcome
Markets with, on average, higher relative over-confidence trade on higher market prices
and have a larger number of assets traded over all periods. The overall higher market
prices are mainly driven by the periods before the peak of the bubble. Markets with, on
average, higher relative over-confidence tend to have a lower market price in the first
period. The higher trading volume in markets with higher relative over-confidence is mostly
the result of the periods after the peak of the bubble and, in particular of period 15. The
average relative over-confidence in a market does not influence the timing of the bubble
burst and the largest deviation of the market price from the fundamental value.
Table 3.4 summarizes the estimation coefficients of OLS regressions at the market level
of market outcome variables on relative over-confidence. The discussion of the results will
refer to the respective regression tables in the appendix C.3.
Table 3.6: Overview of the estimation coefficients of the regressions on the dependet
variables (Market Outcome)
Dependent Periods Period Periods Periods Period
Variable All One Before Peak After Peak Fifteen
Market 29.19** -20.11** 28.91*** 38.69 -21.25
Price [5.19,53.19] [-38.49,-1.72] [15.12,42.70] [-16.40,93.79] [-50.44,7.95]
Trading 0.59* 0.85 0.35 1.44** 3.18*
Volume [-0.01,1.19] [-1.34,3.05] [-0.33,1.03] [0.10,2.78] [-0.27,6.63]
OLS regression coefficients of market outcome variables on relative over-confidence; 95% confidence intervals in squared
parentheses; Unit of observation: Markets. The regression results can be found in the appendix C.3.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Dependent variables: “Market Price:” Price at the end of the respective period at which the assets were traded, in Rappen;
“Trading Volume:” Number of assets that were traded in this period;
Independent variables: “# OCrel:” relative over-confidence measure.
“Periods all:” Pooled regression over periods one to fifteen;“Period one:” Regression for the first period; “Periods Before
Peak:” Pooled regression over period one to the period with the largest deviation from the market price and the expected
value; “Periods After Peak:” Pooled regression over the period with the largest deviation from the market price and the
expected value to period fifteen; ‘Period fifteen:” Regression for the last period.
The market price is higher in markets with on average higher relative over-confidence.68
This is mainly driven by the periods before the peak of the bubble69, while there is no
effect of the average relative over-confidence on the market price for periods after the
burst of the bubble.70 The market prices is lower in the first period for markets with, on
average, higher over-confident participants.71 There is no such effect for the last period.72
68See table C.45 column (1). Confirming the visual impression of figure C.5(a).
69See table C.45 column (2).
70See table C.45 column (3).
71See table C.45 column (4).
72See table C.45 column (5).
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There are no effects of the average relative over-confidence on the period of the bubble
peak73 or the largest deviation of the market price from the fundamental value.74
The trading volume over all periods tends to be higher if the average relative over-
confidence in the market is higher75, which is mostly the result of the periods after the
bubble peak76 and, in particular the final period.77 There are no significant effects of
relative over-confidence on trading volume for the first period and the periods before the
peak of the bubble.78
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion
The purpose of this manuscript is to re-examine the role of risk-attitudes and over-
confidence in experimental asset markets by using the results of 40 experimental asset
markets with 16 participants in each market. Risk attitudes are elicited by giving partic-
ipants 20 choices between a certain outcome and a risky lottery (Holt and Laury, 2002).
Answers to self-reported questions of the final exit questionnaire are also used to measure
the risk attitude in a more broader every-day sense. Relative over-confidence is measured
by letting people answer the Raven’s-Matrix IQ-Test and asking them in which quintile,
among all participant, with respect to correct answers they expect to be with their an-
swers. The deviation between the expected quintile and the real quintile yields the degree
of relative over-confidence.
Risk-aversion: On the individual level no risk-aversion measure correlates with the
final pay-off from the experiment, the offered number of assets to buy or offered prices
to sell. Nevertheless, the offered buy price declines over all periods when participants are
more risk averse in career matters. The magnitude of the latter effect is small and the
coefficient estimates are only weakly significant. However, if risk aversion is measured by
73See table C.47column (1).
74See table C.47column (2).
75See table C.46 column (1). Contrary to what one might guess from figure C.5(b):
76See table C.46 column (3).
77See table C.46 column (5).
78See table C.46 columns (2,4).
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the number of risky lottery choices ( Holt-Laury Task) more risk averse participants tend
to offer lower buy prices once the bubble bursts; this effect is weakly significant. This
finding contradicts Ang et al. (2010) and Breaban and Noussair (2015), who also used a
Holt-Laury-task and find that less risk-averse participants trade on higher prices.
In line with hypothesis 3.1 and the findings of Fellner and Maciejovsky (2007) and con-
trary to Breaban and Noussair (2015), during all 15 periods, more risk-averse participants
tend to offer less assets to sell, hold fewer assets, make less often bid- and sell-offers and
are involved in fewer successful trades. In the majority of the cases the self-reported risk-
aversion with respect to financial decisions correlates with the outcome variables. While
these effects are small in size for the whole market, the effects become stronger after the
peak of the bubble and particularly in the final period one can speak of a considerable
effect of the risk-measures.
On the market level, there is no correlation between the risk-measures and the traded
volume for all 15 periods; which supports hypothesis 3.2. However, the higher the average
number of risky-choices in the Holt-Laury-task, the higher is the trading volume in the
final period. The market price tends to be lower if average risk-aversion is lower in the
market. This contradicts the result of Eckel and Füllbrunn (2015) and confirms both:
The finding of Breaban and Noussair (2015) and hypothesis 3.3, that the market price is
closer to the fundamental value if traders in the market are less risk-averse, on average.79
Again this effect is mainly driven by the periods after the peak of the bubble.
There are three general observations: (1) For the first period, the only weakly sig-
nificant effect we find is that participant who have a low self-reported risk-aversion in
financial matters (risk3), tend to offer more assets to buy. Otherwise, there are no ef-
fects of the risk-measures on trading behaviour. This contradicts the view that due to
risk-averse participants, the market price starts below the expected value in this kind of
experimental asset markets. (2) Most of the effects over all periods are small, (weakly)
significant and mainly driven by the final period. In fact, the decision in the final pe-
79Since the fundamental value is declining in the experimental asset market, from the theory discussed
in section 3.3 one would expect a lower market price in markets with less risk-averse participants.
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riod differs from decisions in the previous periods, because over the whole asset market
uncertainty arises from two sources: First, due to the random dividend draws (nature
risk). Second, by intentional sources such as the action of others or the opponents risk
(Bossaerts, 2009). Both risk components do not necessarily have to be correlated with
each other. Uncertainty stemming from nature is processed differently in the brain, when
compared to uncertainty due to intentional agents, which is perceived more like a situa-
tion of ambiguity (Bossaerts, 2009). Thus, preferences over uncertainty due to nature or
intentional sources can be different. For this reason, the main difference of the final period
from preceding periods, is the absence of the re-selling motivation. In period 15 the value
of the asset is only determined by the last random dividend draw (nature risk). The un-
certainty in the Holt-Laury task stems only from a lottery (nature risk). Hence, this might
help to explain, why one finds mainly correlations between individual trading behaviour
variables and risk-measures in the final period or towards the end of the experiment.80
(3) Finally, since the self-reported questions allow participants to broader interpret the
meaning of risk-attitudes, they also show more often correlation with individual trading
outcomes over the whole asset market.
Relative Over-Confidence: On the individual level, there is no correlation between
the relative over-confidence measure and the earnings from the asset market. This con-
tradicts the finding of Smith (2012), that more over-confident traders perform better.
The only (weakly) significant effect is: Relative over-confident participants offer more
assets to sell after the peak of the bubble. The weak significance of the effect raises the
question of whether there are correlations among relative over-confidence and individual
trading behaviours at all; albeit this finding is consistent with Smith (2012) who finds
that over-confidence does not affect the the number of trades made.
80The findings of Porter and Smith (1995) underline this interpretation. They introduced in an exper-
imental asset market certain per-period dividend and thus eliminated (nature) risk from the dividend.
This change did not alter the bubble in markets with inexperienced traders. Indicating, that even in the
absence of risky fundamentals, there are participants willing to pay a price above the certain dividend
outcome; either by having problems to understand the link between price of an asset and expected value
or by ambiguity about the other traders intention.
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Markets with, on average, higher relative over-confident participants, tend to have
a higher trading volume, supporting hypothesis 3.4. The trading volume is particularly
large once the bubble burst. Furthermore, markets with an higher average of relative over-
confidence trade on higher market prices, in particular around the peak of the bubble.
This results in larger bubbles and is in line with the findings of Kirchler and Maciejovsky
(2002), Michailova (2011) and Oechssler et al. (2011). It contradicts Smith (2012) and hy-
pothesis 3.5, that over-confidence does not affect the price of the price of the asset market.
In sum, beside hypothesis 3.5, all other hypotheses derived from a standard noisy
rational expectation asset pricing model (Hellwig, 1980), are supported. In general, the
effects are small and mostly weakly significant on the individual level. Moreover, they
are not pay-off relevant. Thus further research might consider: (1) Since the self-reported
questions on risk-attitude are more often correlated with trading behaviour and market
outcomes, one should reconsider measuring risk-aversion with the choice of lotteries. If
the Holt-Laury task is used to measure risk preferences, one tests only for preferences
on the first moment of a distribution. In fact, participants might have preferences over
higher moments as well (,e.g. skewness and kurtiosis) (Bossaerts, 2009). Recent work,
e.g. Andersen et al. (2014); Ebert (2015) and Harrison et al. (2015), developed risk-
measures based on asking for preferences over the whole distribution. (2) In light of this
studies result, one might want to disentangle the effect of risk preferences over uncertainty
from nature and intentional sources in decision making. This raises the question of what
serves as an appropriate measure to elicit preferences over uncertainty from intentional
sources. (3) The existence of two different sources of risk which shape risk preferences
over uncertainty, calls for a re-consideration of current theoretical models. New theoretical
models should provide predictions on how preferences about distributions of outcomes and
risk stemming from intentional sources affects financial decision making. The application
of prospect theory on financial decision making seems a promising avenue (Ebert and
Strack, 2015, 2016) for nature risk. (4) Finally, the fact that over-confidence is barely
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correlated with individual trading behaviour but affects market outcomes, casts doubt
on current measurements of over-confidence. Furthermore, on a theory level, how the
interaction of over-confident participants, that do not show much difference in behaviour
at the individual level, leads to difference in outcomes on the market level (i.e., if the
market average of over-confidence increases the market price increases, too).
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A Appendix: Chapter 1
A.1 On Mutual Information
Mutual information is defined as I (y, x) = 12 log2
(
σ2y
σ2yx
)
, that is the information contained
in a random variable x ∼ N(µx, σ2x) about another random variable y ∼ N(µy, σ2y) with σ2yx
as the conditional variance of y once x has been observed. Since the concept is symmetric
and based on entropy, mutual information answers the question by how much the entropy
is reduced of one variable by knowing the other. Thus intuitively mutual information
quantifies the information needed to describe y if x is already known (Veldkamp, 2011,
p.19f).
The following example from Wiederholt et al. (2010) p. 3 should help to grasp the idea
of rational inattention. Think of x as the variable of interest to the decision maker. Since
the decision maker has limited attention resources, the perception of x will be noisy. Thus
the attention choice to the variable x can be modelled as receiving a signal y = x+ where
the  is the noise, due to the limited attention of the decision maker and independent of
x and normally distributed with mean zero and σ2 . Limited attention is modelled by a
bound on the information flow:
I (y, x) = 12 log2
(
σ2y
σ2yx
)
≤ κ (A.1)
With σ2yx = σ2x − σ
4
x
σ2x+σ2
this is equivalent to
σ2x
σ2
≤ 22κ − 1 (A.2)
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In this example, limited attention leads a bound on the variance reduction, which implies
a bound on the signal-to-noise ratio in the signal y concerning x.
With the correlation coefficient Rxy = σ
2
x√
σ2x+σ2
of the random variables x and y one
can rewrite the mutual information by I (y, x) = 12 log2
1
1−R2xy .
A.2 Single Asset Price
This section solves the optimal asset allocation described by 1.7 to 1.7 under the assump-
tion of mean-variance utility. First, one replaces ct and ct+1 in the objective function by
its respective expressions from the side constraints. Since there is no uncertainty in the
first period, the variance will be zero in this case.
arg max
qt
e− qtpt + βqtE
[
d˜t+1|d˜rt (τr)
]
− ρ2q
2
t V ar(d˜t+1|d˜rt (τr)) (A.3)
The conditional expectation can be also rewritten by applying the projection theorem:1
argmax
qt
e− qtpt + β
(
qt
(
µ+ Cov(d˜
s
t , d˜
r
t )
V ar(d˜rt )
(
d˜rt − µ∗
))− ρ2q2t+1
(
V ar
(
d˜st
)− Cov2(d˜st , d˜rt )
V ar(d˜rt )
))
argmax
qt
e− qtpt + β
(
qt
( 1
τ2r
σ2s + 1τ2r
µ+ σ
2
s
σ2s + 1τ2r
(
d˜∗t+1 +
st
τs
+ 
r
t
τr
))
− ρ2q
2
t
(
σ2s −
σ4s
σ2s + 1τ2r
))
(A.4)
using the definition of correlation R = σs√
σ2s+ 1τ2r
one can simplify the expression σ2s −
σ4s
σ2s+ 1τ2r
= σ2s (1−R2). Taking the first order condition of A.4 and solve for the optimal
quantity qoptt of asset hold:
qoptt =
1
ρσ2s (1−R2)
 1τ2r
σ2s + 1τ2r
µ∗ + σ
2
s
σ2s + 1τ2r
(
d˜∗t+1
st
τs
+ 
r
t
τr
)
− pt
β
 (A.5)
1Consider two normal distributed variables xi ∼ N(µi, σ2i ) and xj ∼ N(µj , σ2j ), then (xj xi = a) ∼
N(µˆ, σˆ2) with µˆ = µj + Cov(xj ,xi)σ2
i
(a− µi) and σˆ2 = σ2j − (Cov(xj ,xi))
2
σ2
i
(Vives, 2010) section 10.2.1.
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Since there is only one investor in this economy, in equilibrium she holds all assets, thus
without loss of generality one can set qoptt = 1 and derive from A.5 the equilibrium price:
peqt = β
 1τ2r
σ2s + 1τ2r
µ+ σ
2
s
σ2s + 1τ2r
(
d˜∗t+1 +
st+1
τs
+ 
r
t
τr
)
− ρσ2s
(
1−R2
) (A.6)
A.3 Derivation of Σ1
Following Vives (2010) p. 121 one can interpret the equilibrium asset price as an estimate
of the dividend. When the price would be fully revealing, there would be no uncertainty
left, V ar
(
d˜|p
)
= 0, and if the price is pure noise, there would be no reduction in un-
certainty, V ar
(
d˜|p
)
= V ar
(
d˜
)
. In the following I will derive V ar
(
d˜|p
)
= Σ1 for the
single asset case. Before that one has to find the expected variance of the asset price in
equilibrium 1.12:
V ar(peqt ) = E
[
(peqt − E(peqt ))2
]
(A.7)
= σ
4
s(
σ2s + 1τ2r
)2
(
σ∗2 + 1
τ 2s
+ 1
τ 2r
)
(A.8)
= σ
4
s
σ2s + 1τ2r
, (A.9)
by making use of σ2s = σ∗2 + 1τ2s for the last step and the co-variance between the price
and the dividend:
Cov(d˜, p) = σ
4
s(
σ2s + 1τ2r
)2σ∗2. (A.10)
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With this at hand the conditional variance is Σ1 can be calculated by using the projection
theorem for conditional variance:2
Σ1 = σ∗2 − Cov(d˜, p)
2
V ar(p) (A.11)
= σ∗2 − σ
4
s(
σ2s + 1τ2r
)3σ∗4 (A.12)
Taking the partial derivative of Σ1 with respect to τ 2r :
∂Σ1
∂τ 2r
= −3 σ
4
s(
σ2s + 1τ2r
)4σ∗4 1τ 4r < 0 (A.13)
A.4 Derivation of the Value-function in the Multi-
Asset case
This is the proof for Lemma 1.1:
Simplifying the investment problem stated in equation 1.14- 1.16
arg max
qt
e− q′tpt + β
(
E
[
q′td˜t+1 d˜
r(τ r)
]
− ρ2V ar
(
q′td˜t+1 d˜
r(τ r)
))
(A.14)
This can be also expressed by applying the projection theorem:
argmax
qt
e− q′tpt + β
(
I∑
i=1
qi,t
(
µi +
Cov(d˜si,t+1, d˜
r
i,t+1)
V ar(d˜r
i,t+1)
(
d˜
r
i,t+1 − µi
))
− ρ
2
I∑
i=1
q
2
i,t
(
V ar
(
d˜
s
i,t+1
)
−
Cov2(d˜si,t+1, d˜
r
i,t+1)
V ar(d˜r
i,t+1)
))
(A.15)
argmax
qt
e− q′tpt + β
(
I∑
i=1
qi,t
( 1
τ2
i,r
σ2
i,s
+ 1
τ2
i,r
µi +
σ2i,s
σ2
i,s
+ 1
τ2
i,r
(
σ
∗ +
si,t+1
τi,s
+
ri,t+1
τi,r
))
− ρ
2
I∑
i=1
q
2
i,t
(
σ
2
i,s −
σ4i,s
σ2
i,s
+ 1
τ2
i,r
))
(A.16)
using the definition of correlation Ri = σi,s√
σ2i,s+
1
τ2
i,r
one can simplify the expression σ2i,s −
σ4i,s
σ2i,s+
1
τ2
i,r
= σ2i,s (1−R2i ). Taking the first order condition with respect to qopti,t , the optimal
2See Vives (2010) chapter 10 on details for that.
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quantity qopti,t hold of asset i ∈ I is given by:
qopti,t =
1
ρσ2i,s (1−R2i )
 1τ2i,r
σ2i,s + 1τ2i,r
µi +
σ2i,s
σ2i,s + 1τ2i,r
(
σ∗ +
si,t+1
τi,s
+
ri,t+1
τi,r
)
− pi,t
β
 (A.17)
Since there is only one reciever in this economy, in equilibrium she holds all shares of
the assets, thus without loss of generality one can set qopti,t = 1 and derive from A.17 the
equilibrium price peqi,t:
peqi,t = β
 1τ2i,r
σ2i,s + 1τ2i,r
µi +
σ2i,s
σ2i,s + 1τ2i,r
(
σ∗ +
si,t+1
τi,s
+
ri,t+1
τi,r
)
− ρσ2i,s
(
1−R2i
) (A.18)
Note that the risk-premium ρσ2i,s (1−R2i ) varies with either (1) a change in the precision
τ 2i,r with which the reciever r processes the information or with (2) the precision of the
information send by the sender, which might be due to a lower error in the observation
si,t+1
τ2i,s
or due to a lower variance σ∗2i in the underlying dividend generating process of asset
i ∈ I. In each of the above mentioned cases, the risk-premium changes in the opposed
direction as the change in the underlying factor,( i.e. if τ 2i,r increases the risk-premium
decreases by − ρ(τ2i,r+σ−2i,s )2 ).
Applying the equilibrium condition, qopti,t = 1 ∀ i ∈ I to A.16, the value function
V (d˜r(τ r)) becomes:
V (d˜r(τ r)) = e− pt + β
(
E
[
d˜t+1 d˜
r(τ r)
]
− ρ2V ar
(
d˜t+1 d˜
r(τ r)
))
(A.19)
Note that in expectation for the investor pt and mathbbE
[
d˜t+1 d˜
r(τ r)
]
are invariant to
changes in τr. Thus she maximizes V (d˜
r(τ r)) by minimizing the variance V ar
(
d˜t+1 d˜
r(τ r)
)
maxτ rV (d˜
r(τ r)) ↔ minτ rV ar
(
d˜t+1 d˜
r(τ r)
)
(A.20)
↔ minτ r
I∑
i=1
σ2i,s − σ4i,sσ2i,s + 1τ2i,r
 (A.21)
↔ min
{R2i }Ii=1
I∑
i=1
σ2i,s
(
1−R2i
)
(A.22)
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Ri = σi,s√
σ2i,s+
1
τ2
i,r
is the correlation between the information distributed by sender s on asset
i and information extracted by the investor r. C.p. an increase in Ri goes along with an
increase in τ 2i,r and vice versa.
A.5 Derivation of κoptj
Applying Lemma 1.1 the attention allocation problem stated in 1.18 and 1.19 can now be
written in terms of Ri:
min
R
I∑
i=1
σ2i,s
(
1−R2i
)
(A.23)
subject to
I∑
i=1
I(Ri, vi) ≤ κ (A.24)
The partial derivative of the attention effort constraint with respect to R2i :
∂
∑I
i=1 I(Ri, vi)
∂R2i
= 12viln2
1
(1−R2i )2
(A.25)
Plugging equation A.25 into the equilibrium condition 1.21 one receives equation 1.22:
(
1−R2j
1−R2i
)2
vj
vi
=
σ2i,s
σ2j,s
(1.22)
Solving this for Rj yields:3
1−R2j
1−R2i
= σi,s
σj,s
√
vi
vj
(A.26)
Rj =
√√√√1− σi,s
σj,s
√
vi
vj
(1−R2i ) (A.27)
3Since 1−R
2
j
1−R2
i
≥ 0 only the positive solution of the square-root is relevant.
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A.27 holds for all assets j 6= i and {i, j} ∈ I. Therefore plug A.27 back into the
binding attention effort constraint A.24 one receives an expression for Ri:4
I (R,v) =
I∑
i=0
1
2vi
log2
(
1
1−R2i
)
= κ (A.28)
I∑
i=0
1
vi
ln
(
1
1−R2i
)
= 2κln2 (A.29)
I∏
i=0
(
1
1−R2i
) 1
vi
= 4κ (A.30)
(
1
1−R2i
) 1
vi
I∏
j 6=i
j=0
(
1
1−R2j
) 1
vj
= (A.31)
(
1
1−R2i
) 1
vi
I∏
j 6=i
j=0
 1
σi,s
σj,s
√
vi
vj
(1−R2i )
 1vj = (A.32)
(
1
1−R2i
) 1
vi
+
∑I
j 6=i
j=0
1
vj
I∏
j 6=i
j=0
(
σj,s
σi,s
√
vj
vi
) 1
vj
= (A.33)
(
1−R2i
) 1vi+∑Ij 6=i
j=0
1
vj
= 4−κ
I∏
j 6=i
j=0
(
σj,s
σi,s
√
vj
vi
) 1
vj
(A.34)
R2i = 1−
4−κ I∏
j 6=i
j=0
(
σj,s
σi,s
√
vj
vi
) 1
vj

1
1
vi
+
∑I
j 6=i
j=0
1
vj
(A.35)
Plugging A.35 back into κi = 12vi log2
(
1
1−R2i
)
one receives the optimal attention allo-
4The first four steps are just a conversion of the attention effort constraint.
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cation:
κopti =
1
2vi
log2

1[
4−κ∏Ij 6=i
j=0
(
σj,s
σi,s
√
vj
vi
) 1
vj
] 11
vi
+
∑I
j 6=i
j=0
1
vj
 (A.36)
= 12viln2
1
1
vi
+∑Ij 6=i
j=0
1
vj
ln
4κ I∏
j 6=i
j=0
(
σi,s
σj,s
√
vi
vj
) 1
vj
 (A.37)
= 1
ln4
1
1 +∑Ij 6=i
j=0
vi
vj
κln4 + I∑
j 6=i
j=0
(
1
vj
ln
σi,s
σj,s
+ 12vj
ln
vi
vj
) (A.38)
With Ri = σi,s√
σ2i,s+
1
τ2
i,r
one can also derive the optimal precision τ 2i,r:
Ri =
σ2i,s
σ2i,s + 1τ2i,r
= 1−
4−κ I∏
j 6=i
j=0
(
σj,s
σi,s
√
vj
vi
) 1
vj

1
1
vi
+
∑I
j 6=i
j=0
1
vj
(A.39)
σ2i,s +
1
τ 2i,r
=
σ2i,s
1−
[
4−κ∏Ij 6=i
j=0
(
σj,s
σi,s
√
vj
vi
) 1
vj
] 11
vi
+
∑I
j 6=i
j=0
1
vj
(A.40)
1
τ 2i,r
= σ2i,s

1
1−
[
4−κ∏Ij 6=i
j=0
(
σj,s
σi,s
√
vj
vi
) 1
vj
] 11
vi
+
∑I
j 6=i
j=0
1
vj
− 1
 (A.41)
= σ2i,s

[
4−κ∏Ij 6=i
j=0
(
σj,s
σi,s
√
vj
vi
) 1
vj
] 11
vi
+
∑I
j 6=i
j=0
1
vj
1−
[
4−κ∏Ij 6=i
j=0
(
σj,s
σi,s
√
vj
vi
) 1
vj
] 11
vi
+
∑I
j 6=i
j=0
1
vj
 (A.42)
τ 2opti,r =
1
σ2i,s

4κ I∏
j 6=i
j=0
(
σi,s
σj,s
√
vi
vj
) 1
vj

1
1
vi
+
∑I
j 6=i
j=0
1
vj
− 1
 (A.43)
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A.6 Attention maximizing visibility v∗i
∂κopti
∂vi
= 1
ln4
−∑Ij 6=i
j=0
1
vj(
1 +∑Ij 6=i
j=0
vi
vj
)2
κln4 + I∑
j 6=i
j=0
(
1
vj
ln
σi,s
σj,s
+ 12vj
ln
vi
vj
) (A.44)
+ 1
ln4
1
1 +∑Ij 6=i
j=0
vi
vj
 1vi
I∑
j 6=i
j=0
1
2vj

= 1
1 +∑Ij 6=i
j=0
vi
vj
 1ln4 1vi
I∑
j 6=i
j=0
1
2vj
− κopti
I∑
j 6=i
j=0
1
vj
 (A.45)
∂κopti
∂vi
= 0 ⇔ 1
ln4
1
v∗i
I∑
j 6=i
j=0
1
2vj
= κopti
I∑
j 6=i
j=0
1
vj
1
2ln4
1
v∗i
= κopti
= 1
ln4
1
1 +∑Ij 6=i
j=0
v∗i
vj
κln4 + I∑
j 6=i
j=0
(
1
vj
ln
σi,s
σj,s
+ 12vj
ln
v∗i
vj
)
1 +∑Ij 6=i
j=0
v∗i
vj
2v∗i
= κln4 +
I∑
j 6=i
j=0
(
1
vj
ln
σi,s
σj,s
+ 12vj
ln
v∗i
vj
)
1
v∗i
+ (1− ln(v∗i ))
I∑
j 6=i
j=0
1
vj
= 2κln4 +
I∑
j 6=i
j=0
(
2
vj
ln
σi,s
σj,s
− 1
vj
ln(vj)
)
(A.46)
whereas equation A.46 is the condition for κopti maximizing visibility v∗i . In the last
step I verify that v∗i constitutes a maximum by checking the second-order condition at
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this point:
∂2κopti
∂2vi
∣∣∣∣∣
vi=v∗i
=
−∑Ij 6=i
j=0
1
vj(
1 +∑Ij 6=i
j=0
vi
vj
)2
 1ln4 1vi
I∑
j 6=i
j=0
1
2vj
− κopti
I∑
j 6=i
j=0
1
vj

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
− 1
1 +∑Ij 6=i
j=0
vi
vj
 12ln4 1v2i
I∑
j 6=i
j=0
1
vj
+ ∂
2κopti
∂2vi︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
I∑
j 6=i
j=0
1
vj

= − 1
1 +∑Ij 6=i
j=0
vi
vj
1
2ln4
1
v2i
I∑
j 6=i
j=0
1
vj
< 0 (A.47)
Now I check if τ 2opti,r is increasing in vi:5
∂τ 2opti,r
∂vi
= 1
σ2i,s
4κ I∏
j 6=i
j=0
(
σi,s
σj,s
√
vi
vj
) 1
vj

1
1
vi
+
∑I
j 6=i
j=0
1
vj

1(
1
vi
+∑Ij 6=i
j=0
1
vj
)2 1v2i ln
4κ I∏
j 6=i
j=0
(
σi,s
σj,s
√
vi
vj
) 1
vj
+ 11
vi
+∑Ij 6=i
j=0
1
vj
1
vi
I∑
j 6=i
j=0
1
2vj

> 0 (A.48)
For the comparative statics of v∗i rewrite equation A.46
G = 1
v∗i
+ (1− ln(v∗i ))
I∑
j 6=i
j=0
1
vj
− 2κln4−
I∑
j 6=i
j=0
(
2
vj
ln
σi,s
σj,s
− 1
vj
ln(vj)
)
= 0 (A.49)
5If y = xx then ∂y∂x = xx(ln(x) + 1))
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Taking the derivative of the parameters of interest from function G:
∂G
∂v∗i
= − 1
v∗2i
− 1
v∗i
I∑
j 6=i
j=0
1
vj
(A.50)
∂G
∂κ
= −2ln4 (A.51)
∂G
∂σi,s
= − 2
σi,s
I∑
j 6=i
j=0
1
vj
(A.52)
∂G
∂σj,s
= 2
vjσj,s
(A.53)
∂G
∂vj
= − (1− ln(v∗i ))
1
v2j
+ 2
v2j
ln
(
σi,s
σj,s
)
− 1
v2j
ln(vj) +
1
v2j
= 1
v2j
(
2ln
(
σi,s
σj,s
)
+ ln
(
v∗i
vj
))
(A.54)
Note that A.54 is negative iff σ
2
i,s
σ2j,s
< vj
v∗i
(, i.e. relation of the visibility of asset j to the
visibility of asset i must be larger then the relation of the underlying variance of the
signals send by sender s). With these derivatives at hand one can apply the implicit
function theorem ∂x
∂y
= −
G
∂y
∂G
∂x
and determine the direction of the effect:
∂v∗i
∂κ
< 0 (A.55)
∂v∗i
∂σi,s
< 0 (A.56)
∂v∗i
∂σj,s
> 0 (A.57)
∂v∗i
∂vj

≥ 0 iff σ2i,s
σ2j,s
≥ vj
v∗i
< 0 iff σ
2
i,s
σ2j,s
< vj
v∗i
(A.58)
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A.7 Attention on asset i and changes in visibility vj
of asset j
∂κopti
∂vj
= 1
ln4
1(
1 +∑Ij 6=i
j=0
vi
vj
)2 viv2j
κln4 + I∑
j 6=i
j=0
(
1
vj
ln
σi,s
σj,s
+ 12vj
ln
vi
vj
)
− 1
ln4
1
1 +∑Ij 6=i
j=0
vi
vj
(
1
v2j
ln
σi,s
σj,s
+ 12v2j
ln
vi
vj
+ 12v2j
)
= 12v2j
1
1 +∑Ij 6=i
j=0
vi
vj
(
2viκopti − 2ln
σi,s
σj,s
− ln vi
vj
− 1
)
(A.59)
Taking v∗j as the point where
∂κopti
∂vj
= 0, the second order condition will be
∂2κopti
∂2vj
∣∣∣∣∣
vj=v∗j
= 12v3j
1
1 +∑Ij 6=i
j=0
vi
vj
> 0 (A.60)
Thus v∗j constitutes a local minimum.
A.8 Corner solution to asset i
Asset i will be neglected if there is no attention on it (, i.e. the correlation between
the asset’s dividend stream and the information processed Ri is zero). Therefore take
equation A.35
R2i ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ 1 ≤
4−κ I∏
j 6=i
j=0
(
σj,s
σi,s
√
vj
vi
) 1
vj

1
1
vi
+
∑I
j 6=i
j=0
1
vj
(A.61)
⇐⇒ 4κ ≤
I∏
j 6=i
j=0
(
σj,s
σi,s
√
vj
vi
) 1
vj
︸ ︷︷ ︸
H
(A.62)
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The following derivatives are straight forward:
∂H
∂vi
< 0 (A.63)
∂H
∂σi,s
< 0 (A.64)
∂H
∂σj,s
> 0 (A.65)
(A.66)
The derivative for vj, with j 6= i and j ∈ I, is more complicated. Taking the log(H) and
then the derivative on vj:
∂H
∂vj
= 1
v2j
[
1
2 − ln
(
σj,s
σi,s
√
vj
vi
)]
I∏
j 6=i
j=0
(
σj,s
σi,s
√
vj
vi
) 1
vj
(A.67)
Thus as long as 12 > ln
(
σj,s
σi,s
√
vj
vi
)
the derivative ∂H
∂vj
> 0.
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B Appendix: Chapter 2
B.1 Subject Notes
This figure shows the notes of subject made during the second phase of the experiment.
As one can see, the subject calculated the expected value and wrote down the market
price in the respective period. At one stage the subject calculated a fundamental value
of 240 while the market price was 400. The subject itself could not make sense of it and
noted question marks behind these prices.
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B.2 Earnings per Task
Table B.1: Earnings per Experimental Tasks in CHF
Task Average Min/Max
Word Problems 1.12 0 / 2.1
Raven’s Progressive Matrices 2.52 0.3 / 3.6
Game of Nim 0.78 0 / 1.5
Risk Attitude Test 9.62 0 / 30
Heider Test 3.60 1.5 / 5.4
Reading the Mind in the Eyes 3.21 1.2 / 4.5
Asset Market 29.14 6.04 / 53.4
Welcome 
Thank you for participating in today’s study. 
In addition to a 10 CHF participation payment, you will be paid an amount of money accumulated 
from different tasks, which will be described to you during the study.  
You will be paid privately, in cash, at the end of the study. The exact amount you receive will be 
determined during the study, and will depend on your decisions and sometimes on the decisions of 
the other participants.  
Rules 
During the study, you are not allowed to communicate with the other participants. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to assist you. Please do not ask 
other participants. 
You will enter your decisions at your computer terminal. All interactions among participants will take 
place only through these computers. Please use the computers only as instructed. 
Violation of these rules leads to immediate exclusion from this study. In this case, you will not 
receive any payments. 
Instructions 
This study consists of several different parts. Each part differs in duration. In the middle of the study, 
you will have a 15 minute break. 
For each part, you will receive instructions. Please read them carefully since your payment will 
depend on how well you understand the instructions. For most parts, the instructions will be shown 
on the screen of your computer. 
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B.3 Instructions 1st phase
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B.4 Screening Tasks
B.4.1 Ravens Matrix
The Raven’s Progressive Matrices Test is a non-verbal IQ-Test. We used the standard
version of it (i.e., 12 items with increasing difficult level within a set of items). Therefore
the participants had to exercise increasing cognitive analytic capacities to encode and
analyse the information given. Within the task and experiment we did not provide any
feedback on their performance. We only summarized this information for each task at the
end of the whole experiment.
The participants received the following instructions: “In this part of the study, you will see
visual patterns. A part of each pattern is missing. For each pattern, you can choose the
option that best completes the pattern. You will see 14 patterns. The first two are practice
patterns. After the practices patterns, you will have 12 minutes to solve the remaining 12
patterns. For each of these 12 patterns that you solve correctly, you earn 0.30 CHF. ”
Figure B.1: Raven’s Test sample screen
Thus the Raven’s IQ-Test Version used here consisted of 12 items, incentivized with
0.30 CHF per correct answer, with a time restriction of 12 minutes for all items and
measured two underlying abilities of the analytic capacities. (1) The deductive ability,
requiring to think clearly and make sense of a complex scheme. (2) The reproductive
ability, requiring to store and reproduce information.1
1For more information we refer to (Kline, 2013, p. 462ff).
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B.4.2 Overconfidence Measure
Together with the Raven’s Matrixes IQ-Test we measured overconfidence, by asking the
subjects after the Raven’s Test the following two questions:
1. Please estimate how many of the 12 patterns you completed correctly
2. Which group do you think you belong to?
• Best 20%
• 20% immediately below the best 20%
• Middle 20%
• 20% immediately above the worst 20%
• Worst 20%
The screen looked like this:
Figure B.2: Overconfidence measure screen
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B.4.3 Game of Nim
The game of nim is a strategic game of two players taking turns removing objects from the
board. In the version we used, the participants played against a computer, programmed
to play best-response. The instructions where the following: “On the following screens,
you will play 5 mini-games against the computer. For each mini-game that you win, you
will receive CHF 0.30 at the end of the session.”
“You will play a board game against the computer.
The Board:
The game board consists of rows of “stones”.
Each row will be filled with 0-7 stones.
That is, some rows might be empty.
The Game:
You and the computer will take turns in removing the stones from the board.
You move first.
The computer is programmed to respond optimally to your actions.
To win, you have to be the one who removes the l
¯
ast stone from the board.
The Move:
When it’s your turn, you remove stones from one row.
First, you choose the row from which to remove stones.
Then, you choose how many stones to remove from that row.
You can remove as many stones as you like in that row.
You must remove at least one stone, but you can remove more if you want.
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After you have removed the stones from the row, it’s the computer’s turn.
The computer’s move follows the same rules as yours.
Then the participants started to play the 5 games sequentially, with an increase in the
level of difficulty. The subjects realized whether the won the game or not and faced the
following board-screens, where they also found a summary of the rules of the game.
Figure B.3: Game of nim instruction screen number one
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Figure B.4: Game of nim instruction screen number two
Figure B.5: Game of nim board one
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Figure B.6: Game of nim board two
Figure B.7: Game of nim board three
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Figure B.8: Game of nim board four
Figure B.9: Game of nim board five
Summarizing, the game of nim is a strategic board game, particularly employing the
backward induction capacities of the subjects. We used 5 items, with increasing difficulty.
There were no time restriction on solving each item. For each win, the subjects received
0.30CHF.
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B.4.4 Test on Quantitative and Logical Reasoning
We presented subjects the following seven questions from a standard mathematics and
logic questions of the type frequently used in Wall Street job interviews and used in exper-
imental context by (Bruguier et al., 2010). Subjects had 60 seconds to type the answer
and earned 0.30CHF per correct answer. Within the task and experiment we did not
provide any feedback on their performance. We only summarized this information for
each task at the end of the whole experiment.
The instructions were as follow: “Please answer the questions on the following screens.
In the following, you will answer a series of quiz questions. Answer as many questions
correctly as you can. You have 60s to answer each question. After the 60s you will be
automatically directed to the next question. For every question that you answer correctly
you will receive CHF 0.30 at the end of the experiment. Note in order to save your choice
you have to PRESS THE OK BUTTON! Everything else counts as no choice. ”
This is the list of the seven questions.
• Consider a game played with a deck of three cards: spades, clubs, and hearts. Your
goal is to identify the hearts. The cards are shuﬄed and displayed in a row, face
down. You make your choice. The dealer then turns over one of the two remaining
cards, provided it is not hearts. He then offers you the possibility to change your
choice and switch to the other card that is left face down. What is the best strategy?
Should you switch, stay, or does it not matter?
Options to choose: “switch”, “stay” or “either”.
Correct answer: switch
• Consider a deck of four cards: spades, clubs, hearts, and diamonds. The cards are
shuﬄed and displayed in a row, face down. You choose one card at random and it
is discarded. Then the dealer turns over two cards, chosen at random, but provided
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they are not hearts. Now there is only one card left unturned. If the two cards the
dealer turns over are diamonds and clubs, is the probability that the remaining one
is hearts more than, less than, or equal to 0.5?
Options to choose: “more”, “less” or “same”.
Correct answer: More
• There are 8 marbles that weigh the same, and 1 marble that is heavier. The marbles
are all uniform in size, appearance, and shape. You have a balance with 2 trays.
You are asked to identify the heavier marble in at most 2 (two) weightings. How
many marbles do you initially have to place on each tray?
Input a number below.
Correct answer: 3
• Divide 100 by 1/2. Is the result more, less than or equal to 100?
Options to choose: “more”, “less” or “same”.
Correct answer: More
• Jenn has half the Beanie Babies that Mollie has. Allison has 3 times as many as
Jenn. Together they have 72. Does Mollie have more than, less than, or equal to,
20 Beanie Babies?
Options to choose: “more”, “less” or “same”.
Correct answer: More
• Johnny’s mother had three children. The first child was named April. The second
child was named May. What was the third child’s name?
Type the name below.
Correct answer: Johnny
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• The police rounded up Jim, Bud and Sam yesterday, because one of them was
suspected of having robbed the local bank. The three suspects made the following
statements under intensive questioning.
Jim: I’m innocent.
Bud: I’m innocent.
Sam: Bud is the guilty one.
If only one of these statements turns out to be true, who robbed the bank?
Type the name of the robber below.
Correct answer: Jim
We presented these problems similar in the following way:
Figure B.10: Sample screen of the Quantitative and Logic Test
This 7 items test elicits the logical reasoning capacity as well as how well the partic-
ipant can handle the quantitative aspect of a problem. It was incentivized by 0.30 CHF
per correct answer and with time restriction. Bruguier et al. (2010) found no significant
correlation between performance in this task and the ability to forecast price changes
when there are insiders.
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B.4.5 The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997) shows participants a
pair of eyes (e.g., figure B.12). The participant is asked to identify the emotions being
most likely expressed among four options. We showed in February 2015 nine items to 64
participants and increased the number of items to 15 from then on (N=416).2 There was
no time constraint in answering the questions and the participant received 0.30CHF per
correct answer. Within the task and experiment we did not provide any feedback on their
performance. We only summarized this information for each task at the end of the whole
experiment.
Options to choose from: serious, ashamed, bewildered, alarmed
Figure B.11: Sample item from the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test
The instructions are as follows: “Please answer the questions on the following screens.
In the following, you will see pictures of people’s eyes and you will be asked about what
emotion they are expressing. In case needed you will find the German translation in
brackets behind the english expression. Answer as many questions correctly as you can.
For every question that you answer correctly you will receive CHF 0.30 at the end of the
experiment.”
The screens had the following look:
2Since we were not sure how familiar participants are with the vocabulary, we translated the four
options in to German, which is the mother tongue of most of the participants in the subject pool. Here
we used the suggested translation by Bruguier et al. (2010)
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Figure B.12: Instruction to the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test
Figure B.13: Sample screen of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes test is used to diagnose high-functioning adult
autism.3 The lower the performance in this test, the higher the likelihood of an autism
3Such as the Asperger’s Syndrome
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disorder. Moreover, psychology research indicates, that people with autism perform worse
than a controlled group in test on cognitive empathy, and show on average the same
results when tested on emotional empathy (Dziobek et al., 2008). Thus autism is more
a problem about to infer about others intention, rather then on their emotional state.
Therefore the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test seems to be suitable approximation for
cognitive empathy capacities.
A good performance in the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test is associated with the ability
to detect whether or not price movements in an asset market are affected by traders with
superior insider information (Bruguier et al., 2010).
B Appendix 133
B.4.6 Heider-Simmel Task
The Heider-Simmel-Task consists of two 20s and 60s long videos with geometric shapes
moving on a plane imitating social interaction. It tests the ability to read intention
or goal-directness of others. We stopped the videos every five seconds and asked the
participants to predict whether two of the shapes would get closer, further apart or keep
the same distance at the end of the upcoming five seconds sequence. Figure ?? and ??
show the screen shots after 20 and 25 seconds as an illustrative example of this task for
the first video. For each answer the participants had 5s times. Thus similar to Bruguier
et al. (2010) we ran this as an forecasting exercise with a reward of 0.30 CHF for each
correct answer. Within the task and experiment we did not provide any feedback on their
performance. We only summarized this information for each task at the end of the whole
experiment.
Figure B.14: Screenshots after 20s Figure B.15: Screenshots after 25s
The instructions for the both videos were displayed immediately before each video and
read as follows: “You will watch two movies of three geometric objects: A circle, and two
squares or two triangles, one small and the other one large. The objects move around,
into, inside, and out of a box. In the first (second) movie, with a circle and two triangles
(squares), your task is to predict the movement of the large triangle (square).
The movie will be stopped after 5 seconds. You then have 5 seconds to predict where the
large triangle will be after another 5 seconds of the movie. Specifically, is the large triangle
going to be closer to or farther away from the small triangle than at present? After your
choice, we play the movie for another 5s, stop the movie again, after which you are again
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asked to predict the movement of the large triangle, etc. We will continue these cycles
until the end of the movie. Answer as many questions correctly as you can. Remember:
you have 5 seconds for each answer. For every question that you answer correctly
you will receive CHF 0.30 at the end of the experiment. Note in order to save your choice
you have to PRESS THE OK BUTTON! Everything else counts as no choice.”
Figure B.16: Heider-Simmel-Test Instruction to the first video
Figure B.17: Heider-Simmel-Test sample screen of the forecasting task in the first video
Originally the Heider-Simmel-Test (Heider and Simmel, 1944) is executed differently
by asking the participants several question to describe the observed situation and thus
relying on verbal evidence of anthropomorphizing to determine to which extent a par-
ticipant engages in theorizing about the intentions of the geometric figures.4 Since this
approach involves some subjective interpretation of the examiner, we follow Bruguier et al.
(2010) with a more direct and objective approach. It is (1) direct, since it only asks for
4A very amusing video about US-comedians participating in the Heider-Simmel-Test can be found on
youtube.
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an prediction of the movements, thus anthropomorphizing is not necessary for a good
performance in this task, in general anthropomorphizing is sufficient for mentalizing, but
not necessary. Furthermore the chosen approach (2) avoids to rely on a verbalization,
which might led to misinterpretation. Finally (3), it is a performance based measure and
also agrees with the standards of experimental economics, since we paid for performance.
We had some difficulties with displaying few movie sequences on the screen. So some
subjects couldn’t see them and thus couldn’t answer the question. Therefore we decided
only to evaluate these questions, that have been answered by the subjects, and ignore
unanswered ones, independent of whether they have been intentionally unanswered or by
the displaying problem.
Bruguier et al. (2010) point out that self-reports after their experiment indicate a high
degree of personalization (anthropomorphization) in the Heider-Simmel-Task, but barely
any evidence in their Financial Markets Prediction task. Participants in the Heider-
Simmel-Test with autism show a significant lower tendency to anthropomorphizing the
description than normal developed adolescents (Castelli et al., 2002; Klin, 2000) Similar
to the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test the performance in the Heider-Simmel-Task
positively correlates with the ability to forecast price changes when insider are present in
the experimental asset market (Bruguier et al., 2010).
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B.4.7 Risk-preference
The risk-preferences are assessed by a choice tasks similar to Holt and Laury (2002). The
participants are confronted with a decision table with 20 decisions two make between
option A receiving a fix amount and option B a lottery with CHF 0 or CHF 30 as equally
likely outcomes. Each decision was presented in one row, and the certain amount increase
from row to row, while the lottery was always the same. This approach allows us to
determine the certainty equivalent of the subject and thus compare relatively the degree
of risk-aversion of the subjects.
The instructions are as follows: “On the following screen, you will make several choices.
Depending on these choices, you may receive an additional payment at the end of the
session. In this task you choose between two payments, an “certain” payment or a
“uncertain” payment. The left choice is the certain payment. If you choose this payment,
we will mail you the specified amount. The right choice is the uncertain payment. If you
choose this payment, the payment will be determined by an electronic coin flip. That is, if
you choose the uncertain payment, you will either receive CHF 0 or CHF 30. Each event
will happen with equal probability, depending on the outcome of the coin-flip. Below, you
see 20 rows. Each row is a decision between a certain and an uncertain payment. The
amount of the certain payment varies from row to row. Please make a choice between
certain and uncertain payment for each of the 20 rows. At the end of the session,
the computer will choose one of the 20 rows at random. Your choice in this row will
determine your payment. ”
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Figure B.18: Risk-preferences instruction screen
Figure B.19: Risk-preferences decision screen
Dohmen et al. (2010) find that individuals with higher analytic capacities, measured
by two sub-modules of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, take significantly risk in
the Holt-Laury-lottery task, this relation is independent from age and sex. This is in line
with the recent work on the subjective component in the perception of risk (e.g., Andersen
et al. (2014); Harrison et al. (2015)) and the evaluation of the consequences between a
lottery and a certain amount might be more clear to a participant with higher analytic
capacities.
Instructions 
I will now read through a script to explain to you the nature of the following task, as well as the 
computer interface through which you will enter your decisions. I will use this script to make sure 
that the information given in all sessions of this study is the same. 
If you follow the instructions carefully you are able to earn money, which will be paid out at the end 
of the study. All interactions take place via your computer interface. Use the computer only as 
instructed. If there are any questions, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to assist 
you. Please do not ask other participants. If you violate the rules, you will have to leave the study 
without any payments. 
These instructions contain numerical examples. The numbers shown are fictitious and serve only to 
illustrate the task. In the actual study, you will face situations that differ from the examples used 
here. 
Overview 
For this part of the study, all participants are separated into two independent groups of 16 
participants each. All interactions take place only within this group. 
This part of the study consists of a task that is divided into 15 periods. In each period, you will make 
decisions. At the beginning of the task, you will be given an account with some cash. The amount of 
cash is shown in Rappen. On a second account, you are given some units, or “shares,” of an “asset.”  
Each period consists of two phases: 
Phase 1: 
At the beginning of each period, you can trade shares and money with the other participants. 
Specifically, you can: 
- buy shares from other participants; this will increase the number of shares you own and 
decrease the amount of cash in your account; 
- sell shares you own to other participants; this will decrease the number of shares you own 
and increase the amount of cash in your account.  
Phase 2: 
After all participants have specified their buy and sell orders in the current period, the asset 
generates a random amount of money to everybody who owns shares. Specifically, this amount can 
be 0, 8, 28, or 60 Rappen per share. At the end of the period, the computer randomly determines 
which of these four amounts is paid out in the current period, and adds the money to the cash 
account of all share owners. Each of the four amounts is equally likely in every period. After this, the 
results of the period are shown and the next period starts. 
  
B.5 Instructions 2nd phase
Phase 1: Market Phase 
During the “Market Phase” you can trade shares and cash indirectly with the other participants via 
the computer. You do this by giving sell and buy orders to the computer. We will now explain how 
selling and buying works.  
At the beginning of each period, you are shown the amount of cash and the number of shares that 
you currently own. Then, you enter both a “sell order” and a “buy order.” In the sell order, you 
specify the minimal price at which you are willing to sell a number of shares you own in return for 
cash. In the buy order, you specify the maximal price at which you are willing to buy shares. The 
computer then aggregates all orders from all participants and computes a “market price” at which 
shares will be sold and bought. 
Sell Order 
A sell order consists of two numbers, a sell price and a sell quantity: 
- First, you enter the minimum sell price that you demand in exchange for one of your shares; 
- Then, you enter the maximum number of shares you would like to sell at this price. 
Buy Order 
A buy order also consists of two numbers, a buy price and a buy quantity: 
- First, you enter the maximum buy price you are willing to pay for getting an additional share; 
- Then, you enter the maximum number of shares you would like to buy at this price. 
Whether you buy or sell shares in a given period depends on the orders you made and the market 
price. If the market price is below your maximum buy price, you buy shares. That is, you buy the 
number of shares you have specified in the buy order, at the market price. If the market price is 
above your minimum sell price, you sell shares. That is, you sell the number of shares you specified 
in the sell order, at the market price. If the market price is in between the two prices you stated, 
then you do not trade in this period. 
If you don’t want to sell (buy) any asset, you can leave the sell (buy) order blank. In that case, you will 
not sell (buy) shares in this period, regardless how high (low) the market price is. 
Market Price 
All participants make their sell and buy orders simultaneously. The computer then collects all orders 
and uses them to determine the market price. All shares that are traded in this period are bought 
and sold at this price. The computer automatically chooses a price that allows a maximum number of 
shares to be traded. Then, the computer transfers cash and shares between participants according to 
their orders and the market price. 
If the market price is exactly equal to your maximum buy price, the computer may not be able to 
fully complete your buy order. That is, the number of shares you buy may be lower than the number 
you specified (as there may not be enough shares left for sale). 
If the market price is exactly equal to your minimum sell price, the computer may not be able to fully 
complete your sell order. That is, the number of shares you sell may be less than the number you 
specified in the sell order (as there may be not enough shares left for purchase). 
  
Example: 
We will now go through a fictitious example of phase 1 on the screen. You will proceed by clicking 
the continue button in the bottom right corner. Only click the button when instructed to do so! 
Please click “Continue” now to get to the next screen. 
Your Current Account: The first row of the screen tells you how much cash you currently own; the 
second row tells you how many shares of the asset you currently own. In this example, you currently 
have 1000 Rappen and 2 shares of the asset.  
Sell Order: In the lower part, you can enter your sell order (left) and your buy order (right side). 
Please enter the following sell order: you are willing to sell shares if the market price is at least 300 
Rappen per share; and you are willing to sell up to 3 shares. Then click “Submit sell order.” You see a 
message that you cannot submit this order because you own only 2 shares (you would need at least 
3 shares for this order). Please change the number of shares in the order to 2. Then, click “Submit” 
again. The pop-up message asks you to confirm your order. Click “Yes.” 
Buy Order: Now, enter the following buy order: you are willing to buy shares if the market price is 
200 Rappen per share, or less; and you are willing to buy at most 6 shares. Then click “Submit buy 
order.” You see a message that you cannot submit this order because you have only 1000 Rappen 
(you would need at least 200 x 6 = 1200 Rappen for this order). Please change the number of shares 
to 4. Then, click “Submit” again. Click “Yes” in the pop-up message. To confirm both orders, click the 
red “Submit orders” button. 
Case 1: Market price = 350 Rappen 
The computer collects the orders of all participants and then computes a market price. Suppose that, 
in this fictitious case, the computer calculated a market price of 350 Rappen per share. You see the 
market price at the top of the screen. That is higher than the minimum price at which you were 
willing to sell, 300 Rappen per share. 
Shares: That means that you sell 2 shares, the number you specified in your sell order. The number 
of shares you own decreases from 2 to 0 shares, as you can see on the left side of the screen. 
Cash: You receive 2x350 = 700 Rappen in exchange for the shares. That means that the amount of 
cash you own increases from 1000 to 1700 Rappen. You can see this on the right side of the screen. 
Please click “Continue” 
Case 2: Market price = 250 Rappen 
In this example, the computer calculated a market price that is higher than the maximum price at 
which you were willing to buy, so you don’t buy. The market price is also lower than the minimum 
price at which you were willing to sell your shares, so you also don’t sell. This means that the number 
of shares you own remains the same (2), and the amount of cash also remains at 1000 Rappen.  
Please click “Continue” 
Case 3: Market price = 150 Rappen 
In this case, the computer calculated a market price of 150 Rappen per share. Since this is below your 
maximum buy price of 200 Rappen, you buy 4 shares, as specified in your buy order. For these 4 
shares, you pay a total of 4x150 = 600 Rappen. That means that the number of shares you own 
increases from 2 to 6, and the amount of cash you own decreases from 1000 to 400 Rappen. 
Restrictions 
- You can only submit one sell order and one buy order per period 
- You cannot sell more shares than you currently own. 
- You cannot buy shares for more cash than you currently own 
- Your maximum buy price must be lower than your minimum sell price. 
- Prices must be whole numbers (for example, a price of 10.5 is not allowed) 
Summary Market Phase: 
- You enter a sell order and a buy order 
- The computer determines the market price 
- According to your orders and the market price, you either 
o (a) buy shares (market price below your maximum buy price) 
o (b) sell shares (market price above your minimum sell price) 
o (c) do nothing (market price in between) 
o This figure illustrates when you buy and when you sell: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- If you don’t want to sell (buy) shares at all, you can leave the sell (buy) order blank 
 
- If you buy, you will never pay more than your maximum buy price 
- If you sell, you will never receive less than your minimum sell price 
- If you sell/buy shares, you always receive/pay the market price 
 
- Most of the time, you sell/buy the number of shares that you specified in the order 
- Sometimes, you sell/buy fewer shares, when your order price exactly equals the market price 
 
Do you have questions about the market phase? 
Phase 2: Dividend 
After the computer has completed all transfers of cash and shares between participants, phase 1 of 
the current period is finished. Now, in phase 2, the computer determines the amount of cash that 
the asset generates in the current period. That is, the computer randomly chooses one of four 
possible amounts: 0, 8, 28, or 60 Rappen per share. We call this amount “DIVIDEND.” 
The dividend comes on top of the amount of cash you had at the end of the market phase. Once the 
computer has determined the amount of the dividend, it will be added automatically to your cash. 
After that, the current period is completed and the next period begins. 
In each period, each of the four amounts is equally likely to be chosen. This means that, on average, 
over many periods, you can expect a dividend of 24 Rappen per share and period. 
Example: 
Please click “Continue.” In the lower right part of the screen you see the outcome of the dividend 
phase. In this fictitious example, the computer has randomly chosen the amount of 8 Rappen per 
share for this period. In case 3, you own 6 shares at the end of the period. That means that, in phase 
2, the computer adds a total dividend of 6 x 8 = 48 Rappen to your cash account, and you leave the 
period with a total amount of 448 Rappen. 
 
Final Payoff 
In phase 2 of period 15, the computer will determine a final dividend (0, 8, 28, or 60 Rappen per 
share). This amount will be multiplied by the number of shares you own at the end of period 15, and 
then added to your cash account. The account will then be closed and the final amount of cash will 
be added to your payments from the other parts of the study. Note that after that point, the shares 
you own will be worthless, that is, only the amount in your cash account at the end of period 15 is 
relevant for your payment. 
 
Summary 
- This part is divided into 15 periods. 
- You start out with a certain amount of cash and a certain number of shares 
- In each period, you can submit buy and sell orders to trade shares with other participants 
- After the market phase, each share generates a random cash payment, the dividend 
- You can earn money both from trading shares, and from the dividends generated by the 
shares you own 
 
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
 
We will now show you a couple of comprehension questions to make sure that the 
instructions are clear to everybody. Click “Continue” to see the questions. 
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B.6 Comprehension Question
1 At the beginning of period 11, how many future dividend draws can you expect?
2 What are the maximum earnings you can expect from total dividend payments, if
you hold 5 shares from the beginning of period 11 until the end of period 15
(no selling or buying of new shares
3 At the end of the market phase of period 15, you own 2674 Rappen in cash and 1
share. The dividend draw in period 15 was 8 Rappen per share. How much cash
do you have at the end of period 15, and what will thus be your earnings from this
part of the experiment?
4 At the beginning of a period, you have 2500 Rappen cash and 6 shares. You submit
a buy order of 4 shares at a maximum buy price of 250 Rappen. Your sell order is
1 share at a minimum sell price of 500 Rappen. At the end of the market phase,
the computer determines a market price of 400 Rappen. The dividend at the end
of the period is 28. How much cash do you have at the end of this period after the
dividend payment?
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B.7 Asset Market
Trading Screen
B.8 Final Questionnaire
Asset Market: (Trading Strategy)
In the last part of this study, you could trade an asset on an asset market.
Please explain briefly your considerations how you aimed to make profits through
trading.
5 questions from the Financial Literacy Test
FinLit1 Assume a friend inherits CHF10, 000 today and his sibling inherits CHF10, 000
3 years from now. Who is richer because of the inheritance?
FinLit2 Which of the following statements is correct? If somebody buys the stock of firm
B in the stock market:
– He owns part of firm B
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– He has lent money to firm B
– He is liable for firm B’s debts
– None of the above
– Do not know
FinLit3 Considering a long time period (for example 10 or 20 years), which asset normally
gives the highest return?
– Savings accounts
– Bonds
– Stocks
– Do not know
FinLit4 Normally, which asset displays the highest fluctuations over time?
– Savings accounts
– Bonds
– Stocks
– Do not know
FinLit5 When an investor spreads his money among different assets, does the risk of
losing money:
– Increase
– Decrease
– Stay the same
– Do not know
Socio-Economic Information
Highest Degree: What is your highest finished degree so far?
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Current Degree: What is your current degree program (if you are not studying, please
type in your highest degree program):
Semester Which semester are you in your degree program (If you are not studying, please
type in how many semesters you studied for your highest degree)?
Studienrichtung: Field of study (major)
nationality: Nationality
Language: Native language
gender : Gender
age: Age
Studienintreesse: How interesting was the study for you? (Scale 0 to 7)
Anleitung: Were the instructions clear to you?
– very clear
– somewhat clear
– somewhat unclear
– very unclear
TeilnahmeWP: Have you ever participated in an experiment on asset markets? (Yes/No)
AktienhandelJa: Have you ever actively traded stocks? (Yes/No)
Aktienhandel: How many times did you trade stocks or other assets within the past 12
months? (Guess)
freqHoroscope: On average, how often do you read your horoscope?
– Every day
– Once per week
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– Once per month
– Once per year
– Never
donateRel: Within the past two years, have you donated money to a religious institution
or a religious aid organization? (Yes/No)
believeJustice: Do you believe in a higher justice in life (such as destiny, karma)? (Yes/No)
Risk How would you describe yourself:
patience: Are you generally an impatient person, or someone who always shows great
patience? (Scale from 0 - 10)
impulsiveness: Do you generally think things over for a long time before acting - in other
words, are you not impulsive at all? Or do you generally act without thinking things
over for long time - in other words, are you very impulsive? (Scale from 0 - 10)
risk1 : Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to
avoid taking risks? (Scale from 0 - 10)
You can behave differently in different contexts. How would you assess your willingness
to take risks in the following areas?
risk2 : When driving a car? (Scale from 0 - 10)
risk3 : With financial matters? (Scale from 0 - 10)
risk4 : With sports and leisure? (Scale from 0 - 10)
risk5 : With your professional career? (Scale from 0 - 10)
risk6 : With your health? (Scale from 0 - 10)
risk8 : Imagine you won CHF 100,000 in a lottery. Almost immediately after you
collect your winnings, you receive the following financial offer from a reputable bank, the
conditions of which are as follows:
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• There is the chance to double the money within two years.
• It is equally possible that you could lose half of the amount invested.
Which part of the CHF 100’000 would you allocate to the risky but profit-promising
investment?
• The whole amount of CHF 100’000
• CHF 80,000
• CHF 60,000
• CHF 40,000
• CHF 20,000
• nothing, I would decline this offer
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B.9 Addition Results and Robustness Checks
B.10 Robustness Check on Trading Gains under vary-
ing Quantiles
Table B.2: Regression analysis trading gains across cognitive types with separate quantiles
Median Split q40 q30
A-high 34.783 -123.738 199.463
(184.485) (257.203) (319.115)
M-high -424.671*** -297.823 -662.215
(135.139) (228.790) (394.255)
A*M 855.236*** 852.409*** 761.230
(218.973) (308.460) (466.805)
Constant -4.034 23.617 7.481
(72.013) (110.895) (157.121)
adj. R2 0.052 0.044 0.057
N 256 157 85
OLS regressions, standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the market level, using White sandwich estima-
tors. Unit of observation: participant.
qX is the Xth-quantile for setting the dummy for the respective cognitive capacity.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Dependent variable: Trading gains for entire asset market phase, in Rappen.
Independent variables: Constant: baseline category. “A-high:” dummy taking the value 1 if the participants performance
belonged to the upper Xth-quantile in the A dimension and zero if the performance belonged to the lowest Xth-quantile;
‘M-high:” dummy taking the value 1 if the participants performance belonged to the upper Xth-quantile in the M dimension
and zero if the performance belonged to the lowest Xth-quantile; “A*M:” interaction between A-high and M-high.
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B.11 Comparison of coefficients on Buy- Sell-offer
Prices
Figure ?? reports the mean buy order prices (lines below the average market price) and
mean sell order prices (lines above the average market price) for each type. We classified
sell-order-prices above 2000 Rappen and buy-order-price at zero as not serious orders and
ignored them for this figure.
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Figure B.20: Mean order prices by cognitive types
This graph shows the average market price (dashed line), mean buy order prices (lines below the
average market price) and mean sell order prices (lines above the average market price) per cognitive
type. We classified sell-order-prices above 2000 Rappen and buy-order-price at zero as not serious
orders and ignored them for this figure.
Testing for differences in the valuation we run regression analysis reported in table B.3.
The first column compares the coefficients of equation (2.1) for featureless against the
semiotic types. For this we pooled the data of both types and repeated the regression
from table 2.9. A dummy for belonging to one type was introduced and multiplied with
both components. This allows to disentangle the additional effect of the specific type
and judge whether this difference is significant. For example, the dummy for semiotic
type dSE separates the additional effects on the coefficients for the semiotic types, thus if
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dSE = 0, one receives the equation (2.1) estimate for the featureless type, as presented in
table 2.9. The negative insignificant coefficient on the interaction term of the semiotic-
type-dummy and the fundamental value implies we are not able to reject the Null, that
the coefficients for both types are the same for the fundamental. The same holds true
for the differences on the interaction term between the semiotic-type-dummy and the
last period price. The second and third column compare the featureless types with the
technocratic and semiotic types: Both types have a significant higher coefficient on the
fundamental value and a lower coefficient for the last period price, however this effect
is not significant. Turning towards comparing the semiotic type with both types high
on the A-dimension (, i.e. column four and five respectively), the differences in the
coefficients on the fundamental value are in the right direction and significant. However,
even though the differences on coefficients for the last period price have the predict sign,
these differences are not significant, which we expected for a comparison of the semiotic
and sophisticated type, but not for semiotic vs. technocratic types. The last column in
table B.3 reports the comparison technocratic vs. sophisticated types. The results do not
show any significant differences in behaviour, which we expected for fundamental value,
but not for the coefficient on the last period price. Moreover the difference in the effect
are reverse to what we expected, the technocrat has a larger weight on the last period
price than the sophisticated-type and a lower one on the fundamental value.
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Table B.4: Willingness to accept per type
FL SE TE SO
FVt -0.084 0.251*** 0.801* 0.373***
(0.199) (0.097) (0.415) (0.127)
pt−1 0.621 1.177*** 0.933*** 1.204***
(0.432) (0.296) (0.190) (0.124)
Constant 207.773 -16.715 189.585 -119.367***
(171.049) (93.924) (198.883) (42.359)
R2-overall 0.008 0.025 0.002 0.354
N 806 620 415 389
Standard random effects estimator, using clustered standard errors at the market level, robust standard errors
in parentheses. Unit of observation: participant.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Dependent variable: Willingness to accept for each period
Independent variables: “FVt:” Fundamental Value, expected dividend earnings at the beginning of the period
(, i.e. FVt = (16− t) ∗ 24; “pt−1:” Price in the last period.
Table B.4 shows that for all types the estimated αi1, αi2 have the expected signs, except
for the featureless types, where the coefficient is slightly negative, but insignificant.5 A
higher fundamental value and a higher last period price both increase the willingness to
pay. An F -test rejects the null hypothesis, that both coefficients are the same for all
possible combinations of types6, except for the comparison of TE vs. SO types and TE
vs. SE. Further the coefficients for the fundamental value is larger for the technocratic
type than for the semiotic, while the latter puts more emphasis on the momentum com-
ponent, which gives support for H 2.3. Moreover the difference among sophisticated and
technocratic types are in line to what we expected, the technocrat has a larger weight
on the fundamental price than the sophisticated-type and a lower one on the price of the
last period. In table B.5 we test for the differences of the parameters among types. The
results suggest, that there are nor significant differences in the coefficients for all typwise
comparisons. Beside the coefficients of the fundamental in comparison of the featureless
type against the technocratic or sophisticated types.
5The Breusch-Pagan test suggests a random-effects model.
6At the 5% level for the comparison of the FL vs. SE and at the 10% for the pairs: FL vs. TE, FL
vs. SO, SE vs. SO. The same holds if we include the additional requirement of a common intercept.
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B.11.1 Cash overtime per cognitive type
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Figure B.21: Cash over time per cognitive type
This figure shows on the left y-axis the average cash holdings per cognitive type. In order to
compare market dynamics the average market price (grey line) and the average bubble component
(, i.e. market price less expected value of the asset) (grey dotted line) are added on the right y-axis.
As one can see, the difference between the sophisticated types and the rest, comes from selling the
asset before the price starts do decline steeply.
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B.11.2 Type distribution and market outcome
Figure B.22 reports the number of cognitive types in each market. The baseline markets
1-16 were all similar and the treatment markets, differed, with the markets 1-6 are the
low-markets and 7-12 are the high ones. While the baseline treatment show a fairly even
distribution of types, the segregation treatments show the intended unbalanced distribu-
tion of types. This approves ex-post the chosen segregation procedure.
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Figure B.22: Distribution of cognitive types across the markets
These figures show the type distribution in each of the 42 markets of the experiment. The baseline
markets show a fairly even distribution of types, the additional markets, where the markets 1-6 are
the low-markets and 7-12 are the high ones. Thus the separation worked.
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C.1 Correlation among measures
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